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ABSTRACT 
The overall purpose of this study is to establish 
* 
* 
whether auditors in South Africa also fail to issue the appropriate audit 
opinion on the going concern assumption underlying financial statements 
the reasons for auditors' failure to issue the appropriate audit opinion on 
the going concern assumption 
The hypotheses of this study are tested by 
* 
* 
examining professional auditing standards and secondary data on the 
going concern assumption 
conducting an empirical study of listed industrial compames whose 
listings were terminated because of financial failure 
This study 
* 
* 
provides evidence that auditors in South Africa fail to Issue the 
appropriate audit opinion on the going concern assumption 
advances specific reasons for this failure 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 IMPORTANCE OF THE GOING CONCERN ASSUMPTION 
The gomg concern assumption 1s a fundamental accounting concept 
underlying the preparation of financial statements in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles. AC 000, Framework for the 
preparation and presentation of financial statements (SAICA 1990a), 
contains the following definition of the going concern accounting concept: 
The financial statements are normally prepared on the assumption that 
an enterprise is a going concern and will continue in operation for the 
foreseeable future. Hence, it is assumed that the enterprise has neither 
the intention nor the need to liquidate or curtail materially the scale of 
its operations; if such an intention or need exists, the financial 
statements may have to be prepared on a different basis and, if so, the 
basis used is disclosed. 
It is management's responsibility to prepare the financial statements on 
bases appropriate to the entity. AC 101, Presentation of financial 
statements (SAICA 1999), places an active responsibility on management to 
assess if the going concern assumption is appropriate for the foreseeable 
future. It defines the foreseeable future as a period of at least, but not 
limited to, 12 months from the balance sheet date. The only time when 
2 
management can assume the going concern basis of accounting without a 
detailed analysis, is when the entity has a history of profitable operations 
and ready access to financial resources. The code of corporate practices and 
conduct (King Committee 1994) requires directors to make a formal 
statement in the annual report, to the effect that they have no reason to 
believe that the entity will not be a going concern in the year ahead or to 
provide an explanation of any reasons to the contrary. However, compliance 
with The code of corporate practices and conduct is voluntary except for 
companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
The auditor's responsibility, in terms of section 301 of the Companies Act 
(South Africa 1973) and SAAS 120, Framework for South African standards 
on auditing and related services (SAICA 1996), is to examine the financial 
statements and to form an opinion as to whether they present the financial 
position and the results of operations of an entity fairly for a given period. 
This includes the appropriateness of the accounting bases adopted in the 
preparation of the financial statements. The auditor thus has a responsibility 
to evaluate and report whether the entity will be able to continue as a going 
concern in the foreseeable future. 
Mautz and Sharaf (1961: 3 7) included the going concern concept as an 
auditing postulate, which, according to them, occupies the 'cornerstone 
position in any edifice of theory'. They explained that it is necessary to 
include the going concern concept as an auditing postulate because together 
with other postulates, it provides a basis for a logical integrated theory of 
auditing. With regard to the going concern concept, Mautz and Sharaf 
(1961:42) postulated that 'in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, 
what has held in the past for the enterprise under examination will hold true 
in the future'. Without the going concern postulate the auditor has no basis 
3 
to accept or verify the assertions made by management m the financial 
statements with regard to the 
* 
* 
* 
* 
measurement, recording, valuation and reporting of its assets and 
liabilities 
allocation of costs 
matching of expenses and revenues 
use of assets and other resources 
The more doubt there is about the validity of the going concern assumption, 
the more doubt there is about the appropriateness of the recorded values in 
the financial statements. As a consequence, the going concern assumption 
has a significant effect on the auditor, who is called upon to verify the 
fairness of the financial statements. 
Mautz and Sharaf ( 1961 :49) also believed that the gomg concern postulate 
'places important limits on the extent of an auditor's responsibilities and 
provides a basis for deducing the extent of his obligation to forecast the 
future and to have his work judged on the basis of hindsight'. It provides 
the auditor with a guideline for conducting his or her audit verification work 
and serves as a protection against changes in the business and economy, 
which are unforeseeable at the time of conducting the audit. Unfortunately, 
at the time of the audit of the financial statements, the auditor does not know 
whether there is a going concern problem of sufficient gravity to undermine 
the accounting measurements and classifications used in the preparation of 
the financial statements. To arrive at such a conclusion, the auditor must 
exercise professional judgment, which is not always a simple task but is 
based on complex considerations, as will be evident from this study (see chs 
4 & 5). 
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Judgments about the validity of the going concern assumption are linked by 
the public and financial statement users to judgments about the possibility of 
business failure. The rate of business failure is an important economic 
indicator and is the focus of much public attention. In the first quarter of 
1999, compulsory liquidations of companies in South Africa increased by 
53,6 percent while voluntary liquidations of companies increased by 87,1 
percent compared to the same quarter in 1998 (Dommisse 1999:2). The vast 
majority of bankruptcies involve small firms but the failure rate amongst 
larger firms is increasing. A South African newspaper (Business Day 1991) 
published the following statistics: 
In 1970, only 180 companies went into liquidation. By 1985, this had 
increased to 3 100. This represents an increase of 1 700% over a 15-
year period. Another alarming trend has been the number of JSE listed 
companies which have recently been either liquidated or "rescued" ... 
There have been more quoted insolvencies in the past two years than in 
the previous two decades. 
While business failure is evidenced by a declaration of bankruptcy followed 
by liquidation of an entity's assets, many failures involve reorganisation, 
merger or acquisition of one entity by another and can be classified under 
'rescued'. 
Without pnor warmng about the possibility of financial failure, the 
decisions of shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders are affected and 
can incur substantial losses. This is because the asset values recorded in the 
financial statements are not realised and new or previously undisclosed 
liabilities come to light. Management may also not be aware of the 
seriousness of the situation, as when a warning is sounded about the 
possibility of financial failure. 
5 
The focus is therefore on the auditor's responsibility 
* 
* 
to evaluate the risk whether the gomg concern assumption underlying 
the preparation of financial statements is appropriate for the foreseeable 
future 
to bring warmng stgns of possibly financial failure to the attention of 
management and shareholders early enough, so that potential losses can 
be reduced or avoided 
Conner (1986:77) emphasised this by stating the following: 
Public demands for an early warning when a business stands on the 
brink of failure have never been expressed so forcefully. When 
businesses fail a short time after an unqualified audit report is issued, 
what infuriates the public most is that there was not adequate warning 
of the failure. The public quickly characterizes such business failure as 
audit failures. 
However, auditors have maintained that an unqualified audit opinion issued 
on the financial statements is not a guarantee that the company has the 
ability to continue as a going concern and a going concern qualification is 
not a prediction of business failure (Altman 1982:8; Menon & Schwartz 
1986:52). 
6 
1.2 PRELIMINARY IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF 
THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE AUDITOR'S 
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT ABOUT THE VALIDITY OF THE 
GOING CONCERN ASSUMPTION 
The most important problem confronting the auditor in exercising his or her 
professional judgment about the validity of the going concern assumption 
underlying the preparation of financial statements, is whether to 
* 
* 
issue an unqualified audit opinion that the financial statements present, 
in all material aspects, the entity's financial position, the results of its 
operations and cash flows fairly 
express a qualified/adverse audit opm10n that there 1s substantial 
uncertainty about the going concern assumption 
In exercising his or her professional judgment about the validity of the going 
concern assumption, the auditor can make one of two mistakes: 
( 1) Misclassify a nongoing concern as a going concern, which is known as a 
Type I error 
(2) Misclassify a going concern as a nongoing concern, which is known as a 
Type II error 
There are certain consequences (costs) if a Type I error or a Type II error 
occurs (see table 1-1). Some of these consequences (costs) can be seen as 
underlying problems influencing the auditor's decision to issue an 
unqualified or qualified audit opinion. 
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TABLE 1-1 
CONSEQUENCES (COSTS) IF A NONGOING CONCERN IS MISCLASSIFIED AS 
A GOING CONCERN OR VICE VERSA 
Consequences (costs) of Consequences (costs) of 
Type I errors Type II errors 
Negative publicity for the profession and Negative impact on the audit firm's 
the audit firm reputation 
Integrity and independence of the auditor Deteriorating relations with the client 
are challenged 
Lawsuits against the auditor by the client's Potential loss of the client 
creditors and investors 
Scarce economic resources are Lawsuit against the auditor by the client 
misallocated 
Decisions of entrepreneurs, creditors, Cause client to have gomg concern 
investors and others are affected problems 
Management may not be as aware of the 
seriousness of the situation as when a 
qualification has been given 
Sources: Altman (1982); Bourne (1986); Kida (1980) 
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A number of empirical research studies performed in the United Kingdom 
and the United States of America have examined the occurrence of a Type I 
error. The results indicated that less than 50 percent of bankrupt companies 
received a going concern qualification from their auditors for the last 
financial statements issued prior to the bankruptcy (Altman & McGough 
1974; Barnes & Hooi 1987; Citron & Taffler 1992; Peel 1989). 
The low accuracy rate of the auditors is even more significant when taking 
into account that the above-mentioned researchers investigated only those 
firms declaring bankruptcy, at which stage financial and operating problems 
are usually at their peak. Business failure, however, develops over time and 
does not occur without warning (Argenti 1983; Boritz 1991). Long before 
the actual cessation of operations, an entity will show warning signs of 
financial distress or impending failure. The auditor should use his or her 
professional judgment to evaluate the impact of these warning signs on the 
validity of the going concern assumption. 
The auditors of the bankrupt compames m the above-mentioned research 
studies also failed to comply with the requirements of the professional 
auditing standards. The standards require the auditor to gather sufficient 
appropriate evidence to confirm or dispel the doubt about the going concern 
assumption for the foreseeable future. The foreseeable future represents a 
period of one year after the balance sheet date (AI CPA 1988b) or six months 
after the date of the audit report; whichever is the later (SAICA 1986). 
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The results of empirical research studies examining the occurrence of a Type 
II error indicated that more than 70 percent of companies qualified on a 
going concern basis actually survived (Altman 1982; Barnes & Hooi 1987; 
Citron & Taffler 1992). To find the rationale for this is difficult. Peel 
( 1989) hypothesises that these companies either received an incorrect 
qualification or are correctly qualified on the basis of the information 
available to the auditor at that time, but subsequently recover and/or are kept 
afloat for a longer period by factors outside the auditor's scope of vision. 
From the above-mentioned statistics it would appear that auditors are not 
very successful in their professional judgment about the entity's ability to 
continue as a going concern for the foreseeable future. This has raised 
considerable scepticism about the auditor's ability to make a professional 
going concern judgment. It has been argued that the auditor does not have 
the ability to make a going concern judgment because of his or her limited 
experience in this area because clients fail only in isolated and infrequent 
instances (Bourne 1986; Taffler & Tseung 1984). However, the studies of 
Campisi and Trotman (1985) and Kida (1980) provided empirical evidence 
that the auditor is sufficiently competent to make a going concern judgment, 
but that he or she does not issue a going concern qualification because of 
extraneous factors that influence his or her decision. 
The two most common extraneous factors put forward in the literature for 
the auditor not qualifying when there IS uncertainty about the 
appropriateness of the going concern assumption are the auditor's fear that: 
(1) the qualification will contribute to the client's problems and the 
downfall of the company; fear of the self-fulfilling prophecy (Citron & 
Taffler 1992; Kida 1980; Mutchler 1984; Williams 1984) 
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(2) the qualification will lead to a deterioration in relations with the client 
and the eventual loss of a client; fear of auditor switching (Altman 
1982; Citron & Taffler 1992; Mutchler 1984; Schwartz & Menon 1985) 
The preliminary identification and analysis of the above-mentioned problems 
associated with the auditor's professional judgment about the validity of the 
going concern assumption raise questions about the underlying causes of the 
auditor's failure to issue the appropriate audit opinion. The following 
hypotheses are formulated in a search for the underlying causes: 
(1) The professional auditing standards do not provide sufficient guidance 
to the auditor to make a going con~ern judgment. 
(2) Auditors do not qualify when there is uncertainty about the validity of 
the going concern assumption because of the possible consequences of 
the qualification. 
(3) Auditors do not have the ability to make a professional judgment about 
the continued existence of an entity as a going concern. 
1.3 THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The preliminary analysis of the literature in the previous section identified 
that auditors in the United Kingdom and the United States of America fail to 
issue the appropriate audit opinion in the audit report on the going concern 
assumption underlying the preparation of financial statements. The overall 
purpose of this study is to establish 
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( 1) whether auditors in South Africa also fail to issue the appropriate audit 
opinion on the going concern assumption underlying the preparation of 
financial statements 
(2) the reasons for auditors' failure to issue the appropriate audit opmton 
on the going concern assumption underlying the preparation of financial 
statements 
1.4 THE OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW OF THE 
STUDY 
The research objectives, in relation to the overall purpose and the 
hypotheses formulated in section 1.2, are as follows: 
1.4.1 Research objective 1 
Determine whether the professional auditing standards provide sufficient 
guidance to the auditor in the evaluation and reporting of the going concern 
assumption. 
Research method 
(1) Examine the professional auditing standards issued on the gomg 
concern by the International Federation of Accountants, United States 
of America, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. Compare them 
with the South African auditing standard with a view to critically 
analysing the South African standard. 
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(2) Examine secondary data from empirical research studies to determine 
whether the information and guidance supplied by the auditing 
standards are followed by auditors in public practice to evaluate 
whether an entity will be able to continue as a going concern in the 
foreseeable future. 
1.4.2 Research objective 2 
Determine whether auditors in South Africa qualify the audit reports for 
uncertainty about the going concern assumption and whether the issuance of 
Statement on Auditing Standards AU 294, Going concern (SAICA 1986) had 
any effect on the auditors' qualifying behaviour. 
Research method 
(1) Conduct an empirical study of industrial companies whose listings were 
terminated on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange owing to financial 
failure. 
(2) Select companies failing between 1981 and 1991, thus representing a 
five-year period before and a five-year period after the issuance of AU 
294. 
(3) Examine the audit optmon issued in the audit report for the last 
available audited financial statements before failure. 
( 4) Determine the foreseeable future period for the post-AU 294 group of 
companies to establish whether the auditors took this period into 
consideration. 
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1.4.3 Research objective 3 
Determine whether the gomg concern qualification issued by auditors 
contributes to their clients' problems and the ultimate downfall of the 
company, resulting in a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Research method 
( 1) Examine secondary data from behavioural research studies to determine 
auditors' perceptions about a going concern qualification becoming a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. 
(2) Examine secondary data from research studies reporting on the 
subsequent status of companies that have received a going concern 
qualification to determine if the companies did subsequently failed. 
1.4.4 Research objective 4 
Determine whether the going concern qualification issued by the auditor is 
associated with the loss of the client, resulting in auditor switching. 
Research method 
Examine secondary data from empirical research studies to determine 
whether companies with going concern qualifications switched auditors. 
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1.4.5 Research objective 5 
Determine whether the auditor does have the ability to make a professional 
going concern judgment. 
Research method 
( 1) Examine secondary data from empirical research studies that employed 
statistical models to determine whether the auditor does have the ability 
to make a going concern judgment. 
(2) Examine secondary data from behavioural studies employing ANOV A 
and PROTOCOL analysis to determine whether the auditor does have 
the ability to make a going concern judgment. 
(3) Examine secondary data from empirical research studies that employed 
expert systems to determine whether the auditor does have the ability to 
make a going concern judgment. 
1.5 OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH PROGRAMME 
The remainder of the dissertation IS organised as follows to address the 
identified research objectives: 
( 1) Chapter 2 reviews relevant literature and existing accounting and 
auditing standards associated with the going concern concept in the 
context of the accounting field. The purpose of this review is to 
provide a synopsis of the evolution of the going concern in accounting, 
a detailed definition and the disclosure requirements in the financial 
statements of the going concern concept. Chapter 2 also examines the 
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relationship between the gomg concern concept, financial distress and 
business failure. 
(2) Chapter 3 compares vanous countries' professional auditing standards 
in order to establish the auditor's responsibility to evaluate whether an 
entity will be able to continue in the foreseeable future as a going 
concern and to establish the auditor's reporting responsibility if a going 
concern problem does exist. The chapter will establish whether the 
professional auditing standards provide sufficient guidance to the 
auditor to fulfil his or her responsibilities. The chapter also 
summarises the evolution of the going concern concept in auditing. 
(3) Chapter 4 reviews and evaluates secondary data from empirical studies 
that have been conducted on the auditor's professional judgment 
process m evaluating and reporting whether an entity will be able to 
continue in the foreseeable future as a going concern. The chapter will 
establish whether the auditor does issue the appropriate going concern 
opinion in the audit report, and if not, the reasons for this. The chapter 
also presents an empirical survey of the professional audit opinion 
issued by South African auditors in their audit report of companies 
experiencing going concern problems. 
( 4) Chapter 5 will establish whether the auditor does have the ability to 
make a professional judgment on the continued existence of an entity as 
a going concern by examining the results of empirical research studies 
that have employed either statistical models, behavioural analysis or 
expert systems as a research methodology. 
(5) Chapter 6 summarises the results and conclusions of this research and 
suggests future extensions thereof. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE GOING CONCERN ASSUMPTION IN THE 
CONTEXT OF ACCOUNTING 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Statement of Generally Accepted Accounting Practice AC 000, Framework 
for the preparation and presentation of financial statements (SAICA 
1990a) classifies the going concern as a basic assumption underlying the 
periodic financial statements of an entity. Faul et al ( 1985 :26) classify the 
going concern concept as an accounting principle, which is defined as 
generally accepted rules developed on the basis of postulated 
circumstances and which serve as guidelines for accounting practice. They 
base the going concern concept on the accounting postulate that the entity 
will continue to operate indefinitely. 1 
The going concern assumption is thus one of the fundamental accounting 
concepts underlying the preparation of financial statements in accordance 
with general accepted accounting principles. It establishes the basis for 
the valuations and allocations used in accounting for example, depreciation 
and amortisation procedures are based on the principle that the entity will 
A corresponding postulate also exists in auditing (see sec 3.1). 
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continue to operate for the foreseeable future. 
Because the gomg concern assumption is a fundamental accounting 
concept, it is necessary first to address the accounting implications of the 
concept before the auditing implications can be discussed. The objective 
of this chapter is to peruse existing accounting and auditing standards and 
guidelines in order to: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
provide a synopsis of the evolution of the gomg concern assumption 
in the accounting field 
define the going concern assumption 
assess the nature and extent of disclosure requirements in the 
financial statements when the going concern basis for the preparation 
of the financial statements becomes questionable or invalid 
clarify the relationship between the going concern assumption, 
financial distress and business failure 
discuss the process leading to financial distress and business failure 
identify warning signs of the imminent failure of the entity during this 
process 
2.2 EVOLUTION OF THE GOING CONCERN ASSUMPTION IN 
ACCOUNTING 
One of the earliest comprehensive discussions of the gomg concern 
assumption appeared in Lawrence R Dicksee's book, Auditing, which was 
first published in London in 1892. His statement on the concept is simple: 
'It being the primary object of most ordinary undertakings to continue to 
carry on operations, it is fair that the assets enumerated in a Balance Sheet 
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be valued with that end in view' (Storey 1959:233). 
The American Accounting Association defined the gomg concern 
assumption in 1957 in their Accounting and reporting standards for 
corporate financial statements and preceding statements and supplements 
as: 'In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the entity is viewed as 
remaining in operation indefinitely' (Carmichael 1972:90). 
Although the going concern IS listed as a postulate or concept in 
practically all accounting literature and accounting textbooks (Grady 
1965:27; Moonitz 1961:3 8-39), critical articles devoted to the going 
concern assumption are scarce. Sterling (1968:481) wrote: 
. . . the going concern is one of the most important concepts in 
accounting. Such status would lead one to believe that the concept 
would be well defined, its necessity as an axiom thoroughly 
discussed, and its connection to historical cost demonstrated. 
Anyone with such expectations is due for disappointment. 
Sterling perused an Accounting Review cumulative index m 1968 and 
noted only one article devoted to the going concern assumption. It was 
written by Reed K Storey. Storey (1959:237) concluded that the going 
concern concept: '... merely rules out liquidation and requires asset 
valuation according to intended use'. 
Grady (1965 :27-28) included the gomg concern assumption as a basic 
postulate in his Accounting Research Study No 7 and his explanation of it 
proceeds from the American Accounting Association's explanation: 
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... a large part of accounting practice as well as theory is based on 
the presumption that the accounting entity will continue in operation 
and not be liquidated in the foreseeable future. In the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, the entity should be viewed as remaining in 
operation indefinitely. . .. Indefinitely continuance means that the 
business will not be liquidated within a span of time necessary to 
carry out present contractual commitments or to use up assets 
according to the plans and expectations presently held. 
Moonitz (1961) and Grady (1965) list some specific balance sheet accounts 
for which proper interpretation requires a going concern assumption, 
namely: 
(1) Accounts receivable. Anticipated future cash receipts are recognised, 
ignoring the liquidation value of the receivable in the market and any 
possible legal defect in the transaction. 
(2) Inventories. It is assumed that production will be completed on all 
unfinished goods, and that they will subsequently be sold at a price 
high enough to recoup costs. Without this assumption, work in 
process would be valued very low. 
(3) Buildings and equipment. Changes m immediate market pnces are 
ignored, because the assets will be used, not sold. Thus the entity is 
presumed to continue at least as long as the useful lives of the assets, 
permitting the recovery of undepreciated cost from future revenues. 
(4) Intangibles. These costs, often nonmarketable, may be allocated to 
future periods. 
(5) Liabilities. Estimates for future claims are established and 
corresponding expenses recorded, even though the legal system might 
not find an enforceable obligation. 
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The gomg concern assumption provides a reasonable basis for presenting 
the balance sheet accounts of an entity. When the termination of important 
activities of the entity can be predicted with assurance, the going concern 
assumption should be partially or completely abandoned. Forced-sale or 
liquidation values and liquidation commitments are then relevant in the 
preparation of financial statements (Carmichael 1972:91). 
Carmichael (1972:91) describes the going concern assumption's position in 
the accounting theory as follows: 
While accounting literature differs on the appropriate term to 
describe the going concern idea - postulate, concept, assumption, 
etc.- there is substantial agreement on the meaning of the term. In 
accordance with the going concern concept, an entity is presumed to 
continue in existence indefinitely, although not necessarily in 
perpetuity; however, contrary evidence may negate this assumption. 
But what constitutes contrary evidence referred to in the above-mentioned 
definitions? Carmichael (1972:94) distinguishes between contrary 
evidence which may imply that the entity has difficulty meeting its 
obligations (financial problems) and contrary evidence which may imply 
that the entity fails to operate successfully (operating problems): 
Financial problems 
Liquidity deficiency. The company's current liabilities exceed its 
current assets, resulting in difficulty meeting current obligations. 
Equity deficiency. The company's solvency is questionable because 
of a retained earnings deficit or, in more extreme cases, an excess of 
total liabilities over total assets. 
Debt default. The company has been unable to meet debt payment 
schedules or has violated one or more other covenants of its loan 
agreements. 
Shortage of funds. The company has either limited or no ability to 
obtain additional funds from various capital sources. 
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Operating problems 
Continued operating losses. No net profit has been earned for more 
than one past period. 
Prospective revenues are doubtful. Revenue is insufficient for day-
to-day operating needs, or there have been cut-backs in operations, 
such as personnel reductions. 
Ability to operate is jeopardised. Legal proceedings related to 
operations may severely curtail operations, or suppliers of operating 
materials may refuse to transact with the company. 
Poor control over operations. The company management have been 
unable to control operations, as evidenced by repetitive, uncorrected 
problems. 
Sterling (1968:501) did not agree with the explanation of the gomg 
concern concept as an assumption. He felt that one couldn't simply assume 
a going concern because of the uncertainty of what the future holds. In 
contrast to the going concern being classified as an assumption in the 
literature, he felt that 'prediction' was a more suitable term, or that the 
going concern concept must be 'purged' in so far as it applies to the future 
of the firm. According to him it is also easier to convince oneself of the 
continuity of an entity on the basis of evidence for continuity rather than 
on the basis of absence of evidence for liquidation. 
This was also Fremgen's (1968:650) viewpoint on the subject. Fremgen 
stated that the assumption is invalid for ' ... the thousands of new small 
businesses which are organised each year and destined to fail within the 
year'. He felt that the definition should be altered to read as follows: ' 
the entity is viewed as remaining in operation indefinitely in recognition of 
evidence to that effect'. His conclusion on the subject is that the 
accountant should not assume that a client is a going concern but should 
make investigations to ascertain whether or not this is in fact the case. 
22 
At this stage, both Sterling (1968) and Fremgen (1968) were advocating 
the active evaluation of solvency factors before assuming that the entity is 
a going concern. This is known as the 'active approach' as opposed to the 
'passive approach', which was initially absorbed into the accounting 
literature and professional guidelines (Carmichael 1972: 89). 
For many years there were no development in the accounting field to 
change the passive approach towards the going concern concept when 
preparing financial statements. However, in May 1991 the Cadbury 
Committee was set up in the United Kingdom by the Financial Reporting 
Council, the London Stock Exchange and the accounting profession to 
address the financial aspects of corporate governance. 2 
The Cadbury Committee was set up for the following reasons (BPP 
Publishing 1997): 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
because of a lack of confidence in financial reporting 
because of a lack of confidence in the ability of auditors to provide 
the assurances required by the users of financial statements 
because of a lack of confidence in the ability of directors to control 
their organisations 
the sudden and unexpected company collapses occurring at that time 
the resulting lack of accountability by the board of directors in many 
of these company collapses 
Corporate governance is the system or process by which companies are directed and 
controlled. Directors of the board are responsible for the governance of their companies 
whereas the shareholders are responsible for the appointment of the directors and auditors. 
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Similar developments on corporate governance have taken place in various 
countries. One of the main reference sources for the Cadbury Committee 
was the Treadway Report produced by the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organisations in the United States of America (Williams 1996). 
The Cad bury Committee ( 1992) issued their Report of the Committee on 
the financial aspects of corporate governance that incorporated a Code of 
best practice. From 1 July 1993, all companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange, if incorporated in the United Kingdom, were required to make a 
statement in their annual reports whether or not they had complied with the 
Code of best practice (Williams 1996:9). However, the directors of all 
companies are encouraged to use the Code of best practice for guidance. 
The Code of best practice (Cadbury Committee 1992) contains the 
following statement on the directors, responsibility towards the going 
concern concept: 'The directors should report that the business is a going 
concern, with supporting assumptions or qualifications as necessary.' 
In the Republic of South Africa, the Institute of Directors appointed the 
King Committee, which was similar in concept to the Cadbury Committee 
in the United Kingdom. The King Committee's terms of reference were, 
however, wider than those of the Cadbury Committee. The King 
Committee was to make recommendations on the financial aspects of 
corporate governance, to lay down guidelines for ethical business conduct 
and to address specific circumstances, such as the disadvantaged 
communities in South Africa (KPMG 1995:6). 
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On 29 November 1994, the King report on corporate governance, which 
incorporated a Code of corporate practices and conduct, was issued. The 
Code of corporate practices and conduct (King Committee 1994) applies to 
* 
* 
* 
* 
all companies listed on the mam board of the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange 
large public entities as defined in the Public Entities Act 
banks, financial and insurance entities as defined in the various 
Financial Services Acts 
large unlisted public companies (defined as compames with total 
shareholders' equity in excess of RSO million) 
In addition, all other companies are encouraged to adopt the Code. 
The Code of corporate practices and conduct (King Committee 1994) 
contains the following statement on the directors' responsibility to report 
on the going concern concept in their annual report: 'There is no reason to 
believe the business will not be a going concern in the year ahead or, an 
explanation of any reasons otherwise.' 
The effect of this evolution in the 1990's is that directors are now forced 
to move from a passive approach, assuming the company is a going 
concern, to an active one. The active approach means that the directors 
have to take all reasonable steps to obtain and document the information 
necessary to support their statement on whether or not they believe that the 
company will be a going concern in the year ahead. 
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2.3 DEFINITION OF THE GOING CONCERN ASSUMPTION 
A definition of the going concern assumption can be found in the 
accounting statements of a number of countries. However, not one of the 
countries has an accounting standard dealing specifically with the going 
concern concept as such. Guidelines on the going concern assumption 
were issued by the accounting professions of a number of countries as a 
result of the reports issued by the various committees on corporate 
governance (see sec 2.2). The guidelines aim to assist directors in 
discharging their responsibilities with regard to the appropriateness of the 
going concern assumption. However, compliance therewith is voluntary 
and aimed at only certain large entities and companies as previously 
mentioned, although other companies are encouraged to also comply with 
the principles (see sec 2.2). 
The definition can be found in the accounting statements of the following: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) International 
Accounting Standard (lAS) 1 revised, Presentation of financial 
statements (1997b) 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)-
Accounting Principles Board (APB) Statement No 4, Basic concepts 
and accounting principles underlying financial statements of business 
enterprises ( 1970) 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) -
Statement of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP) 2, Disclosure of 
accounting policies ( 1971) 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) CICA 
Handbook Section 1000.58, Financial statement concepts (1996) 
* 
* 
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Australian Accounting Research Foundation (AARF) - Australian 
Accounting Standard (AAS) 6, Accounting policies (1995) 
South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA) 
Statement of Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (AC) 101 
revised, Disclosure of accounting policies (1999) 
Key words used m the definitions such as normal course of business, 
evidence to the contrary, foreseeable future, curtailing materially or 
significantly the scale of operations are not elaborated on or clarified in 
the accounting statements. The auditing guidelines dealing with the going 
concern concept give a better understanding of these key words but are in 
some respects still vague as indicated in the summary of the definition. 
The auditing guidelines dealing with the going concern are as follows: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
International Standards on Auditing (ISA) 570, Going concern (IFAC 
1995) 
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No 59, The auditor's 
consideration of an entity's ability to continue as a going concern 
(AICPA 1988b) 
Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) 130, The going concern basis 
in financial statements (ICAEW 1994) 
Handbook Section 5510.51-.53, Going concern (CICA 1989) 
Auditing Standard (AUS) 708, Going concern, (AARF 1996) 
Statement on Auditing Standards (AU) 294, Going concern, (SAICA 
1986) 
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2.3.1 Definition of the International Federation of Accountants 
The Framework for the preparation and presentation of financial 
statements (IFAC [S.a.]) defines the going concern as follows in paragraph 
23: 
The financial statements are normally prepared on the assumption 
that an enterprise is a going concern and will continue in operation 
for the foreseeable future. Hence, it is assumed that the enterprise 
has neither the intention nor the need to liquidate or curtail 
materially the scale of its operations; if such an intention or need 
exists, the financial statements may have to be prepared on a 
different basis and, if so, the basis used is disclosed. 
lAS 1 (IF AC 1997b) does not define the going concern assumption but 
elaborates on management's responsibility for assessing the going concern 
assumption as follows: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Continuity must be assessed by management by considering a wide 
range of factors surrounding current and expected profitability, debt 
repayment schedules and potential sources of replacement financing. 
The only time that continuity can be assumed without a detailed 
analysis, is when an entity has a history of profitable operations and 
ready access to financial resources. 
Material uncertainties related to events or conditions that may cast 
significant doubt upon the entity's ability to continue as a going 
concern must be disclosed. 
If the financial statements are prepared on a different basis, not only 
must the basis used be disclosed, but also the reason why the entity is 
not considered to be a going concern. 
Foreseeable future represents a period of at least, but not limited to, 
twelve months from the balance sheet date. 
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2.3.2 Definition of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants 
APB Statement No 4 (AICPA 1970) recogmses the gomg concern 
assumption as a basic feature of financial accounting and defines it in 
paragraph 117 as follows: 
An accounting entity is viewed as continuing m operation in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary. 
SAS No 59 (AICP A 1988b) does not refer to the above-mentioned 
definition. It states the following: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Continuity is assumed in the absence of significant information to the 
contrary (par 1). 
The entity will be able to continue to meet its obligations as they 
become due without substantially disposing of assets outside the 
ordinary course of business, restructuring of debt, externally forced 
revisions of its operations, or similar actions (par 1). 
An entity in the process of liquidation, or where the owners have 
decided to commence dissolution or liquidation, or where legal 
proceedings, including bankruptcy, have reached a point at which 
dissolution or liquidation is probable IS specifically excluded 
(footnotes 1 & 2). 3 
A reasonable period of time is regarded as a period not exceeding one 
year beyond the date of the financial statements (par 2). 
Examples of contrary evidence are given and categorised into negative 
trends, other indications of possible financial difficulties, internal 
matters and external matters that have occurred (par 6). 
This means that the point in time for an entity no longer to be considered as a going concern is 
earlier than under the guidelines ofiF AC, ICAEW, CICA and SAICA. 
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2.3.3 Definition of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England 
and Wales 
SSAP No 2 (ICAEW 1971) identifies four fundamental accounting concepts 
as the broad basic assumptions underlying the periodic financial statements 
of business enterprises. The going concern assumption is one of the four 
concepts and is defined in paragraph 14 of the standard as: 
. . . the enterprise will continue in operational existence for the 
foreseeable future. This means in particular that the profit and loss 
account and balance sheet assume no intention or necessity to 
liquidate or curtail significantly the scale of operation. 
SAS 130 (ICAEW 1994) refers to the definition in SSAP No 2 and 
elaborates on it as follows: 
* 
* 
It recognises the going concern basis to be an accounting concept and 
that the assets and liabilities are recognised and measured on the basis 
that the entity will be able to realise its assets and discharge its 
liabilities in the normal course of business (par 5). 
It does not specify a minimum length of period for the foreseeable 
future because of certain factors influencing the length of period. The 
factors are the entity's reporting and budgeting systems and the nature 
of the entity (its size and complexity) and also because in reality there 
is no 'cut-offpoint' (par 13). 
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2.3.4 Definition of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 
CICA Handbook Section 1000.58 (CICA 1996) states the following: 
Financial statements are prepared on the assumption that the entity is 
a going concern, meaning it will continue in operation for the 
foreseeable future and will be able to realize assets and discharge 
liabilities in the normal course of operations. Different bases of 
measurement may be appropriate when the entity is not expected to 
continue in operation for the foreseeable future. 
Section 5 510 (CICA 1989) provides little elaboration on this definition. 
Paragraph 52 lists a few examples of contrary evidence that may cast doubt 
on an entity's continuance as a going concern. 
2.3.5 Definition of the Australian Accounting Research Foundation 
AAS 6 (AARF 1995) describes the gomg concern basis as meanmg the 
following: 
... the accounting basis whereby in the preparation of the financial 
report the reporting entity is viewed as a going concern: that is, the 
entity is expected to 
(a) be able to pay its debts as and when they fall due; and 
(b) continue in operation without any intention or necessity to 
liquidate or otherwise wind up its operations. 
AUS 708, paragraphs 3 and 6 (AARF 1996) refers to the definition in AAS 
6 and further states the following: 
* 
* 
It does not apply to financial statements prepared on a liquidation 
basis (par 1). 
The entity will be able to realise its assets and extinguish its 
liabilities in the normal course of business (par 7). 
* 
* 
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Management must take all relevant information into account when 
deciding whether to use the going concern basis in the preparation of 
the financial report (par 9). 
This requires management to consider a future period but does not 
specify a standard length for this period because of certain factors 
influencing the length of period. The factors are the entity's reporting 
and budgeting systems and the nature of the entity (its size and 
complexity) and also because in reality there is no 'cut-off point' 
(par 9). 
2.3.6 Definition of the South African Institute of Chartered 
Accountants 
AC 000, Framework for the preparation and presentation of financial 
statements (SAICA 1990a), defines the going concern assumption in 
paragraph 23 and AC 101 (SAICA 1999) elaborates on management's 
responsibility for assessing the going concern assumption in paragraphs 24 
and 25. The definition and management's responsibility as set out in these 
documents are, in all respects, exactly the same as the definition and 
responsibilities supplied by IFAC (see sec 2.3 .1). 
2.3. 7 Summary of the definitional issues 
The decision whether an entity complies with the gomg concern 
assumption is subjective and dependent on management's or the individual 
auditor's judgement. Some of the accounting standards assume continuity 
in the absence of information to the contrary and describe what a going 
concern is not rather than what it is. If the entity has the intention of 
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liquidation, it is not a going concern, or if the entity is not able to realise 
its assets and discharge its liabilities in the normal course of business, it is 
not a going concern. 
Some of the accounting standards, namely lAS 1 (IFAC 1997b), SSAP 2 
(ICAEW 1971), AAS 6 (AARF 1995) and AC 101 (SAICA 1999) use 
liquidation or material curtailment as the criteria for an entity to be a 
nongoing concern. Auditing statements, SAS No 59 (AI CPA 1988b) and 
AUS 708 (AARF 1996), differ in this respect that they specifically exclude 
liquidation and thus require the auditor to determine, prior to the entity 
going into liquidation, whether it is a going concern or not. Ng (1990:7) 
explains this as follows: 
The use of the material curtailment and inability to realise 
assets/discharge [sic] in the normal course of business criteria place 
the other guidelines in the same position as SAS 59 in that material 
curtailment of operations and inability to realise assets/discharge 
liabilities may occur at a point in time before the liquidation date. 
However, the contemporaneous use of liquidation as an alternative 
criterion means that auditors may not need to evaluate an entity to 
ensure its ability to continue in business until the ultimate and 
definite occurrence of liquidation. 
This means that at a point in time before liquidation the entity may be a 
nongoing concern and should be evaluated as such by the auditor in terms 
of SAS No 59 (AICPA 1988b) and AUS 708 (AARF 1996). 
Terms such as 'materially', 'significantly' and 'substantially' are not 
defined in the accounting or auditing standards associated with the going 
concern assumption. It is left to the discretion of the auditor to decide 
when an entity has materially or significantly curtailed its operations, or 
when an entity has substantially disposed of its assets outside the ordinary 
course of business, restructured its debt, or had externally forced revisions 
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of its operations. 
N g (1990:7) considers the issue of material/significant curtailment of 
operations in the ordinary/normal course of business as being vague: 
* 
* 
* 
The base from which to measure the material/significant curtailment 
is not specified and therefore the auditor can measure it in terms of 
any accounting or nonaccounting criteria, such as sales, assets, 
employee costs or number of employees. 
The auditor has to judge if the material/significant curtailment results 
in more effective/efficient production or in the entity's continued 
existence being questioned. 
With the trend towards diversification of businesses, ordinary or 
normal is less clear-cut. 
Most of the definitions refer to the entity to continue in operation for the 
foreseeable future or place a responsibility on the management to assess 
the continuity of the entity for the foreseeable future. SAS 130 (ICAEW 
1994) does not specify a minimum length of time for the foreseeable future 
since in reality there is no cut-off point as per the statement and it depends 
on certain factors which will be different for every entity. For the same 
reasons does AUS 708 (AARF 1996) not supply a standard length of time 
for the foreseeable future. It does, however, draw a distinction between 
circumstances that may face an entity during a relevant period and events 
that may occur after that time. A relevant period is defined as a period of 
approximately 12 months from the date of the auditor's current report to 
the expected date of the next auditor's report. lAS 1 (IFAC 1997b) and AC 
101 (SAICA 1999) regard the foreseeable future as representing a period of 
at least, but not limited to, 12 months from the balance sheet date. 
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SAS No 59 (AI CPA 1988b ), however, limit the foreseeable future to a 
period not exceeding one year beyond the date of the financial statements. 
This correlates with the conclusion that Ng (1990:6) came to, namely, that 
the inclusion of a time frame eases the auditor's job and reduces the audit 
risk. It ensures that auditors deal only with existing conditions and that 
the audit is not a prediction of the entity's ability to continue as a going 
concern in the future. SAS No 59 (AI CPA 1988b) specifically mentions 
the following in paragraph 04: 
The auditor is not responsible for predicting future conditions or 
events ... Accordingly, the absence of reference to substantial doubt 
in an auditor's report should not be viewed as providing assurance as 
to an entity's ability to continue as a going concern. 
Compared to the other countries' statements on the definition of the going 
concern assumption, AC 101 (SAICA 1999) appears to be similar. 
Liquidation is used as the criterion for an entity to be a nongoing concern, 
while it may in fact become a nongoing concern some time before 
liquidation. AC 101 (SAICA 1999) is also vague about the meanings of 
significantly curtailing the scale of its operations. 
The disclosure of the going concern assumption in the financial statements, 
as defined in the above-mentioned statements, is discussed in the next 
section. 
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2.4 DISCLOSURE OF THE GOING CONCERN ASSUMPTION IN 
THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
Accounting standards do not address financial statement disclosures about 
going concern problems in detail. As mentioned in the previous section, 
not one of the countries has an accounting standard dealing specifically 
with the going concern concept (see sec 2.3). In his assessment of existing 
accounting standards governing going concern uncertainties, Boritz 
(1991 :61) concluded that because of the absence of guidance in these 
standards: 
* there is a great deal of variability in the disclosures provided; 
* the disclosures are incomplete and difficult to understand; and 
* worst of all, the frequency and timeliness of "going concern" 
disclosures are inadequate. Typically, there are no indications at 
all of the existence of any doubts about the "going concern" 
assumption in circumstances that, in hindsight, most required such 
warnings. 
The auditing standards require the auditor to consider the adequacy of 
financial statement disclosures about going concern problems. As such 
these standards provide guidance on what financial statement disclosures 
should be made. The accounting treatment and disclosures related to the 
going concern assumption will depend on whether the going concern 
assumption is valid, questionable or invalid. 
2.4.1 If the going concern assumption is valid 
The effect of all the definitions on the going concern is that, if the going 
concern assumption has been followed in preparing the financial statements 
and is valid, disclosure of this fact is not required because it is presumed. 
According to lAS 1 (IF AC 1997b) and AC 101 (SAICA 1999) management 
36 
must follow an active approach in assessing whether the entity is a gomg 
concern. The only time that management can follow a passive approach 
assummg continuity, is when an entity has a history of profitable 
operations and ready access to financial resources. 
Owing to the evolution of corporate governance, the directors of affected 
companies are now required to make a statement that they are of the 
opinion that the going concern assumption is appropriate. The statement 
could be part of either the director's report, the statement on corporate 
governance, or the statement of the directors approving the annual 
financial statements. The guide issued on corporate governance, Guidance 
for directors: going concern and financial reporting (SAICA 1997b), 
supplies the following examples of the statement that the directors should 
make in the financial statements in paragraph 25: 
"After making all necessary enquiries the directors have no reason to 
believe that the company will not be a going concern in the period to 
the date of the next financial statements. For this reason they 
continue to adopt the going concern basis in preparing the annual 
financial statements." 
OR 
"After making all necessary enqmnes the directors believe that the 
company will be a going concern in the foreseeable future. For this 
reason they continue to adopt the going concern basis in preparing 
the financial statements." 
If an uncertainty exists but the auditor concludes that the gomg concern 
assumption is valid as a result of management's plans to deal with the 
adverse effects of the uncertainty, there are certain disclosures that must be 
made in the financial statements according to the auditing statements. 
These disclosures include matters such as the following: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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principal conditions and events that caused the doubt (SAS 59; AUS 
708) 
possible effects of such conditions and events (SAS 59) 
management's evaluation of the significance of those conditions and 
events (AUS 708) 
mitigating factors (ISA 570; SAS 59; AUS 708) 
management's plans (ISA 570; SAS 59; AUS 708) 
2.4.2 If the going concern assumption is questionable 
If the going concern assumption becomes substantially or significantly 
uncertain but not invalid, then it may be used as a basis for preparing the 
financial statements. However, the uncertainty should be disclosed then in 
the financial statements according to the auditing standards and the 
accounting standards, lAS 1 (IFAC 1997b) and AC 101 (SAICA 1999). The 
auditing guidelines require the following disclosures: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
principal conditions and events that caused the doubt (SAS 59; ISA 
570; SAS 130; AUS 708; AU 294) 
possible effects of such conditions and events (SAS 59; AU294) 
management's evaluation of the significance of those conditions and 
events and any mitigating factors (SAS 59; AU 294) 
assumptions adopted by the directors/management (SAS 130) 
possible discontinuance of operations/inability to realise its assets and 
discharge its liabilities in the normal course of business (SAS 59; ISA 
570) 
management's plans (SAS 59; SAS 130) 
* 
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information on or adjustments to the recoverability or classification of 
recorded asset amounts or the amounts or classification of liabilities 
(SAS 59; ISA 570; AUS 708) 
The statement of Canada does not define any disclosures that should be 
made, but states only that the auditor should consider the adequacy of 
disclosures in the event of an uncertainty. The requirements for disclosure 
under a going concern uncertainty of SAS No 59 (AICPA 1988b), are the 
most exhaustive compared to the other standards. 
The guide issued on corporate governance, Guidance for directors: going 
concern and financial reporting (SAICA 1997b:7), provides an example of 
uncertainty in cases where there was a breach of loan covenants, and 
related negotiations with the providers of finance have not been completed. 
The directors should therefore provide the following disclosure in the 
financial statements: 
"The company is in breach of certain loan covenants at its balance 
sheet date and, as such, the company's bankers could recall their 
loans at any time. The directors continue to be involved in 
negotiations with the company's bankers and, as yet, no demands for 
repayments have been received. The negotiations are at an early 
stage and, although the directors are optimistic about the outcome, it 
is as yet too early to make predictions with any certainty. 
In the light of the actions to raise additional capital described 
elsewhere in the annual report, the directors consider it appropriate 
to adopt the going concern basis in preparing the annual financial 
statements." 
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2.4.3 If the going concern assumption is invalid 
If the gomg concern assumption is invalid, conventional financial 
reporting and historical cost valuation should not be used; instead an 
appropriate disdosed basis of accounting should be used to prepare the 
financial statements. lAS 1 (IFAC 1997b) and AC 101 (SAICA 1999) 
require further that the reason why the entity is not considered to be a 
going concern should also be disclosed. 
The Accountants International Study Group (AISG 1975) compiled a report 
on Going Concern Problems in Canada, the United States and the United 
Kingdom. According to this report a different basis of valuing the assets 
and liabilities should be used when an enterprise is no longer a going 
concern. Each item should be reflected at break-up or liquidation value. 
The auditing statements reiterate this by stating that the amounts and 
classification of assets and liabilities in the financial statements may need 
to be adjusted if the going concern assumption is unjustified, and that the 
possibility of additional liabilities accruing should be considered [AUS 
708 (AARF 1996:7-8); ISA 570 (IFAC 1995:4)]. 
The significant differences between financial statements prepared on a 
going concern basis and those prepared on a liquidation basis can be seen 
in table 2-1, drawn from the report on Going Concern Problems (AISG 
1975:48). The break-up or liquidation values as indicated in table 2-1 are 
usually associated with voluntary or orderly liquidation, which implies an 
orderly cessation of operations and the sale of assets in a manner intended 
to maximise the value of the firm to the shareholders. This is in contrast 
to involuntary liquidation, which may involve the selling of the 
enterprise's assets at distressed prices to settle the claims of creditors 
(Nogler & Schwartz 1989). 
40 
TABLE2-1 
COMPARISON OF VALUATIONAL TERNATIVES 
GOING CONCERN BASIS LIQUIDATION BASIS 
Fixed assets such as At cost (or valuation, in the UK) less At estimated realisable values 
land, buildings, plant & accumulated depreciation to write on a "break-up" basis. 
machinery, motor down to estimated residual value 
vehicles, etc over the estimated useful life. The 
net book amounts do not purport to 
represent realisable values. 
Inventories At the lower of cost and "market" At estimated realisable value 
(as the term is used in the three on a "break-up" basis which 
nations) in the ordinary course of will almost always be much 
trade. less than in the ordinary course 
of trade. 
Accounts receivable At the amount of the debts less At the amount of debts less 
provision for doubtful accounts. any contingent or other claims 
which can be set-off and less 
provision for doubtful 
accounts. 
Deferred costs and Carried forward as assets to match Normally excluded as of no 
prepaid expenses against future revenues. value. 
Investments long-term At equity or cost, unless value At market value. 
permanently impaired. 
Investments short-term At lower of cost or market value At market value. 
(sometimes just at market value). 
Liabilities Order of ranking not disclosed Secured creditors and 
except that secured liabilities are preferential creditors ranked in 
shown as such. appropriate order against 
assets. 
No provision for additional Full provision for additional 
liabilities which would emerge if the legal liabilities on cessation, 
enterprise were to cease operations. which may include: unfunded 
vested portion of pension plan, 
severance or redundancy 
payments and claims for 
breach of contracts, eg leases. 
Source: AISG (1975:par 48). 
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2.4.4 Summary of the disclosure requirements 
According to the professional accounting and auditing standards, 
disclosure of the going concern assumption in the financial statements is 
not necessary when it is valid, because it is presumed. However, the 
guidelines issued on corporate governance require directors of affected 
compames to make a statement to the effect that the going concern 
assumption is valid. 
If the going concern assumption is valid as a result of management's plans 
or if it becomes questionable, certain disclosures must then be made in the 
financial statements. 
If the going concern assumption IS invalid, then the financial statements 
should be prepared on a liquidation basis. Some accounting standards 
require further that the reason why the entity is not considered to be a 
going concern should also be disclosed. 
However, the point in time at which it becomes necessary for an entity to 
give note disclosure about the risks and uncertainties of the going concern 
assumption being questionable or to abandon the historical cost basis of 
accounting in favour of realisable and liquidation values due to the going 
concern assumption being invalid, is not clear-cut. It should be judge by 
the preparers of the financial statements and the auditors. 
The auditing guidelines requue the auditor to consider the adequacy of 
financial statement disclosures about going concern problems and therefore 
provide details about what disclosures are required. The accounting 
standards, however, do not provide any guidance on proper presentation 
and disclosure of going concern problems. The link between accounting 
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standards and audit responsibility is thus not bridged. The accounting 
guidelines issued on corporate governance do provide guidance on the 
presentation and disclosure of the going concern assumption. 
The point m time at which the going concern assumption becomes 
questionable can be associated with financial distress and the point in time 
at which the going concern assumption becomes invalid can be associated 
with business failure which consists of typical stages. These are discussed 
in the next section. 
2.5 THE GOING CONCERN ASSUMPTION AND ITS RELATION TO 
FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND BUSINESS FAILURE 
2.5.1 Description of terms 
According to Boritz ( 1991:1 7), the gomg concern assumption becomes 
questionable if an entity is in financial distress and invalid sometime 
before liquidation, which is the final stage of business failure. Sometime 
before business failure, the entity will show signs of financial distress. 
According to Boritz (1991:23) financial distress can be defined as: 'A 
general state of being under financial pressure due to a mismatch of cash 
inflows and outflows, cash shortage brought on by customer payment 
defaults, poor cash flows from operations, and so on.' 
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Business failure has been defined in vanous studies (Beaver 1966:71; 
Boritz 1991:23; Bureau of Financial Analysis 1981:1 0) as the inability of 
an entity to pay its financial obligations as they mature. According to 
Boritz (1991 :22), events such as insolvency, receivership and 
bankruptcy are preferred as being more objective indicators of the failure 
of a business by providing de facto evidence that the "going concern" 
assumption is invalid.' 
Table 2-2 defines some of the terms associated with business failure. 
2.5.2 The stages of business failure 
Since business failure is a process which often takes years to unfold 
(Argenti 1983), it is difficult to determine the exact point in time when an 
entity ceases to maintain its going concern status. Robertson (1983 :25) 
analysed a group of failing companies and found that 60% of them showed 
substantial changes in financial health, some a full ten years before failure. 
Argenti (1983 :73) classifies the failure process typically to take five years 
to unfold. During this time, warning signs will indicate that the entity is 
approaching a state of severe financial distress or even business failure. 
This affords the management of the entity and the auditor the opportunity 
to observe and evaluate the warning indicators and assess their impact on 
the validity of the going concern assumption in the foreseeable future. 
4 
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TABLE 2-2 
TERMS ASSOCIATED WITH BUSINESS F AlLURE 
Bankruptcy: a legal recognition of the state of insolvency, brought on for the benefit of, 
or by, creditors with unsecured debts that were not paid according to agreed-upon terms. 
Voluntary bankruptcy involves an assignment of assets by the debtor for the benefit of 
the creditors. Involuntary bankruptcy is initiated by a petition by an unsecured creditor 
which, if effected, results in a receiving order made by the Court. 
Insolvency: the inability of a debtor to pay obligations as they mature or come due 
because of an inability to raise cash by whatever means possible. Insolvency may be a 
temporary condition, due to a mismatch between cash inflows and cash outflows, 
although it is often the immediate cause of formal bankruptcy proceedings. Insolvency 
in the context of bankruptcy is a condition when an entity's total debts exceed the 
liquidation value of its assets. 
Liquidation: may be voluntary or involuntary. Orderly liquidation involves the sale of 
an entity's assets in an unhurried manner, taking time, for example, to search out all 
potential buyers, waiting until market downturns reverse themselves, and so on. In some 
cases, however, liquidation may also involve the piecemeal sale of an entity's assets at a 
point in time without regard to the potential benefits of waiting until markets improve. 
Receivership: arrangement whereby a receiver is appointed to act on behalf of the 
creditors, usually with secured debt, and whose debts were not paid according to agreed-
upon terms or when there is a risk the creditors' position will deteriorate due to an 
entity's financial distress.4 
Source: Boritz (1991:23) 
In the Republic of South Africa, a company is placed under 'judicial management' if there is a 
possibility that its solvency can be rectified, otherwise it is placed under liquidation. In South 
Africa it is only in rare and isolated cases that a company is placed under 'judicial management'. 
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Boritz (1991: 17) divides the business failure process into typical stages 
namely the incubation stage, the severe cash shortage stage, the 
management attempt rescue actions stage, the rescue attempts fail stage, 
and finally the failure stage, which entails the bankruptcy and liquidation 
of the entity. These typical stages of business failure are illustrated in 
figure 2-1. 
2.5.2.1 The incubation stage 
The incubation stage represents poor management and adverse economic 
conditions which can result in the entity making costly errors and therefore 
putting itself in a position of financial distress (Boritz 1991: 17). 
Poor management has been cited as the initial cause for business failure 
(Andrews 1979; Argenti 1983; Norgard 1987). Argenti and Norgard define 
poor management as stemming from: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
an autocratic chief executive 
an inadequate management depth 
an unbalanced administrative team 
an uninvolved board 
a weak finance function, that is the lack of proper financial 
information such as budgetary control systems, cash flow planning 
and costing systems 
Argenti (1983) and Norgard (1987) also cite the following as a cause of 
business failure: adverse economic conditions and the entity's failure to 
observe them, to regard them as significant, or to respond to them by 
taking appropriate action. Adverse economic conditions represent changes 
in technology and markets and other competitive factors, such as loss of a 
FIGURE2-1 
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key franchise, larger companies moving in to the field and if the cost of a 
major new product substantially exceeds projections. 
With this background, the entity IS now poised to make a costly error or 
errors. According to Argenti (1983) there are three errors: 
(1) overtrading = an entity expands too quickly and borrow to meet its 
increased cash needs 
(2) high gearing = bank borrowing/other loans become too great a burden 
on its profits 
(3) the big project= an entity launches a project of such a magnitude that 
when it goes wrong, the company is financially crippled 
Poor management, adverse economic conditions and costly errors are all 
indicators that may cause doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a 
going concern. Norgard (1987:24) divides these indicators, which are 
identified in the literature as being effective early warning signs that an 
entity might be approaching a state of severe financial distress or even 
business failure, into two groups: 
Operational indicators 
* overtrading 
* margin erosion 
* the big project 
* high gearing 
* corporate inertia 
* changes to the business 
* problem borrowing 
* decline in service standards 
* 
* 
* 
undercapitalisation 
too much easy money 
history of continuing losses 
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Accounting indicators 
* 
* 
* 
* 
financial ratios 
lack of cash flow forecasting 
lack of financial information 
creative accounting 
Some of these indicators are direct causes of business failure while others 
are merely symptoms of the causes. Examples of causes of business failure 
are poor management, lack of cash flow forecasting and financial 
information, defective response to change, overtrading, and high gearing 
(Argenti 1983 :67). These causes are identified and discussed throughout 
the business failure process in the next section (see sec 2.6). 
Argenti (1983 :67) classifies deteriorating financial ratios, creative 
accounting and nonfinancial signs, such as declining service standards and 
a declining market share, as symptoms of business failure that do not 
provide insight into the causes of business failure. Because of the effect of 
creative accountingS, which has been identified as a warnmg signal of 
failure (Jones 1992:21; Norgard 1987:25), financial ratios are likely to 
become less reliable as failure approaches (Keasy & Watson 1987:336). 
However, Boritz (1991:25) points out that these indicators are still 
valuable: 
Creative accounting is a practice followed by the management of an entity in an attempt to 
hide the poor financial condition of the company from outside investors and creditors by 
manipulating the accounts. 
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Despite being indirect, indicators reflecting symptoms are valuable 
since it is often difficult to observe the indicators representing 
causes directly or accurately until it is too late to do anything about 
them. Thus, it is often necessary to draw inferences about underlying 
conditions by observing only external symptoms of those conditions. 
The professional auditing standards divide these warning signs that 
continuance as a going concern should be questioned, into financial 
indicators, operating indicators and other indicators, and provide a few 
examples [ISA 570 (IF AC 1995 :6); SAS 130 (ICAEW 1994:31 ); AUS 708 
(AARF 1996:appendix 2); AU 294 (SAICA 1986:8)]. SAS No 59 (AICPA 
1988b ), paragraph 6 divides them into financial matters (negative trends 
and other difficulties), internal matters and external matters. The 
indicators provided by the auditing standards and the auditor's 
responsibility to evaluate it are discussed in the next chapter (see sec 
3 .4.2). 
2.5.2.2 The severe cash shortage stage 
The incubation stage is followed by the severe cash shortage stage, which 
is a result of the incubation stage. The entity is now in financial distress 
and the going concern assumption becomes questionable. 
2. 5. 2. 3 The management attempt rescue actions stage 
A severe cash shortage leads to management attempting rescue actions. 
This stage represents management's plans to overcome the entity's 
problems. These plans may include, say attempts at new borrowings, 
restructuring of debt, reducing wages, selling productive assets or 
participation in a merger or other form of acquisition (Pastena & Ruland 
1986:288). 
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The professional auditing standards gtve examples of these plans to 
mitigate the adverse effects of the conditions and events that lead inter alia 
to the entity facing a severe cash shortage [AU 294 (SAICA 1986:1 0); AUS 
708 (AARF 1996:appendix 3); ISA 570 (IFAC 1995 :7); SAS No 59 
(AICPA 1988b:7)]. The statements divide these plans into: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
plans to dispose of assets 
plans to borrow money or restructure debt 
plans to reduce or delay expenditures 
plans to increase ownership equity 
The management plans provided by the auditing standards and the auditor's 
responsibility to evaluate them, are discussed in the next chapter (see sec 
3.4.4). 
Nine out of 15 auditing partners interviewed in a research study indicated 
that management's plans to borrow money or restructure debt and plans to 
reduce or delay expenditures are of vital importance, because generally, 
the benefits are realised most quickly. The economic benefits derived from 
plans to dispose of assets and plans to increase ownership equity usually 
require more time. (Williams 1984: 16). 
These plans of management are regarded as rescue actions outside the 
normal course of operations and are warning signs of business failure. If 
there is a high probability that these actions will succeed, then the degree 
of doubt raised about the going concern assumption under the cash 
shortage stage will be reduced. If there is a moderate or low probability 
that these actions will succeed, then the degree of doubt will increase, 
resulting in substantial doubt. 
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Up to this point, according to Boritz (1991: 17), management retain control 
over their assets and operations by the successful implementation of 
actions to rescue the entity from financial distress. 
2.5.2.4 The rescue attempts fail stage 
If management's rescue attempts fail and they lose control (or are likely to 
lose control in the next financial year) over the entity's assets and 
operations to a lender or other creditors through the formal appointment of 
a receiver or a less formal involvement by a consultant or monitor, there is 
very substantial doubt about the validity of the going concern assumption 
(Boritz 1991:17). 
2. 5. 2. 5 The failure stage 
When management lose control (or is likely to lose control in the next 
financial year) over the entity's assets and operations to a trustee in 
bankruptcy, the going concern assumption is invalid and an alternative 
basis of accounting should be used. Although it is sometimes possible for 
an entity to avoid bankruptcy through an effective reorganisation plan, it 
still faces a high risk of bankruptcy and liquidation. (Boritz 1991:17.) 
2.5.3 Summary of the going concern assumption and its relation to 
financial distress and business failure 
Business failure develops over time and does not occur without warmng. 
Long before the actual cessation of operations, an entity will show warning 
signs of financial distress or impending failure. Poor management has 
been cited as the initial cause of business failure. The auditor should be 
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able to recogmse these warmng stgns and evaluate their impact on the 
going concern concept to judge if the entity will be able to continue as a 
going concern in the foreseeable future. By bringing warning signs to the 
attention of management and shareholders early enough potential 
significant losses can be reduced or avoided (Boritz 1991:21). 
Business failure proceeds through identifiable stages, which result in the 
going concern concept being questionable or invalid at a certain stage. If 
the entity is unable to meet its obligations in the current financial year or 
in the next financial year, without initiating actions outside the ordinary 
course of operations to rescue the entity from financial distress or 
insolvency, the auditor should question the appropriateness of the going 
concern concept used in the financial statements (Boritz 1991 :33). Actions 
outside the ordinary course of operations include management's plans to 
dispose of assets, borrow money or restructure debt, reduce or delay 
expenditures or increase ownership equity. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has indicated that the going concern assumption is one of the 
fundamental accounting concepts underlying the preparation of the 
financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles. 
53 
An examination of the various definitions of the going concern assumption 
in the professional standards have revealed that basically the going concern 
assumption means that it assumes that an entity will continue in operation 
for the foreseeable future and will be able to realise its assets and 
discharge its liabilities in the normal course of business. However, the 
evolution has indicated that as early as 196811972 researchers concluded 
that the continuity of a client should not be assumed by the accountant but 
that it should be investigated by the accountant. It was only in 1988 that 
the first professional auditing standard and in 1997 that the first 
accounting standard were amended to ensure that the accountant and 
auditor evaluates the going concern assumption and does not merely 
assume it (see sec 2.3.1 and 3.2.1). 
This chapter has examined the guidance provided by existing professional 
standards on the disclosure of the going concern assumption in the 
financial statements. Existing accounting standards do not provide 
detailed guidance to the preparers of financial statements or to auditors of 
disclosures that should be made in the financial statements when the going 
concern assumption is valid as a result of management's plans or when it is 
doubtful. The auditing standards do provide extensive guidance to the 
auditor in this respect. However, for an auditor to decide if an entity 
complies with the going concern assumption is subjective and dependent 
on his or her judgement. 
It has also been demonstrated in this chapter that when the going concern 
assumption becomes questionable it can be associated with financial 
distress and when it becomes invalid it can be associated with business 
failure. Business failure is a process, which proceeds through different 
stages. Long before the actual business failure, the entity will show 
warning signs or indications of going concern problems, which indicate 
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that the entity is approaching a state of severe financial distress. During 
the business failure process, various attempts will be initiated by 
management to rescue the entity. The auditor should be able to recognise 
and evaluate the impact of the warning signs on the going concern concept 
and the rescue attempts of management during these stages in order to 
judge if there is substantial doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a 
going concern in the foreseeable future or if the situation is alleviated. 
There are different levels of substantial doubt, depending on the 
probability that the rescue attempts of management will/will not succeed. 
The next chapter assesses whether or not the auditing statements provide 
sufficient guidance to the auditor in his or her responsibility to evaluate 
and report on the going concern assumption. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE GOING CONCERN ASSUMPTION IN THE CONTEXT 
OF THE PROFESSIONAL AUDITING STANDARDS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Mautz and Sharaf (1961 :42) incorporated the going concern assumption as 
one of the postulates in auditing, namely: 'In the absence of clear evidence 
to the contrary, what has held true in the past for the enterprise under 
examination will hold true in the future.' They explained that the 
inclusion of the going concern assumption as an auditing postulate is 
necessary because it, together with other postulates, provides the basis for 
a logical, integrated theory of auditing, and that without the going concern 
assumption of accounting, auditing would be 'improbable, if not 
impossible' because: 
Unless the auditor can assume that what has held true in the past will 
hold true in the future for the enterprise under examination, barring 
any clear indications to the contrary, he has no basis for accepting or 
rejecting such assertions as the valuation of receivables and 
inventories, the economic usefulness of fixed assets, or the adequacy 
of internal control (Mautz & Sharaf 1961:49). 
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Mautz and Sharaf (1961) recognised that the going concern assumption of 
accounting was encompassed by the auditing postulate, but believed that 
the postulate added something more, namely: 
* 
* 
* 
It provides the auditor with a guide m the performance of all his 
verification work. For example, if fixed assets are purchased to 
facilitate a certain type of activity, which has been conducted 
according to plan, the auditor, in the absence of contrary evidence, 
can expect the activity to continue and the assets to be used. 
It places important limits on the extent of an auditor's 
responsibilities. 
It provides a basis for reducing the extent of an auditor's obligation to 
forecast the future and to have his worked judged on the basis of 
hindsight. 
The gomg concern assumption therefore has significant effects on the 
auditor. Chapter 2 concluded that the auditor must apply his judgement to 
decide whether an entity is a going concern and that the accounting 
standards do not provide sufficient guidance in this respect. The objective 
of this chapter is to peruse existing auditing standards in order to: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
summarise the evolution of the going concern assumption in auditing 
outline the requirements of the professional auditing standards 
regarding the auditor's 
responsibility to evaluate a client's continued existence 
responsibility to report on a going concern problem 
assess the approach that the standards advocate the auditor should 
follow in the evaluation 
identify the indicators of gomg concern problems supplied by the 
standards 
* 
* 
* 
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identify the audit procedures that the standards prescribe the auditor 
should follow in the evaluation 
assess the auditor's responsibility to evaluate management's plans for 
dealing with the going concern problem 
establish if the auditing standards provide sufficient guidance to the 
auditor in his evaluating and reporting responsibility 
3.2 EVOLUTION OF THE GOING CONCERN ASSUMPTION IN 
AUDITING 
Prior to 1962 the impact of gomg concern problems received little 
attention in the professional standards. The necessity for and the wording 
of the going concern report were left to the discretion of the individual 
auditor (Asare 1990:40). Taffler and Tisshaw (1977:50) also emphasised 
this: 
... when it comes to the critical decision of whether to qualify a 
report for going-concern reasons, the auditor is still very much on his 
own, having to rely virtually entirely on his subjective judgement and 
experience. .. . the accountancy bodies have made virtually no 
pronouncement on what constitutes a going concern, nor does there 
seem to have been any legal guidance. 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) seems to 
be the officiator in the evolution of the auditing statements dealing with 
the auditor's responsibilities regarding the going concern. They were 
always first with new pronouncements on this subject, followed by the 
International Federation of Accountants (IF AC) and the other English-
speaking countries discussed in this dissertation. Thus the following 
discussion on the evolution of the going concern assumption is in the 
58 
context of the United States of America with a brief exposition at the end 
on its evolution in South Africa. 
3.2.1 Evolution of the going concern assumption in the United States 
of America 
The first professional pronouncement on the gomg concern subject 
occurred in March 1962. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
issued Accounting Series Release (ASR) No 90 - Certification of income 
statements, which stated that a 'subject to' qualification in the audit report 
would be appropriate in situations where the outcome of a matter, 
transaction or event is uncertain (Asare 1990:40). 
The auditing profession followed suit, with the AICPA Auditing Standards 
Board issuing the Statement on Auditing Procedures (SAP) No 32 -
Qualifications and disclaimers. SAP No 32 differentiated between a 
'subject to' qualification and an 'except for' qualification and 
recommended that the former be used in situations where the outcome of a 
matter is uncertain. However, the wording of the statement was such that 
the auditor could choose either qualification resulting in the improper use 
of the 'subject to' qualification. For example, in cases of inadequate 
disclosure of conditions involving uncertainty, auditors used the 'subject 
to' qualification instead of the 'except for' qualification. (Konrath 
1985:132.) 
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The AICP A attempted to restrict the improper use of the 'subject to' 
qualification in 1973 by issuing Exposure Draft of Statement on Auditing 
Standards (SAS) No 2 - Reports on audited financial statements. The 
Exposure Draft proposed to replace the 'subject to' phrase with 'except 
for', for qualifications based on uncertainties. However, the proposal was 
not adopted because, among other reasons, the practitioners wanted to 
reserve the 'except for' qualification for situations of disagreement 
between the auditor and management. (Landsittel & Serlin 1982:250.) 
SAS No 2, which was issued in 1974, was the first formal standard 
requiring the auditor to consider the recoverability and classification of 
recorded assets and liabilities when considering the possibility that the 
entity may not be a going concern. The statement advised auditors to 
consider qualifying their report or issuing a disclaimer of opinion in cases 
of material uncertainties and limited the use of the 'subject to' 
qualification to such cases. (Asare 1990:41; Konrath 1985: 132.) 
In the period that followed, the 'subject to' qualification became a 
controversial topic, with numerous attempts to eliminate it. Bankers and 
analysts (users of financial statements) were against the elimination. They 
argued that the 'subject to' qualification provides an early warning signal 
for more extensive analysis of the financial statements and that the 
elimination of the 'subject to' qualification would: 
* 
* 
effectively eliminate an important 'red flag' for investors, as auditors 
have access to inside information upon which the going concern 
qualification is based 
force an auditor to render an unqualified opinion where he continued 
to have serious reservations about the financial position of an entity 
(Landsittel & Serlin 1982:251). 
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Not all auditors, on the other hand, agreed on the need to have a reporting 
responsibility for disclosing going concern uncertainties and they were 
opposed to the 'subject to' qualification. The Commission on Auditors' 
Responsibilities (CAR) summarised the opposition to the 'subject to' 
qualification. They stated that the going concern 'subject to' qualification 
was misinterpreted by users who view it as a prediction of liquidation and 
that unqualified opinions (the absence of 'subject to' qualifications) create 
the impression that entities will continue as going concerns. According to 
the CAR, disclosure in or adjustment of the financial statements is a better 
way of communicating an uncertainty compared to an audit report 
qualification, and it recommended the elimination of the 'subject to' 
qualification. (CAR 1978 :30.) 
In response to this recommendation, the AICP A issued an exposure draft in 
1977, Auditors' report when there are contingencies, which complied with 
the Commission's recommendation to eliminate the 'subject to' 
qualification for all types of uncertainties, including the going concern 
uncertainty, and when necessary to replace it with note disclosure. If the 
note disclosure regarding the uncertainty was adequately set forth, in 
accordance with criteria in the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) Statement No 5 - Accounting for contingencies, then no audit 
report qualification or modification was necessary according to the 
exposure draft. If the disclosures were not adequate, an 'except for' or 
adverse opinion was required. For various reasons this proposal was not 
adopted. There was user opposition from the SEC and various 
commentators. (Landsittel & Serlin 1982:251.) 
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In 19801 the Auditing Standards Board issued an exposure draft entitled 
The auditor's standard report, which attempted to modify the standard 
audit report without eliminating the 'subject to' opinion. However, it also 
failed to pass. Another working draft, entitled 'Matters involving 
uncertainties', was prepared in 1982 and it became the focus of a public 
meeting to consider elimination of the 'subject to' opinion on 20 June 
1983. Strong user opposition was expressed at the meeting and the project 
was sent back for study without the issuance of an exposure draft. 
(Robertson 1988.) 
In March 1981 the AICPA Auditing Standards Board issued SAS No 34, 
The auditor's considerations when a question arises about an entity's 
continued existence (AICPA 1981). SAS No 34 (AICPA 1981) provided 
guidance to the auditor on how to evaluate potential gomg concern 
problems and was an improvement on the mere requirement of SAS No 2, 
to consider the recoverability and classification of recorded assets and 
liabilities in the presence of going concern uncertainties (Asare 1990). 
SAS No 34 (AICPA 1981) required the auditor to be aware that the audit 
procedures performed m the normal course of the audit may uncover 
information contrary to the gomg concern assumption. Contrary 
information may be solvency problems, operating problems or other 
internal/external problems (see sec 2.5 .2.1). SAS No 34 thus adopted a 
passive approach in that it did not impose a responsibility on auditors to 
search for evidence about the continued existence of the client. This 
1 In this year, the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants actually abolished the 'subject to' 
qualification for all types of uncertainties, including the going concern, as well as prescribing the use 
of a middle paragraph in the audit report, to call attention to the uncertainties. 
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contributed to the expectations gap. 2 
SAS No 34 (AICPA 1981) required the auditor to consider factors, which 
might mitigate any of the above-mentioned contrary information. 
Mitigating factors are management's plans to overcome these problems and 
can be divided into plans to dispose of assets, borrow money or restructure 
debt, reduce or delay expenditures, and/or increase ownership equity (see 
sec 2.5.2.3). If there still remains a question about the entity's continued 
existence after consideration of these factors, the auditor must then 
consider the recoverability and classification of recorded asset amounts 
and the amounts and classification of liabilities. 
The effect of SAS No 34 (AICPA 1981) on the auditor's report was that the 
auditor should modify it when substantial doubt remained about the 
entity's ability to continue as a going concern, but only when there is a 
recoverability question. The audit report should then contain a 'subject to' 
qualification (or a disclaimer of opinion). The 'subject to' qualification 
issued is thus stated in terms of recoverability and not continued existence. 
(Pany 1987:87.) 
Under SAS No 34 (AICPA 1981) an unqualified opmwn may thus be 
issued m the presence of going concern uncertainties if the assets and 
liabilities have been appropriately classified and reported on a 
recoverability basis. This also contributed to the expectations gap. 
2 
'Expectations gap' is a term used to describe the belief that users of audited fmancial statements 
misunderstand both the role of the auditor in the financial reporting process and the meaning of the 
audit report. 
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SAS No 34 (AICPA 1981) did not provide the auditor with any guidance on 
what decision-making criteria or process should be used for measuring 
such recoverability. The final decision on the going concern status of an 
entity was thus a matter of professional judgement by the auditor. 
At this stage the auditor's role in going concern uncertainties did not meet 
the public's expectations, as emphasised by Conner (1986 :77): 
Public demands for an early warning when a business stands on the 
brink of failure have never been expressed so forcefully. When 
businesses fail a short time after an unqualified audit report is 
issued, what infuriates the public most is that there was not adequate 
warning of the failure. The public quickly characterizes such 
business failures as audit failures. 
In a study conducted by Menon and Schwartz (1986:46) it was found that 
only 43 percent of 147 companies that had filed petitions for bankruptcy 
during 197 4 to 1983 had their last audit reports that were issued, qualified 
for going concern reasons. Menon and Schwartz (1986:51) concluded that 
the implication of their study was that bankers should not rely on the 
auditor's report as an early-warning signal of pending failure. 
Campbell and Mutchler (1988:49) conducted a research study to provide 
evidence on the extent to which the expectations gap existed regarding the 
auditor's role in the presence of going concern uncertainties, and found 
that: 
* 
* 
42 percent of the auditors agreed with SAS No 34 that an auditor 
issues a going concern audit report if there is a recoverability question 
49 percent of the bank lending officers wanted the auditor to issue a 
going concern audit report because they see it as the auditor's duty to 
provide them with an early-warning signal 
* 
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39 percent of the auditors also thought it was the auditor's duty to 
provide financial statement users with an early-warning signal 
Campbell and Mutchler concluded that there was a demand for change in 
auditor responsibilities and that SAS No 34 (AICP A 1981) needed to be 
revised to require auditors to assess the continued existence of the entity in 
every audit, and to modify the audit report when there is substantial doubt. 
In 1988 the Auditing Standards Board decided to revise the Statements on 
Auditing Standards in an attempt to eliminate the expectations gap. SAS 
No 34 (AICPA 1981) needed to be revised because of the: 
* 
* 
question whether auditors had been taking sufficient responsibility for 
evaluating a client's ability to continue in existence 
fact that more than a few companies had gone out of business shortly 
after the issuance of an auditor's statement that did not mention the 
possibility that the company might not continue (Goldstein 1989:50). 
The Auditing Standards Board revised the statement on the audit report and 
issued SAS No 58, Reports on audited financial statements (AICPA 
1988a). The statement prohibits the use of the 'subject to' qualification in 
audit reports but requires an explanatory paragraph to draw attention to 
going concern uncertainties disclosed in the notes to the financial 
statements. The red flag function of the 'subject to' opinion was thus 
retained in the form of an explanatory paragraph. 
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The Board also issued SAS No 59, The auditor's consideration of an 
entity's ability to continue as a going concern (AI CPA 1988b ), which 
replaced SAS No 34 (AICPA 1981). SAS No 34 and SAS No 59 are 
compared in table 3-1, which indicates that SAS No 59 (AI CPA 1988b) 
differs from SAS No 34 (AICP A 1981) in three major respects, namely: 
(1) The auditor must now follow an active approach to evaluate the 
entity's ability to continue as a going concern for a reasonable 
period of time. 
(2) The auditor must modify the audit report when he has substantial 
doubt about the entity's ability to continue in existence even when 
asset recoverability and liability classification are not in question. 
(3) The auditor must eliminate the 'subject to' opinion and include an 
explanatory paragraph in an unqualified report. The explanatory 
paragraph must describe the uncertainty; refer to the related 
disclosure in the financial statements; and state that the financial 
statements do not include any related adjustments. 
SAS No 59 (AI CPA 1988b ), paragraph 13, provides an example of such an 
explanatory paragraph: 
The accompanying financial statements have been prepared assuming 
that the Company will continue as a going concern. As discussed in 
Note X to the financial statements, the Company has suffered 
recurring losses from operations and has a net capital deficiency that 
raises substantial doubt about the company's ability to continue as a 
going concern. Management's plans in regard to these matters are 
also described in Note X. The financial statements do not include 
any adjustments that might result from the outcome of the 
uncertainty. 
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TABLE 3-1 
COMPARISON OF SAS NO 34 AND SAS NO 59 
Overall responsibility 
SAS No 34 
Entity's ability to continue as 
a going concern is considered 
m an audit only when 
contrary information IS 
discovered. 
SAS No 59 
Entity's ability to continue as 
a going concern is considered 
m every audit. Results 
obtained by audit procedures 
are evaluated to determine 
going concern ability. 
Cause of report modification Questionable recovery of Inability to continue as a 
assets and classification of gomg concern. 
liabilities. 
Level of doubt needed for 
report modification 
Time frame 
Effect on audit opinion 
Substantial. 
Approximately one year. 
Qualified 'subject to'. 
Source: Ellingsen, Pany & Fagan (1989:25) 
Substantial. 
Not to exceed one year from 
audited financial statements. 
Unqualified with an 
explanatory paragraph 
following the opinion 
paragraph. 
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SAS No 59 (AICPA 1988b) thus places more responsibility on auditors for 
assessmg the ability of their clients to continue as going concerns. 
However, with the inclusion of the time frame (par 4) it ensures that 
auditors deal only with existing conditions over a limited period of time 
and that they are not responsible for predicting future conditions or events. 
The results of a research study conducted by Raghunandan and Rama 
(1995) indicated that SAS No 59 (AI CPA 1988b) succeeded in closing the 
expectations gap. Auditors were now more likely to issue going concern 
modified audit reports for financially stressed nonbankrupt companies and 
for bankrupt companies prior to failure in the post-SAS No 59 period than 
in the pre-SAS No 59 period. In contrast Carcello, Hermanson and Russ 
(1995) concluded that the gap between users' expectations and auditors' 
reporting does not seem to have been reduced. They confined their 
research study to the audit reports issued by the 'Big Eight' /'Big Six' audit 
firms and found that the propensity to modify bankruptcy-related opinions 
increased after the issuance of SAS No 34 (AICPA 1981), but not after the 
issuance of SAS No 59 (AICPA 1988b). 3 
SAS No 59 (AICPA 1988b) does not require auditors to perform more audit 
procedures than they currently do (par 5) but requires their current audit 
procedures to be of a sufficient nature to indicate substantial doubt about 
the entity's ability to continue as a going concern. However, the absence 
of specific audit procedures and guidelines to assess the going concern 
status of an entity is regarded as one of the shortcomings of SAS No. 59 
(Koh & Killough 1990:183). 
3 The difference in qualifying attitudes of auditors from 'Big Eight'/'Big Six' audit firms versus auditors 
from other audit firms is discussed in chapter 5 of this study (see sec 5.3.3). 
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Koh and Killough (1990: 190) came to the conclusion that there is a need 
for a more objective and unambiguous approach to evaluate an entity's 
going concern status and saw the use of discriminant analysis and failure 
prediction models as possible solutions to help the auditor make such an 
evaluation. 4 The auditor's examination of historical information under 
SAS No 59 to determine whether there is substantial doubt about an 
entity's ability to continue as a going concern, is regarded by McLaughlin 
(1990:12) as causing auditors to issue misleading audit reports and that 
they need a quantitative measurement for such a determination. He used a 
going concern value ratio conceptual model in his study and concluded that 
it can aid auditors in making a going concern decision (McLaughlin 
1990:121). 
Another shortcoming of SAS No 59 (AI CPA 1988b) identified in the 
literature is the fact that the statement does not define substantial doubt. 
No precise meaning or value is attached to substantial doubt (Ponemon & 
Raghunandan 1994:46). Although SAS No 59 (AICPA 1988b) was issued 
to eliminate the expectations gap, the study of Ponemon and Raghunandan 
(1994) indicated that there is still an expectations gap between auditors 
and users of financial statements regarding the meaning of substantial 
doubt used in SAS No 59. Judges in the study perceived substantial doubt 
at a lower probability value than the auditors, which suggests that they 
believe auditors are too conservative in rendering going concern report 
modifications for entities with going concern problems. Bankers and 
financial analysts in the study perceived substantial doubt at a higher 
probability value than the auditors, which suggests that they believe that 
substantial doubt connotes greater assurance of an entity's financial demise 
than intended by auditors. The results of this study indicated that there is 
4 The feasibility of auditors using statistical models to determine the going concern status of an entity is 
discussed in chapter 5 of this study (see sec 5.2.1). 
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a need for substantial doubt to be quantified in the auditing statements m 
clear and concise language. 
The requirements of SAS No 59 (AI CPA 1988b) are outlined in section 
3.3.2 and compared with other auditing standards currently being followed 
by a number of English-speaking countries in sections 3.4 and 3.5. 
3.2.2 Evolution of the going concern assumption in South Africa 
In South Africa there was no formal guidance available to auditors on how 
to evaluate going concern problems until 1986 when statement AU 294, 
Going concern (SAICA 1986) was issued. AU 294 was issued five years 
after the AI CPA issued their statement, SAS No 34 (AI CPA 1981 ), on the 
evaluation of going concern problems. 
Bosch (1984:240) identified the need for a formal guideline to auditors in 
South Africa on how to evaluate going concern problems: 
In conclusion, it seems obvious that accountants and auditors should 
be provided with more definite guidelines to decide what constitutes 
a going-concern. It involves consequences and implications that are 
too grave for relying solely on the mere judgment and experience of 
individual members of the profession. 
Statement AU 293, Events after the balance sheet date, issued in July 
1985, was the first auditing statement that placed a formal duty and 
responsibility on the auditor to consider the validity of the assumption that 
the undertaking is a going concern (SAICA 1985a). The duty and 
responsibility merely involved the auditor specifically enquiring of 
management whether they are aware of circumstances occurring after the 
balance sheet date that could bring into question the going concern concept 
70 
underlying the financial statements. 
The Auditing Standards Committee issued Exposure Draft (ED) 55, Going 
concern, in September 1985 (SAICA 1985b ). The draft largely contained 
the same information that statement AU 294, issued in September 1986, 
contained in its final form. The only material changes made as a result of 
comments received were additions to paragraphs 18 and 20 of the exposure 
draft, regarding the effect on the auditor's report. 
ED 55 (SAICA 1985b) permitted the auditor the option to issue an 
unqualified audit report if he concluded that the going concern concept is 
inappropriate (par 16) but the financial statements have nevertheless been 
prepared applying this concept; or if he is uncertain about the entity's 
ability to continue as a going concern for the foreseeable future (par 17). 
The only requirement was that the auditor should consider the materiality 
of the effect of the identified going concern problem on the values and 
classification of assets and liabilities (par 18). 
Comments received on ED 55 (SAICA 1985b) from one auditing firm were 
that an unqualified opinion may be warranted only under the above-
mentioned circumstances when there is adequate disclosure of the going 
concern problem in the financial statements, even when there is likely to 
be no impact on the carrying value and classification of assets and 
liabilities. 5 Paragraph 18 of statement AU 294 (SAICA 1986) was changed 
to the effect that an unqualified opinion may be issued if there is likely to 
be no impact on the carrying value of assets and liabilities and there is 
adequate disclosure in the financial statements. 
All comments that have been received on Exposure Draft 55, were reviewed by the author at the 
offices of the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants. 
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Another auditing firm commented that an unqualified opinion 1s never 
warranted under an identified going concern problem and that a qualified, 
adverse or disclaimer of opinion should be expressed, even when full 
disclosure of the circumstances and effects are made in the financial 
statements (see footnote 5). The option to issue an unqualified report 
under an identified going concern problem is thus a controversial aspect. 
Moir (1989:38) writes as follows on this specific aspect: 
This situation clearly does not help to bridge the expectation gap. 
While the application of existing standards will, in the majority of 
instances, result in a qualified audit report where the company is not 
a going concern, there can be little doubt, however, that the users of 
financial statements would like the auditor to draw attention to the 
fact that a business may not be a going concern in all cases, and not 
only if the accounting practices had not been properly applied. 
Paragraph 20 of ED 55 (SAICA 1985b) also proved to be quite 
controversial. Just about every comment received on ED 55 considered the 
inclusion of this paragraph undesirable (see footnote 5). Paragraph 20 read 
as follows: 'The auditor should not refrain from issuing a qualified or 
adverse opinion, or disclaiming an opinion, on the grounds that it may lead 
to the appointment of a judicial manager or liquidator.' It was felt that it 
should be removed since it amounts to an indictment of the integrity of the 
profession. No other statement reminds the auditor that he should not be 
influenced by the consequences of taking appropriate action and fulfilling 
his duty. The action taken by the Auditing Standards Committee was to 
add the following sentence in AU 294 to the paragraph and not to delete it 
(SAICA 1986): 'The auditor is not responsible for the facts that exist; he 
has, however, a responsibility relating to the manner in which those facts 
are reported.' South Africa is the only country to have such an inclusion 
in its auditing statements. The old auditing standard, Section 3.410 
(ICAEW 1985), of the United Kingdom used to have a similar paragraph. 
Ng (1990:23) describes the aim of the inclusion of this paragraph in 
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Section 3.41 0, namely to advise the auditor not to use the self-fulfilling 
prophecl as an excuse not to qualify an entity's financial statements for 
going concern problems, as removing an important and controversial 
factor. 
Other comments were received by the Committee but for the most part not 
acted upon (see footnote 5). Some of the comments which were not acted 
upon then, can now be looked upon as being shortcomings in AU 294 
(SAICA 1986), because of the evolution in the auditing standards which 
tends to place more responsibility on the auditor for assessing their clients' 
continued existence. One auditing firm suggested that the auditor should 
consider the risk, that the going concern concept is inappropriately applied, 
at all phases of the audit and not only at the planning stage as stated in 
paragraph 07 of ED 55 (SAICA 1985b) and AU 294 (SAICA 1986) 
respectively. This would have resulted in an active approach being 
followed by the auditor throughout the entire audit. One of the regional 
associations wanted examples of the further audit procedures which 
practitioners should follow when gathering audit evidence relating to the 
going concern problem as stated in paragraph 09 of ED 55 (SAICA 1985b) 
and AU 294 (SAICA 1986) respectively. This would have provided the 
auditor with more definite guidelines on assessing the going concern 
problem. 
The Auditing Standards Committee issued a new exposure draft, ED 116 
Going concern (SAICA 1997a). ED 116 addressed the above-mentioned 
shortcomings, but at this stage it is on hold, awaiting the release of a new 
exposure draft by the International Auditing Practices Committee (see sec 
3. 3. 1 ). Hence this study does not discuss ED 116 in detail. 
6 Self-fulfilling prophecy can be described as the fear that the qualified audit report itself, rather than the 
entity's condition, may result in or hasten business failure (see sec 4.5.1). 
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The reporting responsibility that the auditor had in the presence of going 
concern uncertainties was outlined in auditing statement AU 321, The 
auditor's report on annual financial statements (SAICA 1982). Statements 
AU 321 (SAICA 1982) and AU 294 (SAICA 1986) required the auditor to 
issue a 'subject to' opinion in the presence of going concern uncertainties 
and a disclaimer of opinion if the uncertainty was fundamental. Statement 
AU 321 (SAICA 1982) was revised in December 1990 and differed from 
the above-mentioned qualification requirements in that the 'subject to' 
opinion was eliminated and an explanatory paragraph was included. 
According to AU 321 (SAICA 1990b:38) the auditor's report should be 
qualified in the light of an inherent uncertainty by setting out in an 
explanatory paragraph the circumstances giving rise to the uncertainty and 
the conditions which precluded the application of auditing procedures 
normally considered necessary. Paragraph 39 states further that an audit 
report, which is so qualified, may not contain an expression of an 
unqualified opinion on the financial statements. The required qualification 
(par 48) if the uncertainty is material, is 'except for', and if it is 
fundamental, a disclaimer of opinion is necessary. 
This was in direct contrast to SAS No 59 (AICPA 1988b) which, for 
material uncertainties, reqmres an explanatory paragraph following an 
unqualified opinion in the audit report if it is properly disclosed in the 
financial statements. At this stage South Africa was also the only country 
that used the 'except for' qualification for uncertainties. All the other 
countries discussed m this dissertation reserve the 'except for' 
qualification for situations of disagreement only. When the AICPA wanted 
to use the 'except for' qualification for uncertainties in 1973, they received 
opposition from practitioners who wanted to reserve it for situations of 
disagreement only (see sec 3.2.1). 
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However, the revised statement AU 321 (SAICA 1990b) was replaced in 
November 1997 by South African Auditing Standard (SAAS) 700, The 
auditor's report on financial statements (SAICA 1997c). The reporting 
requirements of SAAS 700 are now in line with those of SAS No 59 
(AICPA 1988b) and eliminated the 'except for' qualification for 
uncertainties. The auditor should Issue an unqualified opinion with an 
emphasis of matter paragraph to highlight the going concern problem 
affecting the financial statements, which is included in a note to the 
financial statements. If the going concern problem is inadequately 
disclosed, the auditor should express a qualified opinion, 'except for', to 
indicate the disagreement with management. 
The reporting responsibility of the auditor outlined in SAAS 700 (SAICA 
1997c) supersedes the auditor's qualification requirements as outlined in 
AU 294 (SAICA 1986). The requirements of AU 294 (SAICA 1986) and 
SAAS 700 (SAICA 1997c) are outlined in section 3.3.6 and compared with 
other auditing standards currently being followed by a number of English-
speaking countries in sections 3.4 and 3.5. 
3.2.3 Summary of the evolution of the going concern assumption 
The evolution of the going concern assumption in the United States of 
America has advanced to a stage where more responsibility is placed on 
auditors to evaluate the going concern concept in an attempt to close the 
expectations gap. Two shortcomings identified by the literature in the 
current American auditing statement are the absence of specific audit 
procedures to evaluate the going concern assumption and the fact that 
substantial doubt is not well defined in the statement. 
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The current auditing standard on the going concern assumption used in 
South Africa is currently under scrutiny to address certain shortcomings 
and to make it compatible with the international standards. In a study 
conducted by Gloeck (1993 :484) 77 percent of people with financial 
background and 58 percent of auditors in public practice indicated that 
they expect auditors to do more on the going concern aspect. Gloeck 
concluded in his study that AU 294 (SAICA 1986) needs to be changed to 
close the expectations gap. 
3.3 PROFESSIONAL AUDITING STANDARDS ISSUED ON THE 
GOING CONCERN ASSUMPTION 
This section outlines the requirements of the current auditing statements of 
a number of English-speaking countries regarding: 
* 
* 
the auditor's responsibility to evaluate an entity's ability to continue 
as a going concern 
the auditor's reporting responsibility in the presence of going concern 
problems 
These auditing statements are as follows: 
* 
* 
International Standards on Auditing (ISA) 570, Going concern 
(IFAC 1995) 
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No 59, The auditor's 
consideration of an entity's ability to continue as a going concern 
(AICPA 1988b) 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) 130, The going concern basis 
in financial statements (ICAEW 1994) 
Handbook, Section 5510.51-.53, Going concern (CICA 1989) 
Auditing Standard (AUS) 708, Going concern, (AARF 1996) 
Statement on Auditing Standards (AU) 294, Going concern, (SAICA 
1986) 
South African Auditing Standards (SAAS) 700, The auditor's report 
onfinancial statements, (SAICA 1997c) 
3.3.1 Auditing standard issued by the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC) 
In June 1986, five years after the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants issued their first auditing statement on the going concern 
assumption, IFAC issued lAG 23, Going concern, which was revised in 
1989 in an attempt to be consistent with the AICPA's SAS No 59 (Boritz 
1991 :79). In 1995, IFAC issued ISA 570 which contained basically the 
same information as lAG 23 (IFAC 1989), with a shift of emphasis from a 
passive to an active approach. 
According to ISA 570 (IFAC 1995), the auditor's responsibilities are as 
follows: 
* 
* 
An active approach is adopted because the auditor should consider the 
appropriateness of the going concern assumption when planning and 
performing audit procedures and evaluating the results thereof (par 2). 
A list of indications that the going concern assumption may be 
questionable is provided. The list differentiates between financial, 
operating and other indications (par 6). 
* 
* 
* 
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If a going concern problem arises the auditor should gather sufficient 
appropriate evidence (evaluate information obtained earlier; employ 
additional audit procedures) to confirm or dispel the doubt for a 
period not exceeding one year after the balance sheet date (pars 8-9). 
Examples of audit procedures that are relevant in this connection are 
provided (pars 9-1 0). 
The auditor should consider and evaluate management's plans to 
mitigate the situation (par 11). 
According to ISA 570 (IFAC 1995:12-18), the auditor's reporting 
responsibilities are as follows: 
* 
* 
* 
If the going concern question is resolved the auditor should 
not modify the audit report 
consider the need for disclosure of management's plans and 
mitigating factors 
qualify his opinion 'except for' or express an adverse opinion, if 
disclosure considered necessary is not made 
If the going concern question is not resolved but adequate disclosure 
of the principal conditions that raised the doubt were made in the 
financial statements, the auditor should 
not qualify his opinion nor give an adverse opinion 
add an emphasis of a matter paragraph that highlights the going 
concern problem by drawing attention to the note in the financial 
statements disclosing the matter 
If the going concern question is not resolved and adequate disclosure 
of the principal conditions that raised the doubt was not made in the 
financial statements, the auditor should 
* 
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provide an explanatory paragraph stating that there is substantial 
doubt that the entity will be able to continue as a going concern 
and that the financial statements do not disclose this fact 
qualify his opinion, 'except for', or express an adverse opinion 
If the going concern concept is incorrectly used in the preparation of 
the financial statements and is so material and pervasive as to render 
it misleading, the auditor should 
issue an adverse opinion 
In June 1997, the International Auditing Practices Committee of IFAC 
revised ISA 570 and issued a new exposure draft on going concern (IFAC 
1997a). However, the exposure draft is going to be reissued by the 
International Auditing Practices Committee, which is why this study does 
not discuss the exposure draft issued in June 1997. 
3.3.2 Auditing standard issued by the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA) 
According to SAS No 59 (AI CPA 1988b) an auditor has the following 
responsibilities: 
* 
* 
An active approach is adopted because in every audit the auditor 
should evaluate whether there is substantial doubt about the entity's 
ability to continue as a going concern for a reasonable period of time 
(par 2). 
The audit of financial statements based on the assumption of 
liquidation is excluded (footnote 1). 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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The auditor's evaluation should cover a reasonable period of time, 
that is, not exceeding one year beyond the date of the financial 
statements being audited (par 2). 
The auditor need not design audit procedures solely to evaluate the 
entity's continued existence but can rely on the results of his normal 
audit procedures, which are designed and performed to achieve other 
audit objectives. The normal audit procedures can identify conditions 
and events, which in the aggregate indicates substantial doubt about 
the entity's continued existence (par 5). 
Examples of the normal audit procedures that can identify such 
conditions and events are provided (par 5). 
A list of such conditions and events is supplied and differentiates 
between negative trends, other indications of possible financial 
difficulties, internal matters and external matters (par 6). 
If the auditor believes that there is substantial doubt about the entity's 
ability to continue as a going concern, he must consider and evaluate 
management's plans to mitigate it (par 7). 
Guidance is provided to the auditor on considering and evaluating 
such plans (pars 8-9). 
According to SAS No 59 (AICPA 1988b:ll-16), an auditor has the 
following reporting responsibilities: 
* If the substantial doubt is alleviated, the auditor should 
consider the need for disclosure of possible effects of conditions 
and events, mitigating factors and management's plans 
express an unqualified opinion 
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* If the substantial doubt remains the auditor should 
* 
consider the possible effects on the financial statements 
consider the adequacy of disclosures made 
not qualify his opinion or give an adverse opinion 
add an explanatory paragraph that follows the opinion paragraph 
If disclosure is inadequate the auditor should 
qualify his opinion, 'except for', or express an adverse opinion 
3.3.3 Auditing standards issued by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) 
The ICAEW issued their first auditing statement on the going concern 
assumption in 1985, Auditing Guidelines Section 3.41 0, The auditor's 
consideration in respect of going concern (ICAEW 1985). Section 3.410 
did not meet the public's expectations. Barnes and Hooi (1987:33) wrote 
as follows: 
A new auditing guideline is needed ... More fundamentally, the role 
of the auditor needs to be properly defined ... In view of changing 
public expectations the role of the auditor will need to go beyond 
mere verification to include a clear statement that the company is 
facing financial difficulties. 
Section 3.410 (ICAEW 1985) placed a passive duty on the auditor to 
evaluate the entity's ability to continue as a going concern if he becomes 
aware of indications that the going concern assumption is questionable. In 
November 1994 the ICAEW issued a new Statement of Auditing Standards 
SAS 130, The going concern basis in financial statements (ICAEW 1994), 
which replaced Section 3.410 (ICAEW 1985) and which increases the 
auditor's responsibility in the evaluating of the going concern assumption. 
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According to SAS 130 (ICAEW 1994), the auditor's responsibilities are as 
follows: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
An active approach is adopted because the auditor should assess the 
adequacy of the means by which the directors have satisfied 
themselves about 
the going concern basis used in the financial statements 
the required disclosures (if any) relating to going concern in the 
financial statements to give a true and fair view (par 21). 
In assessing the adequacy the auditor should plan and perform audit 
procedures specifically designed to identify any material matters 
indicating going concern problems. A list of matters that the auditor's 
procedures need to cover is supplied, for example, budget and/or 
forecast information, borrowing facilities, directors' plans to resolve 
the going concern problem, et cetera. (Pars 21 & 23-24). 
The procedures should cover the future period to which the directors 
have paid particular attention in assessing going concern. No 
minimum length for the future period is specified. The auditor needs 
to assess the reasonability of the period to which the directors paid 
attention (pars 13, 21 & 23). 
Detailed guidance is provided to the auditor regarding the examination 
of the entity's banking/borrowing facilities (pars 25-28). 
A list of financial, operational and other indicators of going concern 
problems is provided (par 31). 
If the auditor considers that there IS a significant level of concern 
about the entity's ability to continue as a going concern or he 
disagrees with the preparation of the financial statements on the going 
concern basis, he might decide to draw the directors' attention to the 
need to take suitable advice (par 32). 
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* The auditor should consider the need to obtain written confirmations 
of representations from the directors regarding their assessment of the 
company being a going concern and any relevant disclosures in the 
financial statements (pars 33-35). 
According to SAS 130 (ICAEW 1994:40-50), the auditor's reporting 
responsibilities are as follows: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
If there is a significant level of concern but adequate disclosure of the 
matters giving rise to the concern were made in the financial 
statements, the auditor should 
not qualify his opinion 
add an explanatory paragraph 
If there is a significant level of concern and adequate disclosure of the 
matters giving rise to the concern was not made in the financial 
statements, the auditor should 
add an explanatory paragraph 
qualify his opinion 'except for' or express an adverse opinion 
If the period to which the directors have paid particular attention m 
assessing the going concern is less than one year from the date of 
approval of the financial statements and the fact is not disclosed in the 
financial statements or accompanying information, the auditor should 
not qualify his opinion 
disclose the fact within the section of his auditor's report setting 
out the basis of his opinion, unless the fact is clear from any 
other references in his report 
If the going concern concept is incorrectly used in the preparation of 
the financial statements and is so material and pervasive as to make it 
misleading, the auditor should 
issue an adverse opinion 
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3.3.4 Auditing standards issued by the Canadian Institute of 
Chartered Accountants (CICA) 
In 1980 the CICA eliminated the 'subject to' opinion, on the basis that 
adequate financial statement disclosure, m accordance with GAAP, 
provides users with enough information without the auditor having to refer 
to it in his audit report. 
According to the CICA Handbook Section 5510.52-53 (CICA 1989), an 
auditor has the following responsibilities: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
A passive duty is placed on the auditor to evaluate the entity's ability 
to continue as a going concern, if during his examination, he becomes 
aware of conditions that cast doubt on this ability. 
A list of the conditions which may indicate a potential problem 1s 
supplied and the auditor must assess the extent of such conditions. 
The auditor must review and evaluate the accounting treatment, 
disclosure and presentation of the uncertainty to ensure that it is in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. 
He must ensure that the disclosure explicitly mentions the fact that the 
entity may be unable to continue realising its assets and discharging 
its liabilities in the normal course of business. 
According to the CICA Handbook Section 5510 (CICA 1989), an auditor 
has the following reporting responsibilities: 
* 
* 
If the disclosure is adequate, the auditor should 
not qualify his opinion nor refer to it in his report (par 49) 
If the disclosure is not in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles, the auditor should 
84 
qualify his opmwn, 'except for', or express an adverse opmwn 
(pars 13-14) 
The statement does not define the foreseeable period nor does it mention 
any additional audit procedures to be carried out or that management's 
plans should be considered or evaluated. 
Boritz (1991 :96) concluded that his research evidence indicated that there 
is a need for a change in the auditor's approach and reporting 
responsibility in Canada, regarding the going concern evaluation. These 
shortcomings have been addressed by the CICA in an exposure draft (CICA 
1995). The exposure draft places an active duty on the auditor to evaluate 
factors that cast doubt on the entity's ability to continue as a going concern 
and sets out procedures which the auditor may perform to evaluate such 
factors. It defines a future period as one year from the date of the financial 
statements being audited. Any significant event that occurs outside this 
period should also be considered by the auditor. The exposure draft also 
requires the auditor to consider and evaluate management's plans to 
mitigate the effect of the factors that cast the doubt. 
3.3.5 Auditing standards issued by the Australian Accounting 
Research Foundation (AARF) 
In 1981 the AARF issued AUP 7, Going Concern, which was revised in 
1986 and again in 1991. In 1995 the AARF issued AUS 708 to be 
compatible with the International Standard on Auditing, ISA 570 (IFAC 
1995). In 1996 a revised AUS 708 was issued following the reissue of 
Accounting Standard AAS 6 (AARF 1995). AUS 708 (AARF 1996) 
contains more detailed requirements than ISA 570 (IFAC 1995). 
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According to AUS 708 (AARF 1996), an auditor has the following 
responsibilities: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
An active approach is adopted because the auditor should obtain 
sufficient appropriate audit evidence that it is appropriate for 
management to prepare the financial statements on the going concern 
basis (par 1 0). 
The audit of financial statements based on liquidation IS excluded 
(par 1). 
Guidance 1s provided to the auditor on how to obtain a better 
understanding of the entity's business and of any external and internal 
conditions and events which are important elements in assessing the 
risk of going concern problems (pars 17-18). 
A list, which differentiates between operating, financial and other 
indications of going concern problems, is provided (appendix 2). 
If the auditor considers it highly improbable that there is a going 
concern problem, then it is not necessary for him to design specific 
additional audit procedures to test for the existence of going concern 
problems. However, he must remain alert to the possibility that the 
going concern basis may be questionable when evaluating the results 
of other audit procedures (par 19). 
If a going concern problem arises at any stage of the audit, the auditor 
should take into account that certain procedures may take on 
additional significance; and/or evaluate information obtained earlier; 
and/or employ additional audit procedures, to confirm or dispel the 
doubt for the relevant period (par 20). 
Examples of audit procedures that are relevant in this connection are 
provided (par 21). 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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Relevant period represents the period of approximately 12 months 
from the date of the auditor's current report to the expected date of 
the auditor's report for the next annual reporting period, or in the case 
of interim reporting the corresponding period for the following year 
(par 4). 
The auditor should consider the possibility that reasonably foreseeable 
circumstances may exist beyond the relevant period (pars 13-14). 
The auditor should consider and evaluate management's plans to 
mitigate the situation (par 22). 
Guidance is provided to the auditor on considering and evaluating 
such plans (pars 23-28). 
According to AUS 708 (AARF 1996:29-33), an auditor has the following 
reporting responsibilities: 
* 
* 
* 
If the going concern question is resolved, the auditor should 
express an unqualified opinion 
consider the adequacy of the disclosure of the principal 
conditions that raised the doubt, management's plans and other 
mitigating factors 
if disclosure considered necessary 1s not made, qualify his 
opinion 'except for' or express an adverse opinion 
If significant uncertainty exists but adequate disclosure of the 
principal conditions that raise the doubt and appropriate adjustments 
were made in the financial statements, the auditor should 
not qualify his opinion 
include an emphasis of matter section in the audit report 
If significant uncertainty exists and it is not adequately disclosed in 
the financial statements the auditor should 
* 
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add an explanatory paragraph 
qualify his opinion 'except for' or express an adverse opinion 
If the auditor considers the going concern basis as inappropriate, he 
should 
express an adverse opinion 
3.3.6 Auditing standards issued by the South African Institute of 
Chartered Accountants (SAICA) 
As mentioned previously (see sec 3.2.2), the Auditing Standards 
Committee of SAICA revised AU 294 (SAICA 1986) and issued a new 
exposure draft, ED 116 (SAICA 1997a), on going concern. However, the 
exposure draft is on hold, pending the release of a new exposure draft by 
the International Auditing Practices Committee (see sec 3.3.1). Hence this 
study does not discuss ED 116. 
According to AU 294 (SAICA 1986), the auditor has the following 
responsibilities: 
* 
* 
An active duty is placed on the auditor to consider the risk that the 
going concern concept is inappropriately applied, during the planning 
stage of the audit (par 7). 
When considering this risk, the auditor should be aware of factors that 
may indicate doubt about an entity's ability to continue as a going 
concern. A list of such factors is supplied which differentiates 
between financial, operating and other indicators (par 8). 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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If the auditor determines that there is an unacceptable risk in the 
entity's ability to continue as a going concern, he should carry out 
further audit procedures to gather audit evidence in an attempt to 
reduce the audit risk to an acceptable level (par 9). No examples of 
such audit procedures are provided. 
The auditor should consider information which relates to a mtmmum 
of six months following the date of the audit report or one year after 
the balance sheet date, whichever is the later (par 4 ). 
The auditor should consider and evaluate management's plans and the 
bases on which they have been prepared to mitigate the situation 
(pars 10-11). 
If the auditor concludes that the entity is a gomg concern, the 
statement places a further active duty on him to reconsider this 
conclusion during the final review and evaluation stage of the audit 
(par 12). 
The auditor should discuss his findings and conclusions with the 
appropriate level of management before issuing his opinion (par 13). 
The auditor's reporting responsibilities are discussed in the context of 
SAAS 700 (SAICA 1997c) because it supersedes the auditor's reporting 
responsibilities as outlined in AU 294 (SAICA 1986). If SAAS 700 is 
silent on a specific point, reference is made to AU 294. According to 
SAAS 700 (SAICA 1997c:30-32 & appendix II), and AU 294 (SAICA 
1986:14-20), the auditor has the following reporting responsibilities: 
* SAAS 700 does not give any guidance if the going concern question is 
resolved. According to AU 294 
the auditor should express an unqualified opinion 
no disclosure of management plan's or principal conditions 1s 
required 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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If the going concern question is not resolved but adequate disclosure 
was made in the financial statements, the auditor should 
not qualify his opinion 
include an emphasis of matter paragraph in the audit report 
decide whether it is not appropriate to express a disclaimer of 
opinion instead of adding an emphasis of matter paragraph, if the 
matter is so material and pervasive and fundamental 
If the going concern question is not resolved and adequate disclosure 
was not made in the financial statements, the auditor should 
add an explanatory paragraph 
qualify his opinion 'except for' 
express an adverse opinion, if the matter 1s so material and 
pervasive and fundamental 
SAAS 700 does not give any guidance if the gomg concern 1s 
inappropriate but the financial statements applying this concept have 
nevertheless been prepared. AU 294 states that the auditor should 
consider the materiality of this disagreement and should 
issue an unqualified opinion if the effect is immaterial 
issue a qualified opinion 'except for' if the effect is material 
issue an adverse opinion if the effect is fundamental 
AU 294 states that the auditor should consider his reporting 
responsibility dealing with material irregularities. 
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3.3. 7 Summary of the professional auditing standards issued 
More responsibility is placed on auditors by the professional auditing 
standards to evaluate and report the going concern assumption. There is 
thus a change in emphasis from a passive to an active approach. All the 
auditing statements reviewed, except for CICA Handbook Section 5510 
(CICA 1989), provide the auditor with guidance on evaluating an entity's 
ability to continue as a going concern and in expressing his audit opinion 
in the presence of going concern problems. The guidance and the 
sufficiency of the guidance provided by these statements are compared in 
sections 3.4 and 3.5. CICA Handbook Section 5510 (CICA 1989) 1s 
included in this comparison to a lesser extent, as it is in the process of 
being revised. The limited guidance provided by Section 5510 does not 
meet the public's expectations as this stage (see sec 3.3.4). 
3.4 A COMPARISON OF THE VARIOUS AUDITING STANDARDS 
ON THE AUDITOR'S RESPONSIBILITY TO EVALUATE THE 
GOING CONCERN ASSUMPTION 
A comparison of the various professional auditing standards discussed in 
this study, in respect of the auditor's responsibility to evaluate the going 
concern assumption, includes the major aspects of: 
* 
* 
the approach that the statement advocates that the auditor should 
follow in his evaluation, that is either passive or active 
indicators of going concern problems that the auditor should recognise 
and evaluate to identify if there is a going concern problem 
* 
* 
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the audit procedures that the auditor should perform if a gomg 
concern question arises regarding the going concern assumption 
the impact of management's plans to overcome the entity's problems 
and how the auditor should evaluate it 
The auditor's evaluation of the above aspects should cover a reasonable 
period of time. All the statements reviewed, except for CICA Handbook 
Section 5510 (CICA 1989) and SAS 130 (ICAEW 1994) define a 
reasonable period of time that ensures that auditors deal only with existing 
conditions and that they are not responsible for predicting future 
conditions or events. SAS 130 (ICAEW 1994) and AUS 708 (AARF 1996) 
place the responsibility on the directors to assess if the entity is a going 
concern for some future period, for which there is no cut off point. The 
auditor should assess the reasonability of this period and report on it, if it 
represents a period of less than one year from the date of the approval of 
the financial statements. A reasonable period of time has already been 
summarised in this study (see sec 2.3.7). 
3.4.1 The approach that the auditor should follow in the evaluation of 
the going concern assumption 
Because the auditing statements are revised, there is a greater tendency to 
place an active duty on the auditor to evaluate an entity's ability to 
continue as a going concern, whereas in the past it used to be a passive 
duty. Woolf (1983:100) defines passive/active as follows: 
the passive approach: this allows auditors to assume financial 
viability unless they encounter clear indications that such an 
assumption is not justified, in which case a secondary series of 
enquiries would be triggered into action; or 
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the active approach: this requires auditors to pursue a specific line of 
inquiry invoking vigorous testing of the going concern assumption, 
irrespective of whether any of the indications referred to in a) [the 
passive approach] above manifested. 
Measured against these definitions of passive/active, one may conclude 
that all the professional auditing standards reviewed in this study, except 
CICA Handbook Section 5510 (CICA 1989), require the auditor to assume 
an active duty in evaluating an entity's going concern status. CICA 
Handbook Section 5510 (CICA 1989) places a passive duty on the auditor 
to assume the going concern assumption, unless he becomes aware of 
conditions that may cast doubt on an entity's ability to continue as a going 
concern. 
Although ISA 570 (IFAC 1995) and AU 294 (SAICA 1986) can be regarded 
as placing an active duty on the auditor in considering the risk that the 
going concern may be inappropriately applied, SAS No 59 (AI CPA 1988b ), 
SAS 130 (ICAEW 1994) and AUS 708 (AARF 1996) use more descriptive 
wording indicating an active action, namely, evaluating if there is 
substantial doubt and assessing the risk of potential going concern 
problems. According to AU 294 (SAICA 1986:8), the auditor still has the 
option not to do any evaluation if he feels that there is no risk. In 
considering the risk the auditor should be aware only of certain conditions 
and events which may indicate doubt about an entity's ability to continue 
as a going concern, whereas SAS No 59 (AICPA 1988b:3), requires the 
auditor to identify such conditions and events. AU 294 is inclined towards 
a passive approach and should be revised to adopt a more definite active 
approach. In practice, this would not involve a vast amount of incremental 
effort, as many audit procedures in the active approach would in any way 
be performed in a normal audit (Woolf 1983:100). 
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SAS No 59 (AI CPA 1988b) and AUS 708 (AARF 1996) also exclude the 
audit of financial statements based on liqui<lation, in the auditor's 
evaluation of going concern. The significance of this has already been 
pointed out in this study, namely that at a point in time before liquidation, 
the entity may be a nongoing concern and should be evaluated as such by 
the auditor (see sec 2.3. 7). 
3.4.2 The recognition and evaluation of indicators of going concern 
problems 
All the auditing standards reviewed in this study provide lists of indicators 
to assist auditors in identifying going concern problems. The lists 
differentiate between financial, nonfinancial, internal and external matters. 
None of the standards claim that the indicators listed are exhaustive. It has 
been indicated in the previous chapter that some indicators are direct 
causes of business failure whereas others are merely symptoms of the 
causes (see sec 2.5.2.1). 
The indicators of going concern problems listed in appendix 2 of AUS 708 
(AARF 1996) are the most exhaustive compared with the other standards 
and include the following: 
* Operating indicators (including management attributes) 
a lack of strategic direction including appropriately documented 
policies, plans and forecasts such as forward budgets and cash 
flow projections 
deficiencies in the governing body, such as a lack of independent 
members, a low level of involvement in key decisions, poor 
documentation and communication of decisions, imbalance or a 
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lack of expertise among members 
a lack of management expertise or loss of key management 
personnel 
concentration of risk in a limited number of products or projects 
a loss of a major market, franchise or licence 
prolonged industrial relations difficulties 
shortages of important supplies or the loss of a principal supplier 
deficiencies in management information systems, including 
blockages in information flows, or lack of management action in 
response to information received 
rapid or unplanned development of business (particularly m 
noncore activities) without commensurate developments m 
information systems, management expertise, financing structures, 
pricing policies, et cetera 
uninsured or underinsured disasters such as drought, flood, fire, 
fraud or sabotage 
* Financial indicators 
high gearing or a net liability position 
fixed-term borrowings approaching maturity without realistic 
prospects of renewal or repayment 
reliance on short-term borrowings to finance long-term assets 
adverse key financial ratios: working capital ratio, gross profit ratio, 
times interest earned, return on equity, inventory turnover, et 
cetera 
a lack of sustainable operating profits or cash flows from core 
business activities 
arrears or discontinuance of dividends 
the inability to pay creditors on due dates 
excessive reliance on transactions with related parties 
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potential losses on long-term contracts or other uneconomic long-
term commitments 
difficulty in complying with the terms of loan agreements or the 
need to restructure debt 
denial of usual trade credit from suppliers 
the inability to obtain financing for necessary new product 
development or other necessary investments, or conversely, 
overinvestment in new products, ventures or research which are 
not yet successful 
the need to seek new sources or methods of financing or to 
dispose of substantial assets 
* Other indicators 
noncompliance with capital or other statutory requirements 
undue influence of a market dominant competitor 
legal proceedings against the entity that may result in judgments 
that could not be met or in restrictions on trading opportunities 
technical developments that render a key product obsolete 
adverse changes in legislation or government policy 
failure of other entities in the same industry 
a lack of adequate back-up and recovery capabilities for key 
financial or other information systems 
The auditing standards stress the fact that the existence of one or more of 
these indicators does not necessarily signify that the going concern basis 
needs to be questioned [AU 294 (SAICA 1986:8); AUS 708 (AARF 
1996:appendix 2); ISA 570 (IFAC 1995:6)] and that some of them may 
have significance only when viewed in conjunction with others [SAS No 59 
(AICPA 1988b:6)]. SAS No 59 (AICPA 1988b) requires the auditor to 
consider these indicators in the aggregate to decide if there is substantial 
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doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a gomg concern for a 
reasonable period of time. AU 294 (SAICA 1986:8) states further that the 
absence of any such indicators may constitute audit evidence of the 
continuity of the entity. 
The way in which practitioners in auditing practices rank these indicators 
of going concern problems in relative importance and the interaction 
between these indicators are discussed in the next chapter (see sec 4.2). 
3.4.3 Audit procedures that the auditor · must perform in the 
evaluation of the going concern assumption 
SAS No 59 (AICPA 1988b) does not prescribe specific audit procedures to 
identify indications of going concern problems but regards the normal 
audit procedures as sufficient for that purpose. Boritz ( 1991: 87) regards 
this as unrealistic and it has also been identified in this chapter as one of 
the shortcomings of SAS No 59 (see sec 3.2.1). SAS No 59 (AICPA 
1988b:5) provides examples of such normal audit procedures, which may 
indicate substantial doubt. These are: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
analytical procedures 
a review of subsequent events 
a review of compliance with the terms of debt and loan agreements 
the reading of minutes of meetings of stockholders, board of directors 
and important committees of the board 
an inquiry into an entity's legal counsel about litigation, claims and 
assessments 
confirmation with related and third parties of the details of 
arrangements to provide or maintain financial support 
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According to ISA 570 (IFAC 1995) and AUS 708 (AARF 1996), if a 
question arises about the going concern basis, then certain audit procedures 
may take on additional significance and/or should be extended or modified 
or it may be necessary to employ additional audit procedures. ISA 570 
(IFAC 1995:9-1 0) provide examples of procedures that are relevant in this 
regard, namely: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Analyse and discuss cash flow, profit and other relevant forecasts with 
management. Consider the reliability of the entity's system for 
generating such information and the appropriateness of the 
assumptions underlying the forecast. 
Compare the prospective data for recent prior periods with historical 
results and the prospective data for the current period with results 
achieved to date. 
Review events after the period end for items affecting the entity's 
ability to continue as a going concern. 
Analyse and discuss the entity's latest available interim financial 
statements. 
Review the terms of debentures and loan agreements and determine 
whether any have been breached. 
Read the minutes of the meetings of shareholders, the board of 
directors and important committees for references to financing 
difficulties. 
Address enquiries about litigation and claims to the entity's lawyer. 
Confirm the existence, legality and enforceability of arrangements to 
provide or maintain financial support with related and third parties 
and assess the financial ability of such parties to provide additional 
funds. 
Consider the entity's position with regard to unfilled customer orders. 
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The examples of the audit procedures given in ISA 570 (IFAC 1995) are 
basically the same as the audit procedures supplied by AUS 708 (AARF 
1996). SAS 130 (ICAEW 1994:25-27) provides detailed guidance to 
auditors on examining the existence, adequacy and terms of borrowing 
facilities. CICA Handbook Section 5510 (CICA 1989) does not provide 
the auditor with any guidance or examples of audit procedures to be 
performed if a going concern question arises. 
AU 294 (SAICA 1986:9) requires the auditor to carry out further audit 
procedures if a question about the entity's continuity arises, but it does not 
supply any examples of such audit procedures to be performed. A South 
African study conducted by Gerber (1987) showed that most of the auditors 
in his study did not follow formal audit procedures to evaluate the going 
concern status of an entity. This means in effect that they rely on their 
normal audit procedures in the overall assessment of the entity's going 
concern status. The following were ranked at the top of the procedures 
used by the respondents in this assessment: 
* 
* 
* 
the assessment of inherent risk at the planning stage 
the evaluation of cash forecasts and budgets 
the use of ratio analysis to 'pick up' going concern problems, that is 
used as an indicator of going concern problems 
ISA 570 (IFAC 1995), SAS No 59 (AICPA 1988b) and AUS 708 (AARF 
1996) provide examples of audit procedures that the auditor should conduct 
when evaluating management's plans to deal with the adverse effects of the 
continuity problem (see sec 3 .4.4). AU 294 (SAICA 1986) should be 
revised to give auditors guidance on what audit procedures they should 
employ if a going concern question arises. 
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3.4.4 The evaluation of management's plans dealing with the going 
concern problem 
In every auditing standard reviewed, except for CICA Handbook Section 
5510 (CICA 1989), the auditor has a responsibility to evaluate 
management's plans for dealing with the adverse effects of the conditions 
and events that lead to the continuity problem of the entity. It has been 
indicated in the previous chapter that management's plans are considered 
rescue actions outside the normal course of operations and are warning 
signs of business failure (see sec 2.5.2.3). It is therefore important for the 
auditor to consider and evaluate these plans of management. 
The extent of management's plans is divided into four main areas, namely, 
plans to dispose of assets (asset factors), borrow money or restructure debt 
(debt factors), reduce or delay expenditures (cost factors) and increase 
ownership equity (equity factors). ISA 570 (IFAC 1995) and AU 294 
(SAICA 1986) mention these four main areas only, while SAS No 59 
(AI CPA 1988b) and AUS 708 (AARF 1996) provide examples of each. 
Appendix 3 of AUS 708 (AARF 1996) cites the following examples under 
each of the above-mentioned headings: 
* Asset factors 
disposability of assets that are not operationally interdependent 
capability of delaying the replacement of assets consumed m 
operations or of leasing rather than purchasing certain assets 
possibility of using assets for factoring, sale and leaseback or 
similar arrangements 
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* Debt factors 
availability of unused lines of credit or similar borrowing 
capacity 
capability of renewing or extending the due dates of existing 
loans 
possibility of entering into debt restructuring agreements 
* Cost factors 
* 
separability of operations producing negative cash flows 
capability of postponing expenditures for such matters as 
maintenance or research and development 
possibility of reducing overhead and administrative expenditures 
Equity factors 
variability of dividend requirements 
capability of obtaining additional contributions by owners 
possibility of increasing cash distributions from subsidiaries or 
associates 
The auditing standards requue the auditor to consider and evaluate the 
plans of management and other mitigating factors. For example, the loss 
of a principal supplier may be mitigated by the availability of a suitable 
alternative source of supply. SAS No 59 (AI CPA 1988b) and AUS 708 
(AARF 1996) provide the auditor with additional guidance in the form of 
basic audit procedures to evaluate these plans, compared to the other 
auditing standards. AU 294 (SAICA 1986) requires the auditor to consider 
the bases on which the plans have been prepared, that they conform with 
facts already known to him, that the plans are specific rather than general 
and that they are feasible courses of action. However, SAS No 59 (AICPA 
1988b) and AUS 708 (AARF 1996) elaborate on this by providing the 
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auditor with guidance on how to obtain such assurance. 
Examples of audit procedures prescribed by AUS 708 (AARF 1996:22-28) 
to evaluate management's plans, are as follows: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Obtain written representations from management. 
Analyse and discuss cash flow, profit and other relevant forecasts with 
management at the latest practicable date before the date of the audit 
report. 
Consider the reliability of the entity's system for generating such 
information. 
Consider the support for significant assumptions underlying the 
forecast. 
Compare prospective data for recent pnor periods with historical 
results, and prospective data for the current period with results 
achieved to date. 
Obtain a third party's confirmation of the existence of arrangements 
made if their support is significant for the successful outcome of the 
plans. 
Examine the existence, adequacy and terms of borrowing facilities by 
obtaining confirmations from bankers and making an assessment of 
their intentions. 
ISA 570 (IFAC 1995), AUS 708 (AARF 1996) and AU 294 (SAICA 1986) 
all warn the auditor that the relevance of management's plans decreases as 
the time period for planned actions and anticipated events increases. 
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3.4.5 Summary of the auditor's evaluating responsibility 
More responsibility is being placed on auditors to actively evaluate their 
clients' continued existence for a reasonable period of time. This may 
result in the earlier identification of going concern problems with the 
advantage of the auditor being in a position to make constructive 
suggestions and assist management to plan effective strategies to solve the 
problem. SAS 130 (ICAEW 1994) and AUS 708 (AARF 1996) also limit 
the auditor's responsibility regarding the going concern basis to assess the 
adequacy of the means by which the directors have to adopt or evaluate the 
going concern basis for a reasonable period. 
Sufficient guidance Is provided by the auditing standards reviewed 
regarding indicators of going concern problems that the auditor must 
recognise and evaluate. Extensive lists of examples of indications of going 
concern problems are provided. However, audit procedures to evaluate the 
indicators of going concern problems are not covered sufficiently in AU 
294 (SAICA 1986) and some of the other auditing standards. The audit 
procedures supplied by ISA 570 (IFAC 1995) and AUS 708 (AARF 1996) 
give detailed guidance to auditors to evaluate identified going concern 
problems. 
All the standards reviewed require the auditor to evaluate management's 
plans for dealing with the adverse effects of the conditions and events that 
lead to the going concern problem. However, only SAS No 59 (AICPA 
1988b) and AUS 708 (AARF 1996) supply the auditor with procedures on 
how to evaluate such plans. There is a correlation between these audit 
procedures and the audit procedures supplied by ISA 570 (IFAC 1995) to 
evaluate identified going concern problems. 
103 
None of the statements reviewed advocates the use of failure prediction 
models to help the auditor to evaluate an entity's continuity. However, the 
appendix of the Analytical Review Auditing Guideline (AUP 17) in 
Australia, recognises the use of failure prediction models to obtain 
evidence of the going concern assumption (Shailer 1988). Shailer 
(1988 :65) regards the models referred to in AUP 17 as generally unsuitable 
and that the references in AUP 17 to these models should be removed. 
3.5 A COMPARISON OF THE VARIOUS PROFESSIONAL 
AUDITING STANDARDS ON THE 
GOING 
AUDITOR'S 
CONCERN RESPONSIBILITY 
ASSUMPTION 
TO REPORT THE 
A comparison of the requirements of the professional auditing standards 
regarding the auditor's reporting responsibility, indicates that it varies 
according to whether the going concern assumption is considered 
appropriate, questionable or inappropriate. In his reporting responsibility, 
the auditor should consider the adequacy of the disclosure of the going 
concern problem in the financial statements. The nature and extent of 
these disclosure requirements were discussed in the previous chapter (see 
sec 2.4). 
3.5.1 If the going concern assumption is considered appropriate 
If the auditor concludes that the entity will be able to continue as a going 
concern for the foreseeable future, he should express an unqualified 
opinion. This is the view of all the auditing standards reviewed. 
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ISA 570 (IFAC 1995), SAS No 59 (AICPA 1988b) and AUS 708 (AARF 
1996) require further that the auditor should consider the need for 
disclosure of the principal conditions that raised the doubt, mitigating 
factors and management's plans to alleviate the going concern problem. If 
the necessary disclosures are not made, the auditor should express a 
qualified opinion, 'except for' or express an adverse opinion, on the basis 
of the lack of disclosure. According to AU 294 (SAICA 1986), the auditor 
is not required to consider any disclosures if the going concern question is 
resolved. 
SAS 130 (ICAEW 1994) reqmres the auditor to consider whether the 
period to which the directors have paid particular attention is less than one 
year from the date of approval of the financial statements. If the period is 
less than one year it should be disclosed in the financial statements, and if 
it is not disclosed the auditor should mention it in the audit report. An 
unqualified opinion should still be issued. 
3.5.2 If there is significant/substantial uncertainty about the going 
concern assumption 
3. 5. 2.1 Adequate disclosure in the financial statements 
ISA 570 (IFAC 1995), SAS No 59 (AI CPA 1988b ), SAS 130 (ICAEW 
1994) and AUS 708 (AARF 1996) all require the auditor not to qualify his 
opinion or give an adverse opinion, but to add an explanatory/emphasis of 
matter paragraph in the audit report which draws attention to the note 
highlighting the uncertainty in the financial statements. CICA Handbook 
Section 5510 (CICA 1989) also requires the auditor not to qualify his 
opinion, but no mention of this should be made in the audit report. 
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AU 294 (SAICA 1986) is confusing at this stage, as it has not yet been 
revised. Paragraph 18 allows the auditor to issue an unqualified opinion if 
there is no likely impact on the carrying value of assets and liabilities and 
there is adequate disclosure of the going concern problem in the financial 
statements. Paragraph 32 of SAAS 700 (SAICA 1997c) supersedes the 
auditor's reporting responsibility as set out in paragraph 18. It also allows 
the auditor to issue an unqualified opinion but with an emphasis of matter 
paragraph to highlight the disclosure in the financial statements. This 
requirement is in line with the above-mentioned auditing standards. 
However, SAAS 700 (SAICA 1997c) is the only standard that allows the 
auditor the option to disclaim an opinion under these circumstances, if the 
matter is so pervasive and fundamental that according to his judgement it 
is not appropriate to issue an unqualified opinion. 
AU 294 (SAICA 1986) should be revised to be more specific about what 
the auditor's reporting responsibility is if an uncertainty is adequately 
disclosed and when it is not adequately disclosed. 
3. 5.2. 2 Inadequate disclosure in the financial statements 
All the guidelines reviewed, except for AU 294 (SAICA 1986), which is 
silent on this point, require an 'except for' qualification or an adverse 
qualification for disagreement if an uncertainty exists and it is not 
adequately disclosed in the financial statements. An explanatory 
paragraph, stating that there is substantial doubt about the entity's ability 
to continue as a going concern and that the financial statements do not 
disclose this fact, forms part of the audit report. However, these 
requirements do form part of SAAS 700 (SAICA 1997c) that supersedes 
AU 294 (SAICA 1986). 
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3.5.3 If the going concern assumption is considered inappropriate 
ISA 570 (IFAC 1995), SAS 130 (ICAEW 1994) and AUS 708 (AARF 1996) 
require the auditor to issue an adverse opinion if he comes to the 
conclusion that the going concern assumption is being inappropriately used 
in the preparation of the financial statements. SAS No 59 (AICPA 1988b) 
and CICA Handbook Section 5510 (CICA 1989) are silent on this point. 
In considering the materiality of the effect of this disagreement, AU 294 
(SAICA 1986: 16) gives the auditor the option to issue an unqualified, 
qualified or adverse opinion, as appropriate. SAAS 700 (SAICA 1997c) is 
silent on this point. In the light of the seriousness of this situation where 
it is completely predictable that a company will be forced to cease 
operations but the financial statements have nevertheless been prepared on 
a going concern basis, one cannot possibly see how the auditor can issue an 
audit report without saying a word about the problem or even qualifying 
'except for'. An adverse opinion seems to be appropriate under these 
circumstances because of the pervasive effect of using the assumption. 
3.5.4 Summary of the auditor's reporting responsibility 
The auditor's reporting responsibility, according to the professional 
auditing statements, are summarised in table 3-2. The reporting 
requirements of ISA 570 (IFAC 1995), SAS No 59 (AICPA 1988b), SAS 
130 (ICAEW 1994) and AUS 708 (AARF 1996) are all quite in line. 
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TABLE 3-2 
COMPARISON OF THE GOING CONCERN STANDARDS -
THE AUDITOR'S REPORTING RESPONSIBILITY7 
Standard Going concern Going concern uncertainty Going concern 
resolved Adequate Inadequate Invalid 
disclosure disclosure 
ISA 570 Unqualified + Unqualified + 'Except for' or Adverse opinion 
consider emphasis of matter adverse opinion 
disclosure IF paragraph 
nondisclosure, 
'except for' 
SASNo Unqualified + Unqualified + 'Except for' or Silent 
59 consider explanatory adverse opinion 
disclosure IF paragraph 
nondisclosure, 
'except for' 
SAS 130 Unqualified + Unqualified 'Except for' or Adverse 
consider period +explanatory adverse opinion Opinion 
paid attention to paragraph 
by directors 
AUS 708 Unqualified + Unqualified+ 'Except for' or Adverse opinion 
consider emphasis of matter adverse opinion 
disclosure IF paragraph 
nondisclosure, 
'except for' 
AU294/ Unqualified Unqualified + 'Except for' or Unqualified or 
SAAS 700 .. emphasis of matter adverse opinion 'except for' or opm10n 
paragraph OR adverse opinion 
disclaimer of 
opinion if 
pervasive+ 
fundamental 
If a qualification is issued all these standards require a paragraph explaining the qualification to 
precede the opinion paragraph. 
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The reporting requirements of AU 294 (SAICA 1986) differ from the 
other standards reviewed and need to be revised to be in line with SAAS 
700 (SAICA 1997c) and to be more specific when there is/is not adequate 
disclosure of the going concern problem in the financial statements. The 
option to issue an unqualified opinion under AU 294 (SAICA 1986), when 
there is uncertainty about the going concern assumption or when the going 
concern assumption is considered to be inappropriate, should also be 
reconsidered for revision. 
The degree of assurance that is required to confirm/dispel uncertainty 
about the going concern assumption is not spelled out in the auditing 
standards on going concern. The standards require the auditor to consider 
if 'substantial doubt' or 'significant uncertainty' about the entity's ability 
to continue as a going concern remains or is dispelled but without 
defining these terms. 
The 'subject to' qualification for uncertainties has been eliminated in all 
the auditing standards reviewed. However, a 'red flag' to warn users of 
financial statements about the entity experiencing going concern problems 
has been retained in the form of an explanatory paragraph. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the guidance provided by the existing 
professional auditing standards to the auditor in evaluating and reporting 
on the going concern assumption. The auditing standards issued by the 
International Federation of Accountants, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Canada and Australia were compared with the South African 
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standard with a view to critically analysing the South African standard. It 
may be concluded that current standards in the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Australia are providing sufficient guidance to auditors, 
although there are still some shortcomings. 
This chapter has indicated that the evolution of the gomg concern 
assumption, in all the professional auditing standards reviewed, has 
advanced to a stage where the auditor is required to follow an active 
approach in the evaluation of the going concern assumption. The auditing 
standard of Canada is in the process of being revised to adopt a more 
active approach. The South African standard needs to be revised to adopt 
a more definite active approach. 
Shortcomings identified in the auditing standards are the absence of 
specific audit procedures, to evaluate the going concern assumption and to 
evaluate management's plans to deal with the adverse effects of the going 
concern problem, and the fact that substantial/significant doubt is not well 
defined. The South African standard needs to be revised to address these 
shortcomings. An examination of the auditor's reporting responsibility in 
the presence of a going concern problem has revealed that the South 
African standard, AU 294 (SAICA 1986), differs from the other standards 
reviewed and that it needs to be revised to be compatible with the 
international requirements. 
The next chapter exammes empirical research studies that have been 
conducted on the auditor's decision making in the presence of going 
concern uncertainties. 
CHAPTER 4 
AUDITOR'S DECISION-MAKING IN THE PRESENCE OF 
GOING CONCERN UNCERTAINTIES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters have examined the guidance provided by the 
professional accounting and auditing standards to the auditor in evaluating 
the going concern assumption. It has been indicated that the professional 
auditing standards provide general guidelines on how auditors should 
evaluate the going concern assumption. According to these standards 
auditors first have to evaluate various types of evidence (indicators of 
going concern problems) to determine the nature and significance of any of 
the client's financial problems. Secondly, for all significant problems, the 
auditor should consider and evaluate any mitigating factors, such as 
management plans to overcome the problems as well as any aggravating 
factors. Only then will the auditor be in a position to reach a decision 
whether or not a going concern qualification should be issued. 1 
Any referral to a going concern qualification in this chapter is meant to be a qualification as set 
out in section 3.5. 
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The objective of this chapter is to review empirical work conducted on the 
auditor's decision-making process in the presence of going concern 
uncertainties, to establish if the auditor's decision-making process does 
follow the guidelines as set out in the professional auditing standards. In 
reviewing these empirical research studies on the auditor's decision-
making process another objective of this chapter is to: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
determine which indicators are used or are considered important by 
auditors to identify companies as going concern problem companies 
identify factors that influence the auditor's decision to issue a going 
concern qualification 
report on the auditor's failure to issue a going concern qualification by 
analysing the frequency of the misclassification of a nongoing concern 
as a going concern (Type I error) and analysing the frequency of the 
misclassification of a going concern as a nongoing concern (Type II 
error) 
report on the status of going concern qualifications issued m the 
Republic of South Africa 
determine whether the Issuance of the South African auditing 
standard, AU 294 (SAICA 1986), had any affect on the auditor's 
qualifying behaviour 
determine whether the consequences of qualifying influence the 
auditor's decision to issue a going concern qualification 
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4.2 THE AUDITOR'S IDENTIFICATION OF A GOING CONCERN 
PROBLEM COMPANY 
The results of a study conducted by Kida (1980: 186) revealed that the 
auditor's identification of a going concern problem company IS separate 
from his decision to issue a going concern opinion. The identification of 
characteristics that mark a company as a potential recipient of a gomg 
concern opinion represents the first stage in the auditor's going concern 
decision-making process. Such a company is called a gomg concern 
problem company and the characteristics are indicators of going concern 
problems. 
Numerous warning signs/indicators of financial problems or of impending 
business failure have been identified in the literature, which distinguishes 
between operating and financial indicators and which has cited poor 
management as the initial cause of business failure (see sec 2.5.2.1). All 
the professional auditing standards reviewed, provided lists of indicators 
of going concern problems which can help auditors to identify companies 
with going concern problems. The lists distinguished between financial, 
nonfinancial, internal and external indicators (see sec 3 .4.2). 
This section examines vanous behavioural research studies that have 
employed audit managers and partners as subjects to determine which 
indicators are used by them or considered important by them to identify 
companies as having going concern problems. 
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4.2.1 Ranking of indicators of going concern problems 
4. 2.1.1 Ranking of financial evidence indicators 
The author was able to locate four behavioural research studies that 
examine which of the indicators supplied in the professional auditing 
standards are regarded as valuable going concern problem company 
indicators by auditors and if there are any other indicators not supplied in 
the auditing standards that they regard as important. These research 
studies are summarised in table 4-1. The results of the Kida ( 1980) and the 
Mutchler (1984) studies were obtained from questionnaire responses 
received, that elicited from audit partners specific indicators used by them 
to identify going concern problem companies. Williams (1990) and Gerber 
(1987) supplied auditors with indicators listed in SAS No 59 (AICPA 
1988b) and AU 294 (SAICA 1986) respectively, which the auditors had to 
rank according to relative importance. 
Audit partners m the Mutchler (1984:25) study indicated that the two 
criteria, 'enter receivership ' 2 and 'enter reorganisation proceedings' are 
sufficient in themselves to indicate the presence of going concern 
problems. They were also ranked (a) and (b) indicators in the Kida 
(1980:509) study. When the stages of business failure were discussed in 
chapter 2 of this study, these two criteria were also identified as indicators 
of very substantial doubt about the validity of the going concern 
assumption (see sec 2.5). Williams (1990) and Gerber (1987) did not 
supply the partners in their studies with these two criteria because they are 
not included in SAS No 59 (AI CPA 1988b) and AU 294 (SAICA 1986). In 
fact they were not included in any of the professional standards reviewed, 
'Enter receivership' was defined earlier in this study (see table 2-2). 
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TABLE4-1 
BEHAVIOURAL RESEARCH STUDIES -
INDICATORS OF GOING CONCERN PROBLEMS RANKED BY AUDITORS 
Kida (1980) Mutchler (1984) Gerber (1987) Williams (1990) 
Enter receivership Enter receivership Substantial borrowing Default on loan 
without prospects of payment/similar 
renewal or repayment agreement 
Enter Enter reorganisation Net liability position Recurring 
reorganisation operating losses 
Unable to meet Unable to meet Net current liability Denial ofusual 
interest payments interest payments position trade credit from 
suppliers 
Three straight years Three straight years Loss of major market, Negative cash 
of losses of losses franchise or licence flow from 
operations 
Liquidate its assets Three straight years Substantial losses Arrearages in 
of deficit dividends 
Three straight years Negative net worth Pending legal 
of deficit proceedings 
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although they appear to be highly ranked as gomg concern problem 
indicators by practising auditors. 
Of all the indicators of gomg concern problems supplied by the 
professional standards, an entity's inability to meet interest payments/loan 
payments or to repay or renew borrowings approaching maturity, are 
regarded by the auditors in the above-mentioned studies as the most 
important indicator of going concern problems. This is confirmed by a 
study conducted by Chen and Church (1992:30) which revealed that 
auditors rely heavily on the default status of an entity in making going 
concern decisions. The default status is an entity that has difficulty 
fulfilling its debt obligations, such as compliance with lending agreements 
or making scheduled payments and the restructuring of debe and 
management's negotiations with creditors to cure the default of agreements 
or to reschedule payments. 
The auditors in the studies listed in table 4-1 have also identified recurring 
losses, which appear in the lists of indicators supplied by the professional 
standards, as an important indicator of going concern problems. 
Mutchler ( 1986) conducted another study in which she identified a group 
of 119 going concern problem companies that had not received a gomg 
concern qualification. None of these companies has met one of the three 
most important indicators of going concern problems identified in the 
above-mentioned empirical research studies, namely receivership, 
reorganisation and inability to meet interest payments. The absence 
Restructuring of debt is listed by the professional standards as an indicator of going concern 
problems as well as a plan of management to mitigate the adverse effects of the going concern 
problem. Chen and Church's study also confirms that restructuring of debt is an indicator of 
going concern problems as well as a factor that influences the auditor's decision to issue a going 
concern qualification (see sec 4.3.2). 
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thereof confirms the importance of these three criteria to auditors as 
indicators of going concern problems. It also points to the fact stressed in 
AU 294 (SAICA 1986) that the absence of any one of the going concern 
problem indicators may constitute audit evidence of the continuity of the 
entity (see sec 3.4.2). 
Williams (1990) supplied the auditors in his study with only five of the 
indicators listed in SAS No 59 (AICPA 1988b) whereas Gerber (1987) 
supplied the auditors with 16 of the indicators listed in AU 294 (SAICA 
1986). Arrearages in dividends were listed overall number 16 in Gerber's 
study and five in Williams's study and thus appear to be of little or no 
importance to auditors as an indicator of going concern problems. 
4. 2.1. 2 Ranking of adverse key financial ratios 
The professional standards list adverse key financial ratios as an indicator 
of going concern problems. In the Gerber study (1987:49), 77 percent of 
the auditors indicated that they use financial ratio analysis to 'pick up 
going concern problems'. In another study, auditors were supplied with 
only financial ratio data and were able to discriminate between going 
concern problem companies and nongoing concern problem companies with 
an average accuracy rate of 83 percent (Kida 1980:520). These results 
suggest that financial ratio data may provide useful information for 
auditors when identifying companies with going concern problems. 
This section examines which financial ratios auditors consider to be more 
important than others. 
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Auditors in the Mutchler study (1984:28) indicated that debt-related ratios 
were crucial from their point of view. Five of the top six ratios rated by 
them were debt-related ratios. The top six ratios rated by these auditors in 
order of preference are as follows: 
( 1) cash flow/total debt 
(2) current assets/current liabilities 
(3) net worth/total debt 
( 4) total debt/total assets 
(5) total liabilities/total assets 
(6) net income/net sales 
The auditors in the Gerber study (1987) also showed preference for debt-
related ratios. Four of the top six ratios rated by them were debt-related 
ratios. Gerber gave insufficiently clear instructions to the auditor subjects 
in the ranking of the ratios, which resulted in two sets of data. Gerber did 
a Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient test and concluded that: ' ... one 
may safely draw the same conclusion from both sets of data' (Gerber 
1987:58). The top six ratios rated in the one set of data were also under 
the top six ratios in the other set but not exactly in the same order. The 
top six ratios identified by these two sets of data are as follows: 
(1) quick assets/current liabilities4 
(2) cash flow/total liabilities 
(3) cash flow/total debt 
( 4) return on total assets 
(5) total debt/total assets 
(6) net income/net sales 
Mutchler did not supply the auditor subjects in her study with the quick assets/current liabilities 
ratio, although the subjects did mention it most frequently in the interviews. 
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Levitan and Knoblett (1985:38) identified the ratio of total debt/total 
assets as the most heavily weighted variable used by auditors in their 
study. 
Auditors in a study by Simnett and Trotman (1989) identified the following 
ratios that they preferred, in order to distinguish between failed and 
nonfailed firms: 
* 
* 
* 
cash flow before tax/financial debt 
current ratio 
quick asset ratio 
In summary, the following five ratios have been identified in more than 
one of the above-mentioned studies as being crucial to auditors as 
indicators of going concern problems, namely: 
(1) current assets/current liabilities (current ratio) 
(2) quick assets/current liabilities (quick asset ratio) 
(3) cash flow/total debt 
( 4) total debt/total assets 
(5) net income/net sales 
Two ratios that were indicated as being considered the least important by 
the auditors in the studies of Mutchler (1984) and Gerber (1987) were net 
sales/total assets and net income/total assets or retained earnings/total 
assets. 
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4. 2 .1. 3 Ranking of nonfinancial evidence indicators 
All of the studies mentioned in table 4-1 focused primarily on the ranking 
of financial evidence indicators. Nonfinancial indicators of going concern 
problems can be related to the indicators of business failure identified in 
chapter 2 and specifically to poor management which has been identified as 
the initial cause of business failure (see sec 2.5.2.1). 
Ponemon and Schick (1991) conducted a study employing 86 audit 
managers to determine their perceptions of 12 organisational decline 
characteristics for 43 financially distressed firms and 43 nondistressed 
firms. The study provided evidence that auditors associated six of the 12 
characteristics of organisational decline with clients in financial distress. 
The six characteristics are as follows: 
(1) Long-term planning is neglected. 
(2) Key managers and administrators are often scapegoats. 
(3) There is a great deal of turnover in management and administrative 
positions. 
( 4) Morale is declining within the organisation. 
(5) There is no place where the organisation can cut expenditures without 
severely damaging itself. 
(6) When cutbacks do occur they are not prioritised. 
These characteristics of organisational decline are indicators of gomg 
concern problems but management can still implement plans to deal with 
the adverse effects thereof. The combination of these qualitative 
characteristics of organisational decline together with the financial 
evidence indicators can provide the auditor with a good perception of 
whether or not the company is a going concern problem company. 
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4.2.2 Interaction of going concern problem indicators 
In contrast to the overall conclusion drawn in the ranking of the financial 
evidence indicators that arrearages in dividends are of little or no 
importance, it was found that six of the respondents in Gerber's study 
(1987:51) regarded it as very important and one respondent even as 
sufficient alone to indicate going concern problems. This inconsistency 
indicates that auditors do not view indicators of going concern problems in 
isolation. In another study (Williams 1984:14), there was also little 
consistency in the rankings of going concern problem indicators by audit 
partners. This suggests that no one indicator dominates the going concern 
judgment, but that the interaction of the indicators was considered to be of 
vital importance. It confirms the fact emphasised in the professional 
standards reviewed, that some indicators may have significance only when 
viewed in conjunction with other indicators (see sec 3 .4.2). 
Mutchler (1986) identified a set of 15 problem company criteria that were 
obtained from previous research, interviews, questionnaires and 
examination of data from a set of companies that had received a going 
concern qualification (see table 4-2). The criteria are all solvency-related 
and are highly correlated; for example, a company entered m 
reorganisation proceedings will probably also have losses, deficits and 
negative working capital. A group of 119 going concern problem 
companies with going concern qualifications and a group of 119 going 
concern problem companies without going concern qualifications5 were 
examined to determine the total number of problem criteria met by a 
company. 
Going concern problem companies without going concern qualifications were companies that 
met at least one of the going concern problem criteria. 
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The results showed that a company that meets eight or more of the problem 
criteria listed in table 4-2 is more likely to receive a going concern 
qualification and that a company with five or less of the criteria is likely to 
receive an unqualified opinion (Mutchler 1986: 156). Thus the higher the 
total number of problem criteria met by a company, the greater the 
likelihood is that the company will receive a going concern qualification. 
This confirms the professional standards that the auditor considers the 
going concern problem indicators in the aggregate to decide whether or not 
there is substantial doubt about the going concern assumption (see sec 
3.4.2). This was also confirmed by one of the auditor subjects in the 
Gerber study (1987:60) who stated that he found it extremely difficult to 
rank the financial ratios in order of importance because their overall 
impact was weighed up before any conclusions were drawn. 
When a company exhibited six or seven of the problem criteria it was just 
as likely to receive an unqualified opinion as it was to receive a qualified 
opinion (Mutchler 1986:158). This suggests that other factors must have 
influenced the auditor's decision to issue or not to issue a going concern 
qualification (see sec 4.3). 
4.2.3 Summary of the auditor's identification of a going concern 
problem company 
The professional auditing standards provide the auditor with lists of 
indicators of going concern problems. The results of behavioural research 
studies have indicated that some of these indicators are regarded as more 
important than others by auditors to identify a going concern problem 
company. 
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TABLE 4-2 
GOING CONCERN PROBLEM COMPANY CRITERIA 
(1) Enter receivership 
(2) Enter reorganisation 
(3) Inability to meet interest payment 
(4) Going concern audit report in previous year 
(5) In liquidation 
(6) Negative net worth 
(7) Negative cash flow 
(8) Negative working capital 
(9) Three straight years of losses 
(10) Three straight years of deficit 
(11) Two straight years of losses 
(12) Two straight years of deficit 
(13) Current year loss 
(14) Current year deficit 
(15) Negative income from operations 
Source: Mutchler (1986:151) 
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The default status of a client which involves the client's inability to meet 
interest/loan payments or to repay/renew borrowings approaching maturity 
was identified as the most important indicator of going concern problems. 
Recurring losses were also identified as an important indicator of going 
concern problems. However, two financial evidence indicators that were 
highly ranked by the auditors as indicators of going concern problems, 
namely 'enter receivership' and 'enter reorganisation proceedings', do not 
appear in the auditing standards. The auditing standards should be 
amended to include these two criteria in the lists of indicators of going 
concern problems. 
It has also been indicated that auditors use financial ratio analysis to 'pick 
up going concern problems'. Debt-related ratios were identified by the 
auditors as the most important ratios to indicate going concern problems, 
as well as the ratio of net income/net sales. 
The combination of nonfinancial and financial indicators of going concern 
problems may provide the auditor with a good perception of the company 
being a going concern problem company or not. This section indicated that 
auditors consider going concern problem indicators in the aggregate as 
well as the interaction between these indicators in identifying a company 
as a going concern problem company. 
However, the identification of a going concern problem company does not 
necessarily lead to a going concern qualification as management can still 
implement plans to deal with the adverse effects of the going concern 
problems. The auditor should take these plans into account and evaluate 
them before a going concern decision can be made (see sec 4.3). 
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4.3 FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE AUDITOR'S DECISION TO 
ISSUE A GOING CONCERN QUALIFICATION 
The second stage in the auditor's decision-making process 1s the 
consideration and evaluation of factors that may influence the auditor's 
decision to issue a going concern qualification. 
The factors to be considered and evaluated by the auditor include 
management's plans to mitigate the going concern problem as well as any 
other factors that may aggravate the going concern problem. The 
professional auditing standards reviewed divide management's plans into 
plans to dispose of assets, plans to borrow money or restructure debt, plans 
to reduce or delay expenditures and plans to increase ownership equity (see 
sec 3.4.4). 
Mitigating and aggravating factors can be classified as prospective 
information factors. 
have assessed the 
The section below examines empirical studies that 
influence of historical information factors and 
prospective information factors on the auditor's going concern decision. 
4.3.1 The influence of historical information factors on the auditor's 
decision to issue a going concern qualification 
It was indicated in the previous section that historical information, such as 
recurring losses and financial ratio analysis, may provide important 
indications of going concern problems (see sec 4.2.1 ). However, as 
indicated in this section this information may not influence the auditor's 
decision to issue a going concern qualification, as it is not the final factor 
to be considered by the auditor in the decision-making process. 
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Mutchler ( 1986) used discriminant scores generated by a financial ratio 
model (historical information) to assess the relative degree of financial 
distress exhibited by companies that did receive a gomg concern 
qualification and those that did not. The companies were divided into 
three groups, namely those meeting five or fewer of the problem criteria, 
those meeting six or seven and those meeting eight or more of the problem 
criteria (see sec 4.2.2 for a more detailed description of this specific 
study). For the group of companies falling into the six or seven problem 
company criteria category, it was found that the companies that did not 
receive a going concern qualification, exhibited a higher degree of 
financial distress in contrast to those that did receive a going concern 
qualification. The group of companies falling into the eight or more 
problem company criteria category showed essentially the same level of 
financial distress whether they were qualified or not. These findings are in 
contrast to normal expectations and indicate that there must be factors 
other than or in addition to financial distress exhibited by the compames 
(based on historical information) that led to the auditor's opinion decision. 
This confirms that historical information is not a determining factor in an 
auditor's decision to qualify or not to qualify. 
Auditors have indicated that they seldom use financial ratio analysis 6 in 
their decision to issue a going concern qualification because they have an 
insider's view of management (intimate knowledge of the client) and do 
not have to resort to ratio analysis (Gerber 1987:43, Mutchler 1984:27). 
Financial ratios also become less reliable as failure approaches because of 
the effect of creative accounting (see sec 2.5.2.1). These can be 
interpreted as reasons why some auditors do not use financial ratio analysis 
in their going concern decision. 
Financial ratio analysis is performed on historical information as reflected in the fmancial 
statements. 
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Levitan and Knoblett (1985:39) refer to an observation made by the Cohen 
Commission on financial ratios, namely: 
The Cohen Commission was mindful of research showing that 
analysis of financial statements using certain simple ratios was a 
better indicator of a company's future prospects than noting whether 
the auditor had expressed a qualified opinion or an unqualified 
opinion. This study provides some confirmation of this observation. 
The Cohen Commission's observation and the study of Levitan and 
Knoblett could in effect mean that auditors do not use financial ratio 
analysis in their final decision to issue a going concern qualification or 
not. 
Historical information is thus not a determining factor in the auditor's 
going concern opinion. However, it is an indicator of going concern 
problems and is used by auditors as such to identify going concern problem 
compames. 
4.3.2 The influence of prospective information factors on the 
auditor's decision to issue a going concern qualification 
Prospective information factors can be divided into the following two 
groups: 
(1) mitigating factors that will prevent a going concern qualification 
(2) aggravating factors that will determine a going concern qualification. 
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Mitigating factors can be related to management's plans for dealing with 
the adverse effects of the conditions and events that lead to the entity's 
continuity problems. Aggravating factors are factors that can aggravate the 
identified going concern problem. Mitigating and aggravating factors may 
be either solvency-related or nonsolvency-related items. 
Management's plans to mitigate the adverse effects of gomg concern 
problems are divided by the auditing standards reviewed, into plans to 
dispose of assets, borrow money or restructure debt, reduce or delay 
expenditures and increase ownership equity (see sec 3 .4.4). Nine out of 15 
audit partners interviewed by Williams (1984: 16) indicated that 
management's plans to borrow money or restructure debt and plans to 
reduce or delay expenditures were considered more important than plans to 
dispose of assets or to increase ownership equity because those benefits are 
realised most quickly. 
Restructuring of debt has been indicated as a vital indicator of gomg 
concern problems (see sec 4.2.1.1). However, it is also one of 
management's plans to mitigate the entity's going concern problems and is 
considered by the auditor to be a very important factor in his decision to 
issue or not to issue a going concern qualification. This is confirmed by 
the results of Chen and Church's (1992:31) study which indicated that 77 
percent of a group of 127 firms that received a going concern qualification 
were in default or in the process of restructuring their debt. A control 
group of 127 going concern problem firms that did not receive a going 
concern qualification was also examined. Only one firm in the control 
group was in default. These results suggest that if an entity is in default or 
in the process of restructuring its debt, this creates substantial doubt in the 
auditor whether the entity is a going concern and influences his going 
concern decision. 
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Mutchler (1986) used good news (mitigating factors) and bad news 
(aggravating factors) items as variables to determine the impact on the 
auditor's qualifying behaviour (see table 4-3). For the group of companies 
falling into the categories of meeting six or seven and eight or more of the 
problem company criteria, it was found that the companies that did not 
receive a going concern qualification had, on average, a greater number of 
good news items and a smaller number of bad news items, and vice versa 
for the companies that did receive a qualification. The results of 
Mutchler's study indicate that auditors do take into account mitigating and 
aggravating factors in their decision to issue or not to issue a going 
concern qualification. 
A study by Arnold and Edwards (1993:61) also confirms that the auditor's 
decision to issue a going concern qualification is influenced by prospective 
information: 
The results of this study, for example, suggest a significant loss from 
operations in the current year may be a significant factor used by 
auditors to identify potential going concern problems. However, 
because of its historical rather than prospective nature, the current 
year's loss may not be important in the actual decision whether an 
explanatory paragraph on continuity is needed. The going concern 
decision tends to be based on prospective information- credit, 
economic outlook, litigation, etc., not on factors related to past 
performance. 
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TABLE4-3 
GOOD NEWS AND BAD NEWS VARIABLES 
Bad news 
Default on debt 
Inventory obsolescence 
Loss of major customer 
Accounts receivable factoring 
Preferred dividend arrearages 
Employee strike 
Federal tax lien 
Product obsolescence 
Lost money on a fixed-price contract 
Loss of purchase discounts from suppliers 
In reorganisation 
Source: Mutchler (1986:154) 
Goodnews 
Line of credit available 
Successful new product 
Increase in research and development 
expenditures 
Sale of common stock 
Issue of new debt 
Forgiveness of debt including preferred 
dividends 
Restructuring of debt 
Waivers obtained for violation of debt 
covenants 
Obtained employee and supplier concessions 
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4.3.3 Summary of the factors that influence the auditor's decision 
to issue a going concern qualification 
This section indicates that historical information, as reflected in the 
financial statements, is not a determining factor that influences the 
auditor's decision to issue or not to issue a going concern qualification. 
Auditors have also indicated that they do not have to resort to ratio 
analysis (historical information) to make a going concern decision because 
they have intimate knowledge of the client which allows for judgments to 
be made about management performance and management restructuring 
(prospective information). 
The auditor's decision to issue or not to issue a going concern qualification 
is influenced by prospective information factors. Prospective information 
factors consist of management's plans to mitigate the going concern 
problem situation as well as any other factors that may aggravate the 
situation. Certain plans of management, as identified by the professional 
auditing standards, are considered to be more important than others by 
auditors in public practice. Management's plans to restructure debt have 
been indicated as a vital factor that influences the auditor's decision to 
issue or not to issue a going concern qualification. 
After evaluating the mitigating and aggravating factors, the auditor is in a 
position to qualify or not to qualify the going concern problem company's 
financial statements. However, many companies have failed without 
receiving a going concern qualification in their audit report for the last 
financial statements issued prior to the bankruptcy. The degree to which 
auditors fail to issue going concern qualifications when needed is 
discussed in the next section. 
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4.4 THE AUDITOR'S FAILURE TO ISSUE THE APPROPRIATE 
GOING CONCERN QUALIFICATION 
As statistics indicate in this section, paradoxically, the majority of 
companies that have failed did not receive a going concern qualification 
prior to failure, while companies that did receive a going concern 
qualification actually survived. This section explores this phenomenon. 
4.4.1 The misclassification of a nongoing concern as a going concern 
{Type I error) 
The results of a number of empirical research studies performed in the 
United Kingdom and the United States have shown that less than 50 
percent of bankrupt companies received a going concern qualification for 
the last financial statements issued prior to the bankruptcy (see table 4-4). 
From these statistics it would seem that auditors are not very good at 
warning about impending failure within the foreseeable future. 
According to the auditing standards, the auditor has a responsibility to 
evaluate whether the entity will be able to continue m operational 
existence for the foreseeable future. If the auditor issues an audit report 
without a going concern qualification this in effect means that the entity 
will continue in operational existence for the foreseeable future. 7 
7 Foreseeable future has already been defmed in this study (see sec 2.3.7). 
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TABLE 4-4 
FAILED COMPANIES WITH GOING CONCERN QUALIFICATIONS 
Study No offailed % qualified on 
. . 
companies gomg concern Issues 
Altman & McGough 28 46% 
(1974:53) USA 
Taffler & Tseung 86 24% 
(1984:263) UK 
Menon & Schwartz 147 43% 
(1986:46) USA 
Barnes &Hooi 42 33% 
(1987:32) UK 
Peel 40 27,5% 
(1989:333) UK 
Citron & Taffler 107 26,2% 
(1992:339) UK 
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However, the results of two studies performed in the United Kingdom 
(Citron & Taffler 1992:341; Taffler & Tseung 1984:264) indicated that 
only 40 percent of the companies that failed within the scope of the 
definition of foreseeable future did receive a going concern qualification. 
For the remaining failed companies, the audit report did not draw attention 
to the fact that the company might not continue in operational existence in 
the foreseeable future. 
The situation in which a liquidation or reorganisation (bankruptcy) occurs 
and the auditor does not issue a going concern qualification is generally 
known in the literature as a Type I error (Altman 1982:14; Hopwood, 
McKeown & Mutchler 1989:36). For example, if 26,2 percent of the 107 
failed companies in Citron and Taffler's study (see table 4-4) received a 
going concern qualification, then a 73,8 percent Type I error occurred. 
The consequences (costs) of Type I errors can be described as follows 
(Altman 1982:15; Bourne 1986:475; Kida 1980:521): 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
There is negative publicity for the profession and the audit firm. 
The auditor's integrity and independence are challenged. 
Scarce economic resources are misallocated. 
The decisions of entrepreneurs, creditors, investors and others are 
affected. 
There are lawsuits against the auditor by the client's creditors and 
investors. 
Management may not be as aware of the seriousness of the situation as 
when a qualification has been given. 
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A Type I error 1s considered to be more detrimental than a Type II error, 
which is the misclassification of a going coricern as a nongoing concern, 
for two reasons, namely (Koh 1992: 188; Levitan & Knob lett 1985 :32; 
Williams 1984:18): 
(1) The possible financial consequences to the auditing firm are much 
greater. 
(2) This is the error most often made in practice. 
4.4.2 The misclassification of a going concern as a nongoing concern 
(Type II error) 
A Type II error occurs when a company is issued with a gomg concern 
qualification, that is classified as a nongoing concern, but does not 
subsequently fail (Altman 1982:17; Hopwood et al 1989:36). 
The results of a number of empirical research studies indicate that the 
majority of companies qualified on a going concern basis actually survived 
(see table 4-5). Peel and Peel (1987:65) state that it is difficult to find a 
rationale for why this should be the case: 
It would appear that further research is required to establish the exact 
grounds upon which the going concern qualification is given for a 
particular firm. A referee is somewhat less surprised by the result. 
He points out that to provide a going concern qualification for a 
company which is really on the rocks is to make, in effect, the 
momentous decision to push it over the edge. On the other hand if a 
company is really fairly sound but in a technically insolvent position 
then the auditor is not in such a difficult position. Clearly there is a 
need for more work on this issue. 
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TABLE 4-5 
SUBSEQUENTSTATUSOFCONWA}ITES~TH 
Altman 
(1982:16) 
Study 
Barnes and Hooi 
(1987:32) 
Taffler and Tseung 
(1984:267) 
Citron and Taffler 
(1992:343) 
GOING CONCERN QUALIFICATIONS 
No of companies 
with going concern 
qualifications 
213 
51 
40 
86 
% of companies that 
did not 
subsequently fail 
75% 
94,1% 
70% 
71% 
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The consequences (costs) of Type II errors can be described as follows 
(Altman 1982:17; Kida 1980:521): 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
negative impact on the accounting firm's reputation 
potential loss of a client 
deteriorated relations with the client 
lawsuit by the client against the auditor 
cause client to have going concern problems 
Altman (1982: 17) reported that Type II errors seem to occur more 
frequently than Type I errors. This is in direct contrast with the results 
reported by a number of other empirical studies (Koh 1992: 188; Levitan & 
Knoblett 1985:32; Williams 1984:18) (see sec 4.4.1). 
4.4.3 Comparison between failed companies with a going concern 
qualification and failed companies without a going concern 
qualification 
This section indicates that failed compames that receive gomg concern 
qualifications are more acutely financially distressed and fail in shorter 
periods after the publication of their accounts, than failed companies that 
did not receive going concern qualifications. 
Citron and Taffler (1992:338) tested the hypothesis that the weaker the 
financial position of the failing company is at the balance sheet date, the 
more likely it is to have received a going concern qualification. The 
results of their study (Citron & Taffler 1992:341) as well as the results of 
other empirical studies (Menon & Schwartz 1986:4 7; Peel 1989:344) 
suggest that unless the likelihood of failure is very high, the probability of 
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a going concern qualification is very low. These results offer evidence to 
the effect that auditors do not issue qualifications arbitrarily and that 
failing companies that received going concern qualifications, in their last 
accounts before failure, were more acutely financially distressed than 
failing ones that were not qualified on that basis. 
Citron and Taffler (1992:340) and Taffler and Tseung (1984:263) examined 
the failed companies that received going concern qualifications and found 
one of two situations to be present: 
(1) The weak financial status of the company was public knowledge prior 
to the issuance of the going concern qualification. 
(2) The company's financial situation was so critical that the auditor 
would have been negligent to an exceptional degree if he had not 
issued a going concern qualification. 
These situations were found to be valid for 71 percent of the companies in 
Citron and Taffler's study and 80 percent of the companies in Taffler and 
Tseung's study. Menon and Schwartz (1986:47) issued the following 
warning on this issue as well: 
One clear implication of our findings for bankers is that limited 
reliance should be placed on the auditor's report as a warning device 
for spotting companies about to fail. Auditors seem more ready or 
able to blow the whistle on a company when its financial ratios have 
deteriorated to where a default either has already happened or is 
probable in the immediate future. 
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However, gtven these above-mentioned results it is not obvious why the 
majority of firms with going concern qualifications actually survive as 
reported m section 4.4.2. Peel (1989:344) hypothesises that those 
companies either received an incorrect qualification or are correctly 
qualified on the basis of the information available to the auditor at that 
time, but subsequently recover and/or are kept afloat for a longer period by 
factors outside the auditor's scope of vision. 
Citron and Taffler (1992:338) also tested the hypothesis that the shorter 
the time between publication of accounts/audit report signature and failure, 
the greater the propensity is for qualification. The results of three other 
studies performed in the United Kingdom support this hypothesis (see table 
4-6). The average time lag between publication of accounts and failure for 
companies with going concern qualifications represented a shorter period 
in each one of the studies compared to the average time lag for companies 
without going concern qualifications. 
4.4.4 Empirical survey of South African auditors' failure to issue 
failed companies with a going concern qualification 
Because of a lack of empirical research studies conducted in the Republic 
of South Africa on the auditor's going concern qualification, the audit 
reports of 20 industrial companies whose listings were terminated on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange because of financial failure between 1981 
and 1991, were examined. The results of the survey are set out in appendix 
A, table A-1. 
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TABLE 4-6 
TIME LAG BETWEEN PUBLICATION OF LAST ACCOUNTS/ 
AUDIT REPORT DATE AND FAILURE 
Time lag in months: Time lag in months: 
Study companies with going companies without going 
concern qualifications concern qualifications 
Taffler & Tseung 4 9 
(1984:264) 
Peel 
(1989:343) 
6,71 10,62 
Citron & Taffler 5,5 8,7 
(1992:341) 
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The last available audited annual financial statements 8 that could be 
located for the 20 companies before failure were examined to determine the 
nature of the auditors' opinions issued in the auditors' reports. The 
auditors' opinions indicated going concern problems in only 25 percent 
(five of the 20 companies) of the cases, based on the latest available 
audited financial statements prior to liquidation. These results correspond 
with the results of research studies performed in the United Kingdom and 
the United States (see table 4-4). 
To determine if the issuance of Statement on Auditing Standards AU 294, 
Going concern (SAICA 1986) had any effect on the auditor's qualifying 
behaviour, the above-mentioned 20 companies were subdivided into two 
groups: 
(1) the pre-AU 294 group, representing those compames whose audit 
reports were issued before the issuance of AU 294 in September 1986 
(2) the post-AU 294 group, representing those companies whose audit 
reports were issued after the issuance of AU 294 
Nine of the 20 failed compames fell into the pre-AU 294 group. The 
auditor's opinions indicated going concern problems in 55,6 percent (five 
of the nine companies) of the cases. Eleven of the 20 failed companies fell 
into the post-AU 294 group. However, not one of these 11 failed 
companies' audit reports were qualified for going concern problems. 
Difficulties were experienced in obtaining the fmancial statements of these companies. 
Although section 302 of the Companies Act No 61 of 1973, requires a public company to send a 
certified copy of the annual fmancial statements to the Registrar of Companies, none of these 
fmancial statements could be obtained from the Registrar. On discussion with the Registrar it 
was established that they do not have the necessary funds or human resources available to 
follow up on companies that do not send copies of their fmancial statements to the Registrar. 
The fmancial statements that could be located were obtained from the Bureau for Financial 
Analysis, University of Pretoria. 
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Auditors were thus more likely to issue gomg concern modified audit 
reports for bankrupt companies prior to failure in the pre-AU 294 period 
than in the post-AU 294 period. 9 Thus the issuance of AU 294 (SAICA 
1986) did have an effect on the auditor's qualifying behaviour, but not in 
the direction that one would have expected. To find a rationale for this is 
difficult. It can be hypothesised that AU 294 (SAICA 1986) does not 
provide sufficient guidance to the auditor in the evaluation and reporting 
of the going concern assumption. 
To find a reason for this, the foreseeable future period for the post-AU 294 
group was also analysed (see appendix A, table A-2). According to AU 
294 (SAICA 1986:04), the auditor has a responsibility to evaluate 
information relating to one year after the balance sheet date or a minimum 
of six months following the date of the audit report, whichever is the later. 
This period represents the foreseeable future period that the auditor should 
consider in evaluating the going concern assumption. 
In the survey conducted, the provisional liquidation dates of the 11 
companies in the post-AU 294 period were taken as the date of failure and 
compared with the foreseeable future period. The results indicated that 
only two of the 11 companies (18 percent) failed within the foreseeable 
future period without their audit reports being qualified for going concern 
problems. Thus in 82 percent (nine of the 11 companies) of the cases, the 
auditor appears to have complied with AU 294 (SAICA 1986) by 
considering information relating to the foreseeable future period. 
9 This is in contrast to the results of a study done by Raghunandan and Rama (1995) in the United 
States of America on the issuance ofSAS No 59 (see sec 3.2.1). 
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However, the following important points should be noted: 
(1) AU 294 (SAICA 1986:04) states specifically that it would also be 
necessary for the auditor to take account of events which will or are 
likely to occur later than the foreseeable future period. 
(2) The liquidation date represents the final stage of the business failure 
process and is de facto evidence that the going concern assumption is 
invalid (see sec 2.5). 
(3) Some time before this final stage, the company shows warning signs 10 
that it is approaching a state of severe financial distress, which is 
evidence that there is substantial to very substantial doubt about the 
going concern assumption (see sec 2.5.2). 
( 4) How long before the final stage of business failure does the company 
show warning signs of substantial changes in its financial health? 
Some researchers found that the company can show warning signs of 
financial failure five to 10 years before failure (see sec 2.5.2). 
Therefore use of the provisional liquidation date as a criterion to measure 
if the auditor complied with AU 294 (SAICA 1986) by considering 
information relating to the foreseeable future period could produce 
misleading results because of the above-mentioned points. 
By analysing the period beyond the foreseeable future period until the 
failure date (provisional liquidation date) for the nine companies that did 
not fail within the foreseeable future period, it was found that (see 
appendix A, table A-2) 
10 For example, ifthere is a moderate or low probability that management's plans will succeed in 
overcoming the entity's problems, or if these plans fail. 
* 
* 
* 
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four of the mne companies failed within SIX months after the 
foreseeable future period 
four of the nine companies failed within six to 10 months after the 
foreseeable future period 
one company failed 17 months and four days after the foreseeable 
future period 
Taking into account that at some time before the failure date a situation of 
substantial doubt about the going concern assumption must have existed, 
inferences can be made that it is possible that the situation already existed 
in the foreseeable future period for 
* 
* 
the companies failing within six months after the foreseeable future 
period 
the companies failing within six to 10 months after the foreseeable 
future period 
Therefore stating that the auditor was correct in 82 percent of the cases for 
not qualifying the audit report for going concern problems, because he or 
she complied with AU 294 (SAICA 1986) and considered information 
relating to the foreseeable future period, could thus be misleading. 
The auditing standards issued by the United Kingdom (ICAEW 1994: 13) 
and Australia (AARF 1996:09) require the directors to consider a future 
period, but state that it is not possible to specify a minimum length for the 
foreseeable future and 'that any such period would be artificial and 
arbitrary since in reality there is no "cut off' point'. The auditor must 
assess the reasonability of this period (see sec 3.4). The Australian 
auditing standard, AUS 708 (AARF 1996:04), also requires the auditor to 
focus his or her audit work on anticipated events occurring from the date of 
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the auditor's current report to the expected date of the auditor's report for 
the next annual reporting period. This therefore represents a period of 
approximately six months longer than that specifically required by the 
South African auditing standard. 
Applying the foreseeable future period of AUS 708 (AARF 1996) to the 
survey conducted in this study would result in 54,5 percent (six of the 11) 
of the companies failing in the foreseeable future period without having 
their audit reports qualified for going concern problems. The 54,5 percent 
are compared to the 18 percent applying the foreseeable future period of 
AU 294 (SAICA 1986). Thus it can be concluded that AU 294 (SAICA 
1986) should be revised to provide better guidance to the auditor. 
4.4.5 Summary of the auditor's failure to issue the appropriate going 
concern qualification 
This section indicated that less than 50 percent of companies that failed 
received a going concern qualification for the last financial statements 
issued prior to failure, whereas the majority of companies that received a 
going concern qualification did not subsequently fail. Shortcomings in the 
South African auditor's qualifying behaviour and in the guidance provided 
by AU 294 (SAICA 1986) have also been identified. 
In direct contrast with the statistics reported, it was also indicated that 
failed companies that received a going concern qualification before failure 
were more acutely financially distressed and failed in shorter periods after 
the publication of the financial statements in comparison to failed 
companies that did not receive a going concern qualification before failure. 
The reasons for this were found to be that the weak financial status of the 
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company was public knowledge prior to the issuance of the going concern 
qualification, or the company's financial situation was so critical that the 
auditor would have been negligent to an exceptional degree if he did not 
issue a going concern qualification. 
The question that should be asked here, is: 'Why do auditors not qualify 
the auditor's report before failure?' It has been argued that auditors do not 
qualify when there is uncertainty about the appropriateness of the going 
concern concept because of the consequences that the qualification could 
result in. The consequences that may possibly influence the auditor's 
decision to issue a going concern qualification are discussed in the next 
section. 
4.5 THE CONSEQUENCES OF QUALIFYING THAT INFLUENCE 
THE AUDITOR'S DECISION TO ISSUE A GOING CONCERN 
QUALIFICATION 
Kida (1980:516) examined the qualifying attitudes of audit partners and 
found that auditors who are more prone to issue going concern 
qualifications had stronger beliefs that the costs (consequences) of a Type 
I error would materialise, for example, a client's creditors would sue, 
grounds for alleging auditing negligence would be provided, the audit 
firm's reputation would be negatively influenced, and the auditor's 
responsibility would not be fulfilled (see sec 4.4.1). Audit partners who 
are more hesitant to issue going concern qualifications had stronger beliefs 
that the costs (consequences) of a Type II error would materialise, for 
example, they would lose the client, the client would sue, the audit firm's 
reputation would be negatively affected, and relations with the client 
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would deteriorate (see sec 4.4.2). However, both groups of auditors tended 
to believe that it is possible that a going concern qualification would cause 
the client to have going concern problems, reflecting the self-fulfilling 
argument. 
The two more common consequences put forward in the literature for the 
auditor not qualifying when there is uncertainty about the appropriateness 
of the going concern assumption are the auditor's fear that: 
(1) the qualification will contribute to the client's problems and the 
downfall of the company (fear of the self-fulfilling prophecy) 
(2) the qualification will lead to a deterioration in relations with the 
client and the eventual loss of a client (fear of auditor switching) 
These two consequences are discussed in this section. 
4.5.1 Fear of the self-fulfilling prophecy 
The auditor's fear of the self-fulfilling prophecy can be explained as the 
fear that the audit report itself, rather than the entity's condition, may 
actually lead to the failure of the business. 
Various studies investigated whether the presence or absence of a gomg 
concern qualification is associated with the self-fulfilling prophecy 
argument. A distinction should be made between behavioural studies that 
examine auditors' perceptions of the likelihood that a going concern 
qualification becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy and studies reporting on 
the subsequent status of companies that have actually received a going 
concern qualification. 
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4. 5.1.1 Studies reporting on auditors' perceptions of the likelihood that a 
going concern qualification becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy 
The following statistics were obtained from behavioural studies examining 
auditors' perceptions of the likelihood that a going concern qualification 
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: 
* 
* 
* 
Kida's study (1980:517) reported that 61 percent of auditors indicated 
that they believe that a going concern qualification would cause 
problems for nonproblem entities, while 50 percent of auditors 
indicated that they believe that it would contribute to the difficulty 
already experienced by problem entities. 
Mutchler's study (1984:24) reported that the majority of auditors did 
not agree with the self-fulfilling argument, and that they argued that 
the basic problems are already there and that the going concern 
qualification itself has nothing to do with the client going under. 
However, 37,5 percent of the auditors agreed with the concept. 
Williams (1984: 18) interviewed 15 audit partners of whom 73 percent 
indicated that they agree that a going concern qualification could lead 
to the failure of an entity. 
The results of a study by Firth (1980) indicated that bankers and credit 
analysts attached great importance to going concern qualifications in audit 
reports and that the credit standing of a company with a going concern 
qualification was substantially impaired. The company's ability to obtain 
additional financing is thus affected, and this, could affect its ability to 
survive. Holt and Moizer (1990) also indicated that a going concern 
qualification caused increased uncertainty among users of financial 
statements because they feel less confident about the financial statements. 
If auditors are aware of the perceptions of users of financial statements on 
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gomg concern qualifications this may contribute to their reluctance to 
issue going concern qualifications. 
Hence there is a perception among some auditors that a gomg concern 
qualification either causes or contributes to going concern problems, 
reflecting the self-fulfilling prophecy issue. Taffler and Tseung (1984: 
268) draw the following conclusion in this regard: 
Blaming the audit report in the case of failing companies is like 
shooting the messenger who rides in after the event with news which, 
as we have seen, in many cases is already common knowledge. Does 
the auditor believe that if he does not question whether the accounts 
of an insolvent company provide a " true and fair view" it will not 
fail? Bad management does not need the help of an audit report to 
bankrupt a business; it is perfectly capable of doing this itself. 
4. 5.1. 2 Studies reporting on the subsequent status of companies that have 
received a going concern qualification 
The results of the studies listed in table 4-5 (see sec 4.4.2) indicated that 
70 percent or more of the companies that received going concern 
qualifications did not subsequently fail. Thus the results of these studies 
do not support the self-fulfilling prophecy; otherwise the majority of these 
companies would have failed. 
Citron and Taffler (1992:344) compared companies that failed with going 
concern qualifications (21 %) with a match group of companies that failed 
without going concern qualifications (22%). These results indicated that 
there is no evidence that failure is more likely to follow upon a gomg 
concern qualification than upon a nonqualified report, and once again the 
self-fulfilling prophecy is not supported. 
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Table 4-6 (see sec 4.4.3) indicates that compames with gomg concern 
qualifications fail in shorter periods after the publication of their accounts 
than companies without going concern qualifications. This appears to 
support the self-fulfilling prophecy. However, given the above-mentioned 
evidence that shows that the vast majority of companies issued with going 
concern qualifications do not subsequently fail, this argument would 
appear to lose some of its force. 
4.5.2 Fear of auditor switching 
The auditor's fear of auditor switching is based on the belief that 
companies would like to avoid receiving going concern qualifications and 
would, consequently, be prepared to change auditors to prevent it. 
Various empirical studies investigated whether the presence of a gomg 
concern qualification 1s associated with the likelihood of auditor 
switching. 
The following studies disclosed a positive relationship between the receipt 
of a qualified audit opinion and the propensity of entities to switch 
auditors in the following year: 
* Chow and Rice's study (1982:328) reported that 12,5 percent of 
companies with qualifications switched auditors in the following year. 
For the companies that did not receive qualifications, only three 
percent replaced their auditors in the subsequent year. Chow and 
Rice's study did not specify the type of qualifications issued to the 
companies. 
* 
* 
* 
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Citron and Taffler's study (1992:343) reported that 13,1 percent of 
companies that received going concern qualifications switched 
auditors in the following year. Of the companies that did not receive 
qualifications, only 3,3 percent replaced their auditors. 
Kida's study (1980:516) reported that audit partners who are more 
hesitant to issue a going concern qualification had stronger beliefs 
that they would lose the client. 
Mutchler (1984:23) interviewed 16 audit partners of whom 62,5 
percent indicated that they had lost clients because of the issuance of 
a going concern qualification. 
The following studies could find no evidence that a gomg concern 
qualification leads to auditor switching: 
* 
* 
* 
Altman's study (1982:17) reported that a relatively small percentage 
of only 5,6 percent of the companies that received a going concern 
qualification changed their auditors. No comparison was given of 
auditor switching among unqualified companies. 
Taffler and Tseung's study (1984:267) reported that one out of 21 
(5%) companies with going concern qualifications mentioned that in 
the next year new auditors would be appointed. For the companies 
that did not receive going concern qualifications, eight percent 
indicated that they would be changing auditors in the next year. 
Schwartz and Menon's study (1985 :256) reported that 18 percent of 
companies with qualifications switched auditors. Of the compames 
that did not receive qualifications, 33 percent replaced their auditors. 
They could offer no meaningful interpretation of this unexpected 
finding. Schwartz and Menon's study did not specify the type of 
qualifications issued to the companies. 
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Schwartz and Menon (1985 :255) also revealed that failing compames 
(26,5%) do have a greater tendency to switch auditors than healthier 
companies (9,8%). This is supported by Altman's study (1982:16) which 
indicated that a change in auditors occurred twice as often in companies 
that had actually entered bankruptcy (9%) than in those companies that had 
not entered bankruptcy ( 4%). Schwartz and Menon offered the following 
reasons for auditor switching by companies in financial distress: 
* 
* 
* 
More extensive auditing is required of a client in financial distress, 
which results in increased audit costs and may force management to 
search for an audit firm willing to perform the audit for a lower fee. 
Companies in failing health may change auditors because of a need for 
different attributes comprising the audit package and to obtain better 
management advice. 
There is a breakdown in the auditor-client relationship. The auditors 
interviewed in the Mutchler study (1984:23) also indicated that there 
is usually a long and heated discussion with management about the 
audit opinion, which leads to a breakdown in the auditor-client 
relationship. 
The results of auditor switching after the issuance of a gomg concern 
qualification/audit qualification are thus not always consistent. However, 
there are some reported results supporting the fear of auditor switching. 
The auditor's independence is threatened by the fear of auditor switching. 
This ties up with the studies of McKeown, Mutchler and Hopwood (1991) 
and Mutchler (1986) which indicate that auditors more often issue going 
concern qualifications to smaller companies. This could suggest that the 
auditor's independence is influenced by the size of the client, for example 
that the auditor may be bowing to client pressure or that the auditor does 
not want to lose the audit fee. 
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4.5.3 Summary of the consequences of qualifying that influence the 
auditor's decision to issue a going concern qualification 
This section has examined whether the consequences of issuing a gomg 
concern qualification would result in the qualification becoming a self-
fulfilling prophecy or in the client switching auditors. 
It has been indicated that the perceptual belief of the majority of auditors 
is that a going concern qualification would either cause or contribute to 
going concern problems, although the results of empirical studies could 
find no support for the self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Studies conducted on whether compames change auditors after rece1vmg 
going concern qualifications revealed inconsistent results. However, there 
appears to be a perceptual belief among some auditors that a going concern 
qualification could result in losing the client. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has reviewed empirical research studies that have been 
conducted on the auditor's judgment process in the presence of going 
concern uncertainties. This chapter indicated that the auditor's judgment 
process constitutes two separate stages of decision-making. 
The first stage constitutes the auditor's identification of a gomg concern 
problem company by means of various going concern problem indicators. 
One may conclude that some of the indicators of going concern problems 
are regarded as more important than others by auditors in public practice, 
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and that auditors consider these indicators in the aggregate as well as the 
interaction between them in identifying a going concern problem company. 
The second stage constitutes the auditor's consideration and evaluation of 
management's plans to mitigate the going concern problem situation as 
well as any other factors that may aggravate the situation. The auditor 
then finds himself in a position to make a going concern decision. 
Although auditors follow a formal decision-making process in making 
going concern judgments, as indicated in this chapter and as outlined in the 
professional auditing guidelines (see ch 3), they still fail to make the 
correct going concern decision for companies that fail and companies that 
survive. This chapter has indicated that some of the reasons for the 
auditor's failure to issue going concern qualifications, could be the 
auditor's fear that his client may switch auditors or that a gomg concern 
qualification would become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Another reason that has been raised in the literature is whether the auditor 
does have the ability to make a going concern judgment. This will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE AUDITOR'S ABILITY TO MAKE A 
GOING CONCERN JUDGMENT 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter examined the auditor's decision-making process in 
the presence of going concern uncertainties. The chapter indicated that 
many companies that fail do not receive a going concern qualification for 
the last annual financial statements issued prior to bankruptcy, whereas 
many companies that do receive a gomg concern qualification do not 
subsequently fail. This has raised considerable scepticism about the 
auditor's ability to make going concern judgments. 
It has been stated that auditors do not have the ability to assess whether an 
entity can remain in operational existence for the foreseeable future 
because of their limited experience in this area as clients fail only in 
isolated and infrequent instances (Bourne 1986:4 73; Taffler & Tseung 
1984:268). However, auditors have maintained that an unqualified opinion 
about the financial statements is not a guarantee that the company has the 
ability to continue as a going concern and a going concern qualification is 
not a prediction of business failure (Altman 1982:8; Menon & Schwartz 
1986:52). 
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The objective of this chapter is to examine the results of various empirical 
research studies that have been conducted to establish whether the auditor 
does have the ability to make going concern judgments. These empirical 
studies can be divided into three different groups according to the 
approaches employed, namely: 
( 1) studies that use statistical models 
(2) behavioural studies 
(3) studies that use expert systems 
5.2 STUDIES THAT EMPLOYED STATISTICAL MODELS TO 
EXAMINE THE AUDITOR'S ABILITY TO MAKE A GOING 
CONCERN JUDGMENT 
The auditor's ability to make a going concern judgment has been examined 
by several empirical research studies, that have compared the auditor's 
going concern opinion issued in the audit report with a bankruptcy 
prediction model. The bankruptcy prediction models are based on certain 
key financial ratios to distinguish between bankrupt and nonbankrupt 
firms. A large body of literature has shown that statistical models utilising 
financial ratios can predict company failure with a reasonable degree of 
success. Zavgren (1983) and Jones (1987) provide reviews of this 
literature and propose various bankruptcy prediction models as being 
useful to auditors. 
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Altman and McGough ( 197 4) were the first to provide the link between 
bankruptcy prediction models and auditors' going concern optmon 
decisions by comparing the accuracy of the model to auditors' opinions one 
year prior to the bankruptcy event. Several other studies were also 
conducted on this issue, the results of which indicate the auditor's ability 
to issue a going concern opinion to be inferior to the models (see table 
5-l). Although these results appear to be significant, there are certain 
limitations and problems in the use of statistical models that have to be 
taken into account when comparing statistical models with the going 
concern opinions issued by auditors. 
5.2.1 Limitations and problems in the use of statistical models 
The following limitations and problems anse m the use of statistical 
models, and these have been noted in the literature: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
The auditor's going concern opinion decisions are not isomorphic with 
bankruptcy predictions. Statistical models are developed to predict 
bankruptcy whereas auditors are mainly concerned with assessing the 
going concern status of a client and not predicting business failure. 
The financial ratios used by the statistical models are not necessarily 
the ones identified by the auditors as being important. 
Qualitative factors are not easily incorporated into statistical models 
and may be included by auditors in their going concern decisions. 
The auditor's decision to issue a going concern qualification may be 
influenced by factors other than the likelihood of going concern 
problems, such as the perceived outcomes of qualifying or not 
qualifying. 
These are discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
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TABLE 5-1 
AUDITOR VERSUS MODEL ACCURACY 
IN BANKRUPTCY PREDICTION ONE YEAR PRIOR TO THE EVENT 
Study Models' prediction Auditors' opinion 
accuracy accuracy 
Altman & McGough 82% 44% 
(1974:53) 
Altman 86,2% 48,1% 
(1982:14) 
Levitan & Knoblett 89,3% 66% 
(1985:31-37) 
Koh & Killough 78,57% 21,43% 
(1990:189) 
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5. 2.1.1 Going concern decisions are not isomorphic with bankruptcy 
predictions 
The results of Kida's study (1980) indicated that the auditor outperformed 
the model as often as the model outperformed the auditor. The auditors in 
his study were able to discriminate problem from nonproblem firms, given 
only ratio data, with an average accuracy rate of 83 percent compared to 
the 90 percent accuracy rate of the statistical model. Kida refers to the 
results found by Altman and McGough (1974) between model (82%) and 
auditor ( 44%) accuracy and states that the 82 percent accuracy rate of the 
model refers to the prediction of problems, whereas the 44 percent 
accuracy rate of the auditor refers to the auditors' judgments of continuity 
qualifications, which are not the same as auditors' predictions of problem 
firms. He concludes that a comparison of bankruptcy model predictions 
with actual audit qualification decisions does not allow valid inferences to 
be drawn about the auditor's ability to identify problem companies as the 
auditor's going concern opinion decisions are not isomorphic with 
bankruptcy predictions. 
Altman (1982:8) and Koh and Killough (1990:190) also state that the 
auditor is mainly concerned with assessing going concern problems and not 
predicting business failures. These studies pointed out that an assumption 
must be made when using failure prediction models, namely that expected 
failure and going concern problems are equivalent. Mutchler (1985 :673) 
indicated that these two events are related, although there is not a one-to-
one correlation. 
It appears thus as if the results reported by the studies in table 5-1 are 
based on the assumption that expected failure and going concern problems 
are equivalent. 
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5.2.1.2 The financial ratios used by the statistical models are not 
necessarily the ones identified by auditors as being important 
Levitan and Knoblett (1985) examined the question whether auditors used 
the same variables and weighing schemes as those of a bankruptcy 
prediction model. They examined a total of 26 variables consisting of 
indicators of going concern problems as suggested by SAS No 34 (AICPA 
1981), as well as key financial ratios derived from previous bankruptcy 
studies. The results indicated that both the auditors and the bankruptcy 
prediction models used the ratio current years net worth/total debt, 
recurring negative cash flow and the slope of three years' current ratio as 
variables to distinguish between healthy firms and firms approaching 
bankruptcy. However, the most important ratio used in the bankruptcy 
model was the ratio of the slope of the three years' operating 
income/stockholders' equity, whereas the most important ratio used by the 
auditors was total debt/total assets. All these variables, except for the 
ratio of the slope of the three years' operating income/stockholders' 
equity, have been ranked by auditor subjects as being vital indicators of 
going concern problems (see sec 4.2.1). Thus the most important variable 
used in the bankruptcy model was not considered by the auditors as being 
important. 
The bankruptcy prediction model used by Altman and McGough (1974) and 
Altman (1982) utilised the same five financial ratios. However, two of the 
five ratios used have been indicated by auditors as not being important as 
indicators of going concern problems, namely retained earnings/total assets 
and sales/total assets (see sec 4.2.1). 
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Chen and Shim erda (1981) identified seven groups and key representative 
ratios for each group for bankruptcy prediction utilising financial ratios. 
The seven groups identified are return on investment, capital turnover, 
financial leverage, short-term liquidity, cash position, inventory turnover 
and receivables turnover. They suggest that auditors should select one key 
ratio from each group to have a relatively complete ratio analysis approach 
but caution that the selection of more than one ratio from each group may 
lead to multi-collinearity among ratios and may cause the results to be 
sample-sensitive and possibly misleading. Boritz (1991) also states that 
the ' ... use of highly correlated ratios is both inefficient and potentially 
ineffective, since the inter-correlation or multi-collinearity of ratios can 
introduce instability into a statistical model'. The bankruptcy prediction 
model used by Koh and Killough (1990), for example, utilised 21 financial 
ratios consisting of four liquidity ratios, five profitability ratios, four 
leverage ratios, four activity ratios and four returns and market ratios. The 
results of the study of Koh and Killough reported in table 5-1 should thus 
be questioned for the possibility of whether multi-collinearity of ratios did 
not occur. 
5. 2.1. 3 Qualitative factors are not easily incorporated into statistical 
models 
Another limitation is that qualitative factors, such as management ability 
and future plans, the economic outlook of the industry and competitive 
developments are not easily incorporated into statistical models and may 
be included by auditors in their going concern decision (Koh & Killough 
1990:190; Menon & Schwartz 1987:313). It has also been indicated in this 
study that the auditor does take into account qualitative factors in his 
decision to issue a going concern qualification (see sec 4.3.2). The 
professional auditing guidelines/standards also require the auditor to 
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consider indicators of going concern problems, which include qualitative 
factors, in the evaluation of the going concern status of an entity (see sec 
3.4.2). 
Keasey and Watson (1987) examined whether a model utilising a number of 
nonfinancial (qualitative) variables, either alone or in conjunction with 
financial ratios, can predict small company failure more accurately than a 
model based solely on financial ratios. Their results indicated that the 
model containing the ratios and nonfinancial variables was a better 
predictor of small company failure than the model containing financial 
ratios only. However, the nonfinancial variables incorporated in the model 
were based on historical publicly available information such as, whether 
any directors left during the three-year period, whether there was any 
change in auditors in three years and the average lag between the auditor's 
signature and submission. This study, however, has indicated that the 
going concern decision tends to be based on prospective information rather 
than historical information (see sec 4.3.2). 
5.2.1. 4 The auditor's decision not to issue a going concern qualification 
may be influenced by factors other than the likelihood of going 
concern problems 
A comparison of bankruptcy model predictions with actual gomg concern 
qualification decisions may understate the auditor's ability to recognise 
problems. The reason being that an auditor's decision not to qualify a 
report may be influenced by factors other than the likelihood of going 
concern problems, such as the auditor's fear of losing the client, or that the 
client may sue, or that the audit firm's reputation may be negatively 
affected (see sec 4.5). 
162 
The studies of Kida (1980) and Campisi and Trotman (1985) provided 
empirical evidence to support this contention that auditors are sufficiently 
competent to formulate judgments about the ongoing ability of a business 
entity but that they do not qualify the financial statements in the light of 
going concern problems because of extraneous factors that influence their 
decision. 
5. 2.1. 5 Methodological problems in the use of statistical models 
Besides the above-mentioned limitations and problems, there are also 
certain methodological problems that statistical models suffer from. 
Hopwood, McKeown and Mutchler (1994) re-examined the auditor versus 
model accuracy and criticise previous research, which has indicated the 
auditor's opinion to be inferior to models in predicting bankruptcy, as 
being not reflective of the auditor's real-world decision environment. 
Previous research is criticised on the following two points: 
(1) The samples of prevwus studies contained both stressed and 
nonstressed 1 firms. Hopwood et al (1994:411) partitioned their 
sample into stressed and nonstressed categories and refer to other 
research which also suggested ' ... that the standard statistical models 
do not apply simultaneously to both stressed and nonstressed firms 
and are not reflective of the auditors' decision problem.' 
(2) Samples are not drawn randomly but according to their status (ie 
bankrupt or nonbankrupt) (Koh & Oliga 1990:68). This result in an 
oversampling problem. Previous bankruptcy prediction studies have 
constructed samples using a 50 percent bankruptcy rate, a rate much 
A nonstressed firm is defined as a firm not showing any signs of fmancial distress. 
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higher than the one faced by auditors, which Zmijewski (1984:67) 
found to be less than one percent among listed firms. 
After taking these two factors into account, the study of Hopwood, 
McKeown and Mutchler could find no evidence of the auditor being 
inferior to the model. Their results indicated that the auditor faces a 
different decision problem in stressed companies compared to nonstressed 
compames. None of the prediction methods applied in the study could 
predict the nonstressed companies. In another study by McKeown, 
Mutchler and Hopwood (1991 :6) it was also found that none of the 
nonstressed companies received a going concern qualification. No 
significant differences were found between the model using only the 
stressed group and the auditors' actual opinions across a wide range of cost 
ratios. 2 
The result reported by the statistical model studies, namely that the auditor 
is inferior to the model, could thus not be accepted because of the 
significant limitations and problems experienced in the use of statistical 
models. 
5.2.2 Advantages and usefulness of statistical models 
Statistical models that accurately predict the gomg concern status of 
entities have the following advantages and uses for the auditor (Koh & 
Killough 1990: 189; Koh & Oliga 1990:68): 
The cost ratio was defmed as the ratio of the cost of misclassifying bankrupt companies to the 
cost ofmisclassifying nonbankrupt companies. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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They provide objective and unambiguous information to supplement 
an auditor's subjective judgment m making gomg concern 
assessments. 
They provide the auditor with guidelines on the appropriate ratios to 
consider and how to evaluate them. 
They are an analytical tool that the auditor can use when discussing 
problems with a client and recommending changes in the financial 
statements. 
They are a defensive device in the case of litigation. 
They can be used at the beginning of the audit to make an initial risk 
assessment of the client in order to determine the necessary audit 
procedures. 
They can be used at the end of the audit to assist in determining the 
type of audit opinion that is appropriate. 
5.2.3 Summary of studies that employed statistical models 
The results of empirical research studies have indicated that statistical 
models appear to be better indicators of financial failure than auditors' 
going concern opinions. This section, however, has indicated that there are 
certain limitations to and problems in the use of statistical models that 
make the comparison between failure prediction using statistical models 
and going concern opinions issued by auditors, questionable. One study 
could find no evidence of the auditor being inferior to the model after 
taking into account certain of these identified limitations. The auditor's 
ability to make a going concern judgment may thus be understated by 
statistical models and they should therefore not be used to examine the 
auditor's ability to make a going concern judgment. 
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Boritz (1991:131) draws the same conclusion: 
In summary, bankruptcy prediction models by themselves may not be 
appropriate benchmarks to use for evaluating auditor performance 
since auditors' judgments may be the result of a complex set of 
considerations in which the raw probability of bankruptcy is only one 
factor. 
This does not mean that the auditor should not use statistical models at all. 
Statistical models do have certain advantages and uses for the auditor in 
making going concern evaluations, for example, providing him with 
objective information. However, they should not replace the auditor's 
professional judgment but should rather supplement it. 
The limitations of and problems experienced in the use of statistical 
models provide a point of departure for behavioural studies (see sec 5.3) 
and expert systems studies (see sec 5.4) to examine the auditor's ability to 
make going concern judgments. 
5.3 BEHAVIOURAL STUDIES THAT EXAMINED THE AUDITOR'S 
ABILITY TO MAKE A GOING CONCERN JUDGMENT 
Audit partners and managers have been used as subjects in behavioural 
studies to examine the auditor's ability to make a going concern judgment. 
Two main types of research methodologies or techniques are applied by 
researchers to study the quality of auditor judgment, namely ANOV A 
analysis and protocol analysis (Choo 1989:1 07). In ANOV A analysis, a set 
of accounting/auditing cases that are systematically different from each 
other is constructed and presented to the auditors. The researcher observes 
how an individual auditor's judgments change from case to case. In 
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protocol analysis, auditors think aloud into a tape recorder while 
performing the experiment task. The researcher analyses the verbal 
protocol data collected. The studies discussed in this section have 
employed these techniques to study the auditor's going concern judgment. 
5.3.1 Studies that examined the auditor's professional judgment in 
general 
Choo (1989) reviewed research studies that examined the differences in 
knowledge structuring and judgment competence between expert and 
novice auditors. Although the studies reviewed by Choo examined auditor 
judgment in general and not specifically in the context of a going concern 
situation, they give one insight into the difference between expert-novice 
knowledge structuring and decision making. A summary of the main 
findings of these research studies reviewed by Choo 
appendix B. 
. . . 1s g1ven m 
From these findings it is clear that the expert auditors used a more 
scientific approach in acquiring and integrating information lacking among 
the novice auditors. In the actual judgment performance the expert 
auditors showed more confidence in the decisions made by them than the 
novice auditors. Significant differences were also found between the 
expert and novice auditors when confronted with judgments to be made in 
semistructured and unstructured tasks. 
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5.3.2 Studies that examined the auditor's professional going concern 
judgment 
5.3.2.1 The study of Campisi and Trotman 
Campisi and Trotman (1985) examined the performance of auditors when 
formulating going concern judgments. They compared the level of 
consensus among auditors who had an average experience of 10,3 years 
among them. By way of ANOV A analysis the results indicated that the 
auditors were able to reach a relatively high level of consensus when 
formulating going concern judgments. The study thus provided some 
empirical evidence that auditors are sufficiently competent to formulate 
judgments about the ability of an entity to continue as a going concern. 
5.3.2.2 The study of Chao and Trotman 
Choo and Trotman (1991) examined the relationship between knowledge 
structure and judgment competence, in the context of a gomg concern 
situation, for experienced and inexperienced auditors. Seniors with an 
average of 4,4 years of experience were recruited as experienced auditors 
whereas the inexperienced auditors had had less than six months of 
practical experience. The subjects had to recall typical and atypical 
information in the context of the going concern situation. Typical 
information is an item likely to exist (occur) for a company with going 
concern problems and atypical information is an item unlikely to exist 
(occur) for a company with going concern problems. 
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The results of the study indicated that there are differences between 
experienced and inexperienced auditors 
* 
* 
in the amounts, type and clustering of items recalled 
in the inferences made by them 
The inferences made by the experienced auditors were significantly 
correlated with predictive judgments and the clustering of items recalled. 
This implies that the inferences made by the experienced auditors are 
contingent upon the degree to which they organise memory by a particular 
type of information. The study of Choo and Trotman may be criticised 
given that, for most firms, going concern decisions are performed by audit 
managers and partners with significantly more experience than only 4,4 
years. 
5.3.2.3 The study of Bonner and Pennington 
Bonner and Pennington (1991) refer to the mixed results found by pnor 
research studies on the evaluation of going concern issues performed by 
expert auditors. Some studies found high levels of performance among 
expert auditors whereas others found low levels of performance. Their 
study offers two possible explanations for the mixed results, namely the 
types of cognitive processing and knowledge needed for evaluating going 
concern Issues. 
The first explanation offered by Bonner and Pennington's study (1991:37) 
was that the type of cognitive processing required for the task affected 
performance. They found that experts perform better in tasks: 
* 
* 
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requiring construction processes rather than reduction processes. 
(A construction process involves information retrieval and 
comprehension, hypothesis generation and design. A reduction 
process reduces information to obtain an evaluation of a hypothesis, 
estimate or choice.) 
requiring or allowing for theory-driven reasonmg rather than 
statistical reasoning. 
The second explanation offered by Bonner and Pennington's study 
(1991:37), was that the quality of knowledge is an important determinant 
of expert performance. They found that experts performed better in tasks: 
* 
* 
processing on the basis of well-structured knowledge as opposed to 
processing on the basis of impoverished knowledge. (Structured 
knowledge refers to knowledge that is well organised but not 
necessarily extensive. Impoverished knowledge lacks either structure 
or depth.) 
with good learning environments for the initial acquisition of the 
knowledge needed. (Good learning environments include extensive 
instruction prior to practice and feedback, that is timely, accurate, 
complete and useful.) 
When applying these two explanations to going concern issues, Bonner and 
Pennington (1991:24) found that auditors perform well in gaining 
knowledge of going concern issues and that they perform poorly in 
evaluating going concern issues. The reasons are as follows: 
* 
* 
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Gaining knowledge of a gomg concern Issue reqmres a construction 
process and allows for theory-driven reasoning, both being tasks in 
which auditors tend to perform well. 
Evaluating going concern issues requires a reduction process and 
allows for statistical reasoning, both of which are tasks in which 
auditors tend to perform poorly. 
The study indicated that auditors possess a well-structured knowledge base 
for gaining knowledge of and evaluating going concern issues. A strong 
relationship was found between learning environment and performance, 
which suggests that auditors perform poorly in evaluating going concern 
issues because they do not have good opportunities to acquire knowledge 
in evaluating going concern issues. It was estimated by 23 experienced 
auditors of a 'Big Six' firm that only 25,3 percent of the knowledge needed 
for evaluating going concern issues was gained through instruction versus 
practical experience. 
5.3.2.4 The study of Bonner 
Bonner (1994) examined the effects of task complexity on audit judgment 
performance. She found that an increase in task complexity/skill leads to a 
decrease in judgment performance. Task complexity/skill was significantly 
negatively related to performance on going concern evaluations. Bonner 
suggests that judgment performance could be improved by: 
* 
* 
* 
restructuring the task with a decision aid or other appropriate devices 
making changes in training programmes for auditors 
assigning tasks to auditors with the necessary experience according to 
the complexity of the task 
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5.3.3 Studies that examined 'Big Eight' /'Big Six' auditors' abilities to 
make going concern judgments 
The difference in qualifying attitudes of auditors from 'Big Eight' /'Big 
Six' audit firms versus auditors from other audit firms was examined by 
various empirical studies. 
Menon and Schwartz (1986:51) found that auditors from the 'Big Eight' 
audit firms had a greater tendency to issue going concern qualifications 
although the differences were not statistically significant. O'Clock and 
Devine (1995 :205) reported that auditors from one 'Big Six' firm were 
more likely to issue going concern qualifications than auditors from other 
'non-Big Six' firms. In contrast to these two studies, Citron and Taffler 
(1992:344) and Taffler and Tseung (1984:264) did not find a difference in 
qualification rates between auditors from the big international firms and 
other audit firms. 
Thus because of the inconsistency in the results reported by these studies, 
no conclusion could be drawn about whether auditors from 'Big 
Eight' /'Big Six' audit firms are in a better position to issue going concern 
qualifications. 
5.3.4 Studies that examined the impact of hypothesis framing on the 
auditor's going concern judgment 
Hypothesis framing suggests that changes in the presentation or wording of 
a task can alter a person's reference point, thereby affecting the decision 
alternative selected. General studies in psychology on the effect of 
hypothesis framing have reported a tendency for subjects to adopt 
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confirmatory strategies. A confirmatory strategy can be defined as a 
tendency by subjects to preferentially solicit evidence which tends to 
confirm rather than disconfirm one's hypothesis (Asare 1990:53). 
The results of studies in auditing on the going concern issue provide weak 
support for a confirmatory strategy in hypothesis testing by experienced 
auditors (Asare 1990; Kida 1984; Trotman & Sng 1989). It should be 
noted, however, that the subjects of all three of these studies were audit 
partners and managers from internationali'Big Eight' /'Big Six' audit firms. 
In contrast, a study by O'Clock and Devine (1995) employed 47 subjects 
associated with a local or regional audit firm, 70 subjects associated with a 
large non-'Big Six' firm and 44 subjects associated with a 'Big Six' firm. 
The auditor subjects were asked to evaluate the going concern status of a 
client and to make a decision about whether the audit report should be 
modified. Continued bank financing was directly dependent on the client 
firm's ability to expand its customer base. One group of auditor subjects 
was told that there was a 30 percent chance that contract negotiations with 
a potential new customer would fail (negatively framed information), 
whereas the other group was told that there was a 70 percent chance that 
contract negotiations would be successfully completed (positively framed 
information). The results indicated that the auditor subjects from the 
local/regional firms and the large non-Big Six firm were susceptible to 
hypothesis framing. Consistent with the results of the three above-
mentioned studies, framing effects were not significant among the 'Big 
Six' auditor subjects. One possible explanation offered by O'Clock and 
Devine for this finding is that auditors from 'Big Six' firms may have been 
alerted to potential framing biases through their training programmes, 
which should lead to implementation of strategies and procedures to 
mitigate the effect thereof in the decision-making process. 
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5.3.5 Studies that examined the sequence in which the auditor 
evaluated the going concern evidence 
The sequence in which evidence is evaluated suggests that the order in 
which the auditor evaluates contrary information and mitigating factors 
affects his going concern judgment. General studies in psychology on the 
sequence in which evidence is evaluated have reported that a mixed 
sequence of complex evidence produces recency effects in evidence 
evaluation. Recency can be defined as implying 'that greater weight is 
given to confirming evidence when it is processed after disconfirming 
evidence rather than before' (Asare 1992:383). 
The results of studies conducted in auditing on the gomg concern Issue 
confirm that recency effects do occur in auditors' gomg concern 
judgments, namely that greater weight is given to mitigating factors when 
they are evaluated after contrary information rather than before (Asare 
1992; Asare 19903). The results of Asare's study (1992:390) indicated that 
the recency effect was also manifested in the auditors' opinion choice. 
Auditors who first evaluated contrary information followed by mitigating 
factors issued more unqualified opinions than those who did it in the 
reverse order. 
The findings of the above-mentioned studies have important practical and 
theoretical implications. The auditing statements, for example, recommend 
that auditors should first evaluate conditions (including any mitigating 
factors) that cast doubt on the client's continuity status, and then obtain 
information about management plans to mitigate those conditions. Several 
auditor subjects in Asare's study (1992:391) recalled audits for which they 
Asare (1990) refers to the results of a study by Messier, WF Jr in 1990, and which was 
presented as a working paper at the University of Florida. 
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had planned to issue a qualified audit report but changed their plans when 
the client obtained a new line of credit or waiver from a key creditor at the 
last minute. 
5.3.6 Summary of the behavioural studies that examined the auditor's 
ability to make a going concern judgment 
If one considers that auditors responsible for making gomg concern 
judgments are usually at partner or manager level, one may conclude that 
these auditors are experts. This section has indicated that expert auditors 
use a more scientific approach than novice auditors to acquire and integrate 
information in making professional judgments. Expert auditors are also 
better able to make professional judgments when confronted with 
semistructured and unstructured tasks, and compared to novice auditors, 
show more confidence in the judgments they make. 
The behavioural studies in this section have reported mixed results on the 
auditor's ability to make going concern judgments. Some studies found 
high levels of performance by expert auditors while others found low 
levels of performance. It was indicated that auditors performed well m 
gaining knowledge of going concern issues but performed poorly m 
evaluating those issues because evaluation is a reduction process that has 
been indicated as a cognitive process in which experts generally tend to 
perform poorly. 
It was also suggested that auditors perform poorly in evaluating gomg 
concern issues because they do not have good opportunities to acquire 
knowledge in evaluating going concern issues. This ties up with the 
statement made at the beginning of this chapter, namely that auditors are 
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incapable of making a gomg concern judgment because of their limited 
expenence in this issue as clients fail only in isolated and infrequent 
instances. One study suggested that the auditor's judgment performance 
could be improved by using a decision aid, say, a statistical model, by 
improving the training programmes of auditors and that going concern 
judgments should be assigned to auditors with the necessary experience. 
It was also indicated in this section that recency effects do occur in the 
auditor's going concern judgment, namely that greater weight is given to 
mitigating factors when they are evaluated after contrary information 
rather than before. The result is that auditors issue more unqualified 
opmwns. 
Because of the mixed results reported by these behavioural research 
studies, no conclusion can be drawn from the behavioural studies on 
whether the auditor does have the ability to make a going concern 
judgement. 
Asare (1990:55) draws the same conclusion: 
In sum, more behavioral research is needed to understand the 
decision processes of auditors making going-concern judgments, as 
well as to contribute to the debate on whether auditors are capable of 
evaluating their clients' going-concern status. 
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5.4 STUDIES THAT EMPLOYED EXPERT SYSTEMS TO EXAMINE 
THE AUDITOR'S ABILITY TO MAKE A GOING CONCERN 
JUDGMENT 
Expert systems can be described as 'computer programs that solve 
unstructured problems requiring domain-specific knowledge' (Asare 
1990:55). Boritz (1991:133) describes an expert system as one that 
permits 'rules of thumb (or heuristics) to be collected from experienced 
practitioners and statistical models, codified into computer processable 
logic expressions, often taking the form of IF ... THEN rules, and applied to 
particular client circumstances'. 
Research on expert systems is in an embryonic stage. A review of the 
literature indicated that three expert systems are currently being developed 
for the going concern decision, namely the GCX model, the AOD model 
and a rule-based prototype expert system developed at the University of 
Waterloo (Asare 1990:56; Boritz 1991:134; Messier & Hansen 1987:100). 
5.4.1 The GCX model 
The GCX model (Going Concern eXpert model) developed by Biggs, 
Selfridge and Krupka (1993) is a computational model that proposes that 
auditors possess and use three broad categories of client-based knowledge 
while making a going concern judgment, namely: 
* 
* 
* 
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Financial knowledge consisting of 
- financial measures 
- company finances 
Event knowledge consisting of 
- actual events4 
- normal events5 
• 6 
- company operations 
Procedural knowledge consisting of four reasomng processes that 
operate on the financial and event knowledge, namely 
- recognising going concern problems 
- casual reasoning about going concern problems 
- evaluative reasoning about plans to mitigate problems 
- rendering a going concern judgment 
From the development of the GCX model it became clear that auditors were 
intimately familiar with events that affected the client and that these 
events were critical to their going concern decision. 'Thus, it is proposed 
that client-based knowledge plays a critical role in auditor judgment and 
that research into auditor expertise that ignores this type of knowledge is 
incomplete' (Biggs et al 1993:86). 
4 
6 
Auditors possess knowledge of actual events occurring in the client's environment and 
understand how those events affect the client's business. 
Auditors know the normal pattern of events involved with the operating and financing activities 
of the client. 
Auditors understand the client's operations and are able to reason about the fmancial effects of 
the operations. 
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This ties up with the views of audit partners interviewed by Mutchler 
(1984:23), who indicated that they consider all the information needed to 
make a going concern decision to be found on the financial statements, 
except for information about forecasts and management performances 
which requires intimate knowledge about the client. 
Figure 5-1 illustrates the GCX model as a sequence of the four reasoning 
processes that operate on the financial and event knowledge and which the 
auditor uses to make the going concern judgment. 
The GCX model proposes that the first reasoning process is the recognition 
of a going concern problem, which involves knowledge of financial 
measures and the ability to reason with that knowledge. The second 
reasoning process is the casual reasoning about the going concern problem, 
which identifies events as the underlying causes of the recognised going 
concern problem. This process involves all five types of financial 
(financial measures, company finances) and event (actual events, normal 
events, company operations) knowledge. The third reasoning process is 
the evaluative reasoning about management plans to mitigate the going 
concern problem and requires information about business and 
environmental factors and involves future factors that are difficult to 
predict. The GCX model breaks down this process into two questions, 
namely is the plan executable and is the plan effective? The fourth 
reasoning process is the rendering of the going concern judgment, which 
may be either 'going' if the client has no going concern problems; or 'not 
going' if the client has problems and there are either no plans to mitigate 
them or the plans are judged to be ineffective; or 'going conditional on' if 
the client has problems and plans to mitigate them are judged to be 
effective. 
---- -
FIGURE 5-l 
THE GCX MODEL 
Recognize Going- Understand Cause Evaluate Render Going 
Concern Problems of Problems Mitigation Plans Concern Judgment 
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financial measures Infer direct cause Evaluate executability to financial 
Recognize out-of- Infer original cause Evaluate effectiveness measures 
range values 
i i i i 
Knowledge of Knowledge of financial measures, Knowledge of 
financial measures company finances and operations, and financial measures 
and standards actual and normal events and standards 
Source: Biggs et al (1993:87) 
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An evaluation of the GCX model indicates that the model's output closely 
parallels the output of the expert auditor and that it is a valuable research 
tool for understanding expert auditor judgment. 
5.4.2 The AOD model 
The AOD model (Audit Opinion Decision model) was developed by JF 
Dillard and JF Mutchler to assist the auditor in making going concern 
opinion judgments (As are 1990:56; Messier & Hansen 1987:1 00). The 
knowledge-based expert system was constructed from authoritative 
pronouncements and verbal protocols collected from audit experts. The 
AOD system is a network of frames, each representing a decision-action 
state through which the auditor is guided with suggestions, rules and 
methods for making the going concern judgment. Both Asare and Messier 
and Hansen state that the AOD model is currently being adapted for PC 
implementation but neither one of them refer to the performance of the 
AOD model or its testing. 
5.4.3 The prototype rule-based expert system 
Boritz (1991:134) refers to a prototype rule-based expert system that was 
developed at the University of Waterloo for assessing going concern 
problems. The prototype expert system was constructed from consultations 
with experienced auditors, a review of relevant academic and practitioner 
literature, as well as a review of professional standards. Some 200 rules 
were incorporated into the system and divided into six categories: 
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(1) debt structure and liquidity factors 
(2) operating factors 
(3) other financial indicators 
( 4) management 
(5) nonfinancial internal factors 
(6) external factors 
Figure 5-2 illustrates the rules for the prototype expert system. The rules 
were incorporated into the system by using a decision tree format for each 
one of the categories. Various questions are posed in the decision trees 
and lead to the accumulation of risk points. The auditor evaluates the 
accumulated risk points to determine the range in which the entity falls. A 
risk score (R) greater than 33 indicates a going concern problem, a score of 
8 to 33 indicates a going concern problem mitigated by other factors, and a 
score below 8 indicates no going concern problem. 
The system was subsequently tested on ten actual clients of a large 
auditing firm and in eight of the ten cases the output of the system 
paralleled the judgment of an expert auditor. 
5.4.4 Summary of studies that employed expert systems to examine 
the auditor's ability to make a going concern judgment 
Although there is limited information on expert systems, one may conclude 
that expert systems research provides an important avenue for 
understanding auditors' gomg concern judgments. Expert systems are an 
improvement on statistical models because they incorporate both 
quantitative and qualitative factors to examine what knowledge and 
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FIGURE 5-2 
RULES FOR PROTOTYPE GOING CONCERN EXPERT SYSTEM 
CATEGORIES 
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reasomng skills an expert auditor uses to make going concern judgments. 7 
An important qualitative factor identified by the expert systems that the 
auditor uses in making going concern judgments, is the auditor's intimate 
knowledge of the client's affairs. 
A limitation of expert systems that should be noted, however, is that the 
system is only as effective as the person/people who designs/design it, the 
experts upon which the system is built, and the auditor who uses it (Boritz 
1991:135; Choo 1989:107). Expert systems should thus not replace the 
auditor's professional judgment but should rather be used by the auditor as 
a decision-making aid in going concern judgments. Messier and Hansen 
(1987:95) draw the same conclusion: 
Expert systems are computer programs that solve complex problems 
that require some type of expertise. Expert systems in auditing are 
intended to support, not replace, the auditor. As such, we classify 
them as a type of decision aid. 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has reviewed empirical research studies, consisting of studies 
employing statistical models, behavioural studies and studies employing 
expert systems, that have been conducted to establish whether or not the 
auditor has the ability to make going concern judgments. 
One of the limitations of statistical models is that qualitative factors are not easily 
incorporated into statistical models (see sec 5.2). 
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On the basis of the results employing statistical models and expert systems 
it appears as if auditors do have the ability to make going concern 
judgments. No definite conclusion can be drawn about whether auditors do 
or do not have the ability to make going concern judgments based on the 
results of the behavioural studies. However, one may conclude that both 
statistical models and expert systems may be valuable decision-making aids 
for the auditor in objective going concern judgments and should be 
employed as such. They should not replace the auditor's professional 
judgment. 
CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The problem examined in this study involves auditors' failure to issue the 
appropriate opinion in the audit report on the going concern assumption 
underlying the financial statements. The failure to issue the appropriate 
opinion in the audit report can be classified as one of the following 
mistakes made by auditors in exercising their professional judgment about 
the validity of the going concern assumption: 
(1) The misclassification of a nongoing concern as a going concern. 
(2) The misclassification of a going concern as a nongoing concern. 
The following hypotheses were formulated in chapter 1 in search for the 
underlying causes why auditors fail to make the appropriate professional 
judgment about the validity of the going concern assumption underlying 
the financial statements: 
186 
(1) The professional auditing standards do not provide sufficient guidance 
to auditors to make a going concern judgment. 
(2) Auditors do not qualify when there is uncertainty about the validity of 
the going concern assumption because of the possible consequences of 
the qualification. 
(3) Auditors do not have the ability to make a professional judgment 
about the continued existence of an entity as a going concern. 
The objective of this chapter is to summanse the results of this research 
addressing the problem and hypotheses formulated, draw conclusions and 
make recommendations from the results, and also suggest future extensions 
of this research. 
6.2 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY 
As originally discussed in chapter 1, the overall purpose of this study is to 
establish 
(1) whether auditors in South Africa also fail to issue the appropriate 
audit opinion on the going concern assumption underlying the 
preparation of financial statements 
(2) the reasons for auditors' failure to issue the appropriate audit opinion 
on the going concern assumption underlying the preparation of 
financial statements 
Five research objectives were formulated in chapter 1 and the following 
subsections include a summary of the research results pertaining to each 
research objective, with conclusions based on those results. 
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6.2.1 Research objective 1 
Research objective 1 was originally formulated in chapter 1 as follows: 
Determine whether the professional auditing standards provide sufficient 
guidance to auditors in the evaluation and reporting of the going concern 
assumption. 
In chapter 3 of this research, the professional auditing standards issued on 
the gomg concern assumption by the International Federation of 
Accountants, United States of America, United Kingdom, Canada and 
Australia were examined and compared with the South African auditing 
standard AU 294, Going concern (SAICA 1986) to determine if sufficient 
guidance is provided to auditors in the evaluation and reporting of the 
going concern assumption. In chapter 4, secondary data from empirical 
studies were examined to determine if auditors in public practice follow 
the guidelines set out by the auditing standards. 
6. 2.1.1 The approach followed in the evaluation of the going concern 
assumption 
The examination revealed that almost every current professional auditing 
standard reviewed states that it is the active duty of auditors to evaluate an 
entity's ability to continue as a going concern (see sec 3.4.1). The active 
approach requires auditors to pursue a specific line of enquiry invoking 
vigorous testing of the going concern assumption during the planning of 
the audit, the performance of the audit procedures and the evaluation of the 
results. Statement AU 294 (SAICA 1986) states that it is the active duty of 
the auditor during the planning and final review stage of the audit to 
consider the risk that the going concern may be inappropriately applied. 
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6.2.1.2 Using liquidation as a criterion to evaluate the going concern 
assumption 
The results of the literature review indicated that the liquidation date 
represents the final stage of the business failure process and is de facto 
evidence that the going concern assumption is invalid (see sec 2.5). At 
some time before this final stage the entity shows warning signs that it is 
approaching a state of severe financial distress, indicating that there is 
substantial to very substantial doubt about the going concern assumption. 
The examination of the professional auditing standards revealed that some 
of the auditing standards state specifically that they do not apply to an 
audit of financial statements based on the assumption of liquidation (see 
sec 2.3. 7). The significance of this is that at a point in time before 
liquidation, the entity may be a nongoing concern and should be evaluated 
as such by the auditor. 
6. 2.1. 3 The evaluation of indicators of going concern problems 
The examination revealed that all the auditing standards reviewed supply 
auditors with lists of indicators of going concern problems (see sec 3.4.2). 
The literature review indicated that auditors consider these indicators m 
the aggregate as well as the interaction between these indicators m 
identifying an entity as having going concern problems (see sec 4.2.2). 
Poor management has been cited in the literature as the initial cause of 
business failure (see sec 2.5 .2.1 & 4.2.1.3). Most of the auditing standards 
reviewed do list 'loss of key management without replacement' as an 
operating indicator of going concern problems but do not elaborate on it. 
The Australian standard provides examples of poor management attributes 
that could lead to going concern problems. 
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Two financial indicators, namely 'enter receivership' Uudicial management 
in South Africa) and 'enter reorganisation proceedings', have been 
identified as evidence that there is very substantial doubt about the going 
concern assumption (see sec 4.2.1.1). The auditing standards do not list 
these two criteria as indicators of going concern problems. 
The results indicated that the default status of an entity 1s the most 
important financial indicator of going concern problems (see sec 4.2.1.1). 
The default status involves the process of restructuring debt and the 
entity's inability to meet interest/loan payments, to repay/renew 
borrowings approaching maturity and management's negotiations with 
creditors to reverse the default. Recurring losses were also identified as an 
important financial indicator of going concern problems. These financial 
evidence indicators are listed by the auditing standards as indicators of 
going concern problems. 
Adverse key financial ratios are also listed by the auditing standards as 
indicators of going concern problems but do not provide any examples of 
such key ratios. The results indicated that financial ratios are historical 
information, which is not a determining factor that influences auditors' 
decision to issue or not to issue a going concern qualification (see sec 
4.3.1 ). The reason for this is that they have intimate knowledge of the 
client, which allows for judgments to be made about management 
performance and management restructuring. However, auditors use 
financial ratios to identify going concern problems and regard the 
following key ratios as being important in identifying such problems (see 
sec 4.2.1.2): 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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current assets/current liabilities (current ratio) 
quick assets/current liabilities (quick asset ratio) 
cash flow/total debt 
total debt/total assets 
net income/net sales 
A limitation of financial ratios that should be taken into account is the fact 
that they become less reliable as failure approaches because of the effect of 
creative accounting (see sec 2.5.2.1). 
6. 2.1. 4 Audit procedures that the auditor must perform in the evaluation 
of the going concern assumption 
The results of the examination revealed that some of the auditing standards 
that were reviewed provide examples of specific audit procedures that the 
auditor should perform in the evaluation of the going concern assumption 
(see sec 3.4.3). These auditing standards divide the specific audit 
procedures into two groups: 
(1) examples of audit procedures that may take on additional significance 
and/or should be extended or modified or it may be necessary to 
employ additional audit procedures, if indicators of going concern 
problems have been identified 
(2) examples of audit procedures to evaluate management's plans for 
future action to mitigate the going concern problem 
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The absence of such specific audit procedures has been identified in the 
literature as being one of the shortcomings of the auditing standards (see 
sec 3.2.1). Statement AU 294 (SAICA 1986) does not provide the auditor 
with any examples of audit procedures that should be performed in the 
evaluation of the going concern assumption. 
6. 2.1. 5 Evaluation of management's plans dealing with the going concern 
problem 
The results of the examination revealed that almost every auditing standard 
reviewed requires the auditor to evaluate management's plans for dealing 
with the adverse effects of the going concern problems (see sec 3.4.4). The 
auditing standards divide management's plans into four main areas, namely 
plans to dispose of assets, borrow money or restructure debt, reduce or 
delay expenditures and plans to increase ownership equity. Statement AU 
294 (SAICA 1986) mentions these main four areas only, while some of the 
auditing statements provide examples of each main area. 
The results of the literature review indicated that management's plans to 
borrow money or restructure debt are considered more important by 
auditors in public practice because the benefits derived from such plans 
realise most quickly (see sec 4.3.2). The results also indicated that if there 
is a low or moderate probability that management's plans will succeed, this 
creates substantial doubt in the auditors whether the entity is a going 
concern and influences their going concern decision. 
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6.2.1. 6 The evaluation of the going concern assumption for the 
foreseeable future 
The examination revealed that all the auditing standards reviewed require 
the auditor to evaluate information relating to the going concern 
assumption for the foreseeable future (see sec 2.3. 7). The foreseeable 
future represents a reasonable period of time beyond the balance sheet 
date. The required length of the foreseeable future period to be considered 
by the auditor varies for each auditing standard reviewed. The general 
norm seems to be that a minimum period to be considered by the auditor 
represents a period of at least one year beyond the date of the financial 
statements. 
The Australian auditing standard, AUS 708 (AARF 1996), requues the 
auditor to obtain audit evidence on the going concern assumption for a 
period of 12 months from the date of the auditor's current report to the 
expected date of the auditor's report for the next annual reporting period. 
According to AU 294 (SAICA 1986), the foreseeable future represents a 
period of one year after the balance sheet date or a minimum of six months 
following the date of the audit report, whichever is the later. Compared to 
AUS 708 (AARF 1996), it represents a period of approximately six months 
less that the South African auditor needs to consider. The results indicated 
that if the foreseeable future period as defined per AUS 708 (AARF 1996) 
is applied to the survey conducted in this study on South African 
companies, 54,5 percent of the companies fail within the foreseeable future 
period without having their audit reports qualified for going concern 
problems. This is compared to 18 percent applying the foreseeable future 
period of AU 294 (SAICA 1986). It can thus be concluded that the 
foreseeable future period defined by AU 294 (SAICA 1986) appears to be 
insufficient. It can also be concluded that the auditors in these cases did 
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not consider the events occurring later than the foreseeable future period, 
although AU 294 (SAICA 1986) specifically requires it. 
The reason proffered in the literature for the inclusion of a time frame is 
that it ensures that auditors deal only with existing conditions and that the 
audit is not a prediction of future conditions or events, thereby reducing 
the audit risk (see sec 2.3. 7 & 3.1). However, specifying a minimum or 
standard length for the foreseeable future period can be extremely risky, as 
this study indicated, because it could provide auditors with a scapegoat for 
their responsibilities not to consider events occurring later than the 
specified period. The United Kingdom auditing standard, SAS 130 
(ICAEW 1994), states that it is not possible to specify a minimum length 
for the foreseeable future because it would be artificial and arbitrary to do 
so, since in reality there is no cut-off point. Depending on certain factors 
the cut-off point may also be different for each entity. 
6. 2.1. 7 The reporting of the going concern assumption 
The examination of the auditing standards revealed that the auditor's 
responsibility to report on the going concern assumption depends on 
whether the assumption is appropriate, questionable or inappropriate (see 
sec 3 .5). The reporting requirements of AUS 708 (AARF 1996), ISA 570 
(IFAC 1995), SAS No 59 (AICPA 1988b) and SAS 130 (ICAEW 1994) are 
all quite in line. The reporting requirements of CICA Handbook Section 
5510 (CICA 1989) and AU 294 (SAICA 1986) differ from those of the 
above-mentioned auditing standards. However, the reporting requirements 
of SAAS 700, The auditor's report on financial statements (SAICA 
1997c), supersede those of AU 294 (SAICA 1986) and are compatible with 
the above-mentioned auditing standards. 
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The companson of the South African auditing standard with the auditing 
standards issued on the going concern by the International Federation of 
Accountants, United States of America, United Kingdom, Canada and 
Australia indicated the following two differences, which can be regarded as 
shortcomings in the reporting requirements of AU 294 (SAICA 1986) and 
which SAAS 700 (SAICA 1997c) does not address: 
(1) When consideration of mitigating factors and plans implemented by 
management have had a significant effect upon the auditor in forming 
the opinion that the going concern basis is appropriate, the auditor 
does not need to consider any disclosures in the financial statements. 
(2) The auditor has the option to issue an unqualified, qualified or 
adverse opinion if the going concern assumption is inappropriate. 
In reporting on the gomg concern assumption the auditor must make a 
decision whether there is 'substantial' or 'significant' uncertainty/doubt 
about the entity's ability to continue as a going concern. However, the 
results of the review indicated that the auditing standards associated with 
the going concern assumption do not define 'substantial' or 'significant' 
uncertainty/doubt (see sec 3.2.1 & 3.5.4). It is left to the discretion of the 
auditor to decide when a situation of 'substantial' or 'significant' doubt 
exists. The literature review indicated that there is an expectations gap 
between auditors and users of financial statements regarding the meaning 
of substantial doubt (see sec 3.2.1). There is thus a need for these terms to 
be quantified in the auditing statements in clear and concise language. AU 
294 (SAICA 1986) refrains from using the terms 'substantial' or 
'significant'. 
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6.2.2 Research objective 2 
Research objective 2 was originally formulated in chapter 1 as follows: 
Determine whether auditors in South Africa qualify the audit report for 
uncertainty about the going concern assumption and whether the issuance 
of Statement on Auditing Standards AU 294, Going concern (SAICA 1986) 
had any effect on the auditors' qualifying behaviour. 
In section 4.4.4 of this research, an empirical study of industrial companies 
whose listings were terminated on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
because of financial failure was conducted to determine if auditors in 
South Africa qualify the audit report for uncertainty about the going 
concern assumption. The audit opinion issued in the audit report for the 
latest available audited financial statements prior to liquidation was 
examined. 
It was found that in only 25 percent of the cases did the audit report 
indicate going concern problems. These results correspond with the results 
of studies performed in the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America and provide further compelling evidence that auditors fail to 
qualify the audit report for going concern uncertainties. 
To determine if the issuance of Statement on Auditing Standards AU 294, 
Going concern (SAICA 1986) had any effect on the auditor's qualifying 
behaviour, the group of industrial companies was split into a pre-AU 294 
and a post-AU 294 group. The results indicated that auditors were more 
likely to issue going concern modified audit reports for bankrupt 
companies prior to the failure in the pre-AU 294 period than in the post-
AU 294 period. For the pre-AU 294 group the audit report indicated going 
concern problems in 55,6 percent of the cases. None of the audit reports of 
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the post-AU 294 group was modified for going concern problems. 
To find a rationale for this, the foreseeable future period for the post-AU 
294 group was also analysed. The provisional liquidation date was taken 
as the date of failure and compared with the foreseeable future period to 
determine if the company failed within the definition of the foreseeable 
future period as per AU 294 (SAICA 1986). The results indicated that 82 
percent of the post-AU 294 group did not fail within the foreseeable future 
period. It can thus be concluded that the auditors of these companies acted 
within the parameters set by AU 294 (SAICA 1986) regarding the 
foreseeable future period. 1 However, AU 294 (SAICA 1986) also requires 
the auditor to take account of events that will or are likely to occur later 
than the foreseeable future period. The results indicated that 73 percent of 
the post-AU 294 group failed within 10 months after the foreseeable future 
period, and were not taken into account by the auditors. 
It can thus be concluded that auditors in South Africa fail to qualify the 
audit report for uncertainty about the going concern assumption and that 
the issuance of AU 294 (SAICA 1986) did have an effect on the auditor's 
qualifying behaviour, but not in the direction one would have expected. 
A limitation of the study that should be taken into account is the fact that 
the provisional liquidation date, which is de facto evidence that the going 
concern assumption is invalid, was used to determine whether the 
companies failed within the foreseeable future period. Research has shown 
that at some time before this date the company shows warning signs that it 
is approaching a state of severe financial distress. Therefore stating that 
the auditor was correct in 82 percent of the cases for not qualifying the 
The parameters set for the foreseeable future period by AU 294 have been shown to provide 
insufficient guidance to auditors (see sec 6.2.1.6). 
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audit report for going concern problems because the companies did not fail 
within the foreseeable future period, could be misleading. 
6.2.3 Research objective 3 
Research objective 3 was originally formulated in chapter 1 as follows: 
Determine whether the going concern qualification issued by auditors 
contributes to their clients' problems and the ultimate downfall of the 
company, resulting in a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
In section 4.5.1, secondary data from empirical research studies were 
examined to determine whether the going concern qualification issued by 
auditors contributes to their clients' problems and the ultimate downfall of 
the company, resulting in a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
The results indicated that there is a perception among some auditors that a 
going concern qualification is a self-fulfilling prophecy by either causing 
or contributing to the gomg concern problems of a client. It was also 
indicated that some users of financial statements attach so much 
importance to going concern qualifications in audit reports that the self-
fulfilling prophecy is supported. 
It can thus be concluded that the auditor is hesitant to issue a going 
concern qualification because of the self-fulfilling prophecy. However, the 
results of empirical studies that examined the subsequent status of 
companies that have received a going concern qualification could find no 
support for the self-fulfilling prophecy. 
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6.2.4 Research objective 4 
Research objective 4 was originally formulated in chapter 1 as follows: 
Determine whether the going concern qualification issued by auditors IS 
associated with the loss of the client, resulting in auditor switching. 
In section 4.5 .2, secondary data from empirical research studies were 
examined to determine whether the going concern qualification issued by 
the auditor is associated with the loss of the client, resulting in auditor 
switching. 
Inconsistent results were obtained from studies examining the relationship 
between qualified audit opinions and auditor switching and studies 
examining unqualified audit opinions and auditor switching. It was also 
indicated that failing companies do have a greater tendency to switch 
auditors than healthier companies, not necessarily because of going 
concern qualifications but for other reasons. However, there are some 
reported results of auditor switching after the issuance of going concern 
qualifications, although these represent a relatively small percentage. 
Therefore on the basis of these results, no conclusion can be made whether 
a going concern qualification is associated with auditor switching. 
6.2.5 Research objective 5 
Research objective 5 was originally formulated in chapter 1 as follows: 
Determine whether auditors do have the ability to make professional going 
concern judgments. 
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In chapter 5, secondary data from empirical research studies were 
examined to determine whether the auditor does have the ability to make a 
professional going concern judgment. 
6. 2. 5.1 Studies that employed statistical models to examine the auditor's 
ability to make a going concern judgment 
The results of vanous empirical research studies have indicated that 
statistical models are better indicators of financial failure than auditors' 
gomg concern opinions issued in the audit reports (see table 5-l). The 
results of the literature review, however, have indicated that there are 
significant limitations to and problems in the use of statistical models that 
make the comparison between failure prediction using statistical models 
and going concern opinions issued by auditors, questionable (see sec 
5.2.1). Studies that were conducted to address the limitations and 
problems could find no evidence that the auditor is inferior to the model. 
The auditor's ability to make a going concern judgment may thus be 
understated by statistical models predicting bankruptcy. 
On the basis of these results employing statistical models, it can be 
concluded that auditors' going concern opinions are not inferior to 
statistical models and therefore that auditors' failure to issue the 
appropriate opinion on the going concern assumption, is not because they 
do not have the ability to make going concern judgments. 
However, it has been indicated in this study that statistical models do have 
certain advantages and uses for the auditor and may be used as a valuable 
audit tool to make objective going concern judgments, but that such models 
should be supplementary and not replace the auditor's professional 
judgment. Use of statistical models would also eliminate the auditor's 
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evaluation problem identified in the next section, namely that evaluation 
allows for statistical reasoning that has been indicated as a cognitive 
process in which experts tend to perform poorly (see sec 6.2.5.2). 
6. 2. 5. 2 Behavioural studies that examined the auditor's ability to make a 
going concern judgment 
The examination of the behavioural studies revealed mixed results on the 
auditor's ability to make going concern judgments (see sec 5.3). It was 
indicated that auditors performed well in gaining knowledge of going 
concern issues but performed poorly in evaluating such issues. The reason 
for this is that evaluation is a reduction process and allows for statistical 
reasoning that involves cognitive processes in which experts generally tend 
to perform poorly. It was also indicated that a strong relationship exists 
between learning environment and performance. This is another reason 
why auditors perform poorly in evaluating going concern issues on account 
of their limited experience in this issue because clients do not fail on a 
day-to-day basis but only in isolated and infrequent instances. 
The results also indicated that recency effects do occur m the auditor's 
going concern judgment, namely that greater weight is attached to 
mitigating factors when they are evaluated after rather than before contrary 
information. The significance of this is that it is possible that auditors 
could issue more unqualified opmwns. The auditing statements also 
require the auditor to consider mitigating factors, m particular 
management's plans for future action, the outcome of which is expected to 
improve the situation, as the last step in the going concern decision-
making process just before forming the audit opinion. 
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Because of the mixed results reported by the behavioural research studies, 
no conclusion can be drawn on whether the auditor does have the ability to 
make a going concern judgement. However, it does appear as if auditors 
do lack experience in evaluating going concern issues, as clients do not fail 
every day. 
6. 2. 5. 3 Studies that employed expert systems to examine the auditor's 
ability to make a going concern judgment 
The results of the review indicated that there IS limited information 
available on expert systems because research m this area is in an 
embryonic stage (see sec 5.4). Three expert systems were identified, two 
of which were tested. The results of the systems tested revealed that it 
paralleled the judgment of an expert auditor. 
The examination also revealed that expert systems are an improvement on 
statistical models because they incorporate both quantitative and 
qualitative factors to examine what knowledge and reasoning skills an 
expert auditor uses to make going concern judgments. One important 
qualitative factor, identified by the expert systems, that auditors use m 
making going concern judgments, is their intimate knowledge of the 
client's affairs which is not incorporated into statistical models. 
A limitation of expert systems that should be noted, however, is that the 
system is only as effective as the person/people who designs/design it, the 
experts upon which the system is built, and the auditor who uses it. 
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6.3 CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the results of this study, it can be concluded that auditors 
in South Africa fail to issue the appropriate audit opinion on the going 
concern assumption underlying the financial statements (see sec 6.2.2). 
The results of this study thus provide further compelling evidence that 
correspond with the results of studies performed in the United Kingdom 
and the United States of America, namely that auditors fail to issue the 
appropriate audit opinion on the going concern assumption underlying the 
financial statements. 
The conclusions related to the hypotheses formulated in search for the 
reasons why auditors fail to issue the appropriate audit opinion on the 
going concern assumption are as follows: 
(1) The professional auditing standards reviewed in this study do provide 
guidance to auditors in the evaluation and reporting of the going 
concern assumption underlying the financial statements (see sec 
6.2.1). However, it can be concluded that there are certain 
shortcomings in the guidance provided by the auditing standards (see 
sees 6.2.1.1 - 6.2.1. 7), which could be a reason why auditors fail to 
issue the appropriate opinion on the going concern assumption. Hence, 
there appears to be some support for the first hypothesis formulated, 
namely that the professional auditing standards do not provide 
sufficient guidance to auditors to make a going concern judgment. 
(2) The results indicated that auditors are hesitant to issue going concern 
qualifications because they believe that this could result in a self-
fulfilling prophecy (see sec 6.2.3). These results thus support the 
second hypothesis formulated, namely that auditors do not issue going 
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concern qualifications because of the possible consequences thereof. 
However, no conclusion can be drawn whether a going concern 
qualification results in auditor switching because inconsistent results 
were obtained from the examination (see sec 6.2.4). 
(3) The third hypothesis formulated, namely that auditors do not have the 
ability to make a professional going concern judgment can be rejected 
on the basis of the results employing statistical models and the results 
employing expert systems. These results indicated that the expert 
systems paralleled the going concern judgment of expert auditors and 
that the auditors' going concern opinions are not inferior to statistical 
models (see sees 6.2.5.1 & 6.2.5 .3). However, on the basis of the 
results obtained from the behavioural research studies, the hypothesis 
can be partly accepted and partly rejected because the results 
indicated that auditors performed well in gaining knowledge of going 
concern problems but performed poorly in evaluating them (see sec 
6.2.5.2). Evaluation entails cognitive processes in which experts tend 
to perform poorly and because auditors lack experience in evaluating 
going concern issues due to clients failing only in isolated and 
infrequent instances. 
6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Three types of recommendations emerged from this study. The first group 
contains recommendations aimed at improving the guidance provided by 
the South African auditing standard AU 294, Going concern (SAICA 
1986). The aim of the second group of recommendations is to make 
auditors in public practice aware of certain research results that can 
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Improve their evaluation and reporting of the gomg concern assumption. 
The third group suggests areas for further research. 
6.4.1 Recommendations pertaining to the South African auditing 
standard AU 294, Going concern 
It is recommended that AU 294 (SAICA 1986) should be revised on the 
following matters: 
(1) AU 294 (SAICA 1986) should adopt a more definite active approach 
throughout the entire audit, namely during the planning, performance 
of audit procedures and final review stages. The wording used in 
paragraph 7, namely "consider the risk" should be replaced with more 
descriptive wording indicating an active action, namely "evaluating 
the risk" or "assessing the risk" that the going concern assumption 
underlying the financial statements may be inappropriately applied. 
The wording used in paragraph 8, namely the auditor should "be 
aware" that certain factors may indicate doubt about an entity's ability 
to continue as a going concern should also be replaced with more 
descriptive wording indicating an active action, namely the auditor 
should "identify" such factors that may indicate doubt. 
(2) AU 294 (SAICA 1986) should be revised to specifically exclude the 
liquidation basis. The following paragraph serves as an example 
(AICPA 1988b): 'This section [auditing statement] does not apply to 
an audit of financial statements based on the assumption of liquidation 
(for example, when [a] an entity is in the process of liquidation, [b] 
the owners have decided to commence dissolution or liquidation, or 
[c] legal proceedings, including bankruptcy, have reached a point at 
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which dissolution or liquidation is probable)'. The inclusion of such a 
paragraph will result in the auditor having to determine whether it is a 
going concern or not, prior to the entity going into liquidation. 
(3) The list of indicators of going concern problems provided in AU 294 
(SAICA 1986) should be expanded to include, say, the following poor 
management attributes that could be indicators of going concern 
problems (AARF 1996): 
(a) a lack of strategic direction including appropriately documented 
policies, plans and forecasts such as forward budgets and cash 
flow projections 
(b) deficiencies in the governing body, such as a lack of independent 
members, a low level of involvement in key decisions, poor 
documentation and communication of decisions, imbalance or a 
lack of expertise among members 
(c) deficiencies m management information systems, including 
blockages in information flows, or lack of management action in 
response to information received 
(d) rapid or unplanned development of business (particularly m 
noncore activities) without commensurate developments m 
information systems, management expertise, financing structures, 
pricing policies, et cetera 
It is also recommended that the list of indicators of going concern 
problems in AU 294 (SAICA 1986) should be expanded to include the 
following two financial indicators: 
(a) enter judicial management 
(b) enter reorganisation proceeding 
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(4) AU 294 (SAICA 1986) should be revised to include specific examples 
of audit procedures that should be performed in the evaluation of the 
going concern assumption. AUS 708 (AARF 1996) provides detailed 
examples of such audit procedures that could be considered for 
inclusion (see sees 3.4.3 & 3.4.4). 
(5) AU 294 (SAICA 1986) should be revised to include more detailed 
examples of management's plans under each main area. AUS 708 
(AARF 1996) provides detailed examples of such plans that could be 
considered for inclusion (see sec 3.4.4). 
(6) It is recommended that the foreseeable future period to which the 
auditor should pay attention in assessing the going concern 
assumption, as defined in AU 294 (SAICA 1986), should be revised 
and that due consideration should be given before specifying a 
minimum or standard length for this period. The foreseeable future 
period as defined by AUS 708 (AARF 1996) could be used as a 
guideline, namely a period of approximately 12 months from the date 
of the auditor's current report to the expected date of the auditor's 
report for the next annual reporting period. More emphasis should 
also be placed on the fact that auditors should also take account of 
events occurring shortly after the foreseeable period. 
(7) It is recommended that AU 294 (SAICA 1986) should be revised in 
order to be in line with the reporting requirements of SAAS 700 
(SAICA 1997c). The following two aspects of the auditor's reporting 
responsibility also need to be revised: 
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(a) If the going concern uncertainty is resolved because of mitigating 
factors, in particular management's plans, the auditor should 
consider the need for disclosure of such matters if it had a 
significant effect upon him or her in forming his or her opinion 
that the going concern assumption is appropriate. If the necessary 
disclosures are not made, the auditor should express a qualified 
opinion, 'except for' or express an adverse opinion. 
(b) If the auditor concludes that the going concern assumption used in 
the preparation of the financial statements is inappropriate, he or 
she should express an adverse opinion. 
(8) Although AU 294 (SAICA 1986) does not refer to the terms, 
'substantial' or 'significant' doubt at this stage, it is recommended 
that if these terms should be used in a revised auditing statement on 
the going concern assumption, they should be quantified in clear and 
concise language. 
6.4.2 Recommendations pertaining to the auditor in public practice 
It is recommended that auditors in public practice should be made aware of 
the results of empirical studies indicating that the majority of companies 
that received going concern qualifications did not subsequently fail, and 
therefore that this should not be a factor influencing the auditor's decision 
to issue a going concern qualification. 
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It is recommended that the auditor in public practice should make use of 
statistical models and/or expert systems as audit tools, to aid in making an 
objective evaluation of the going concern assumption. However, these 
audit tools should be supplementary and should not replace the auditor's 
professional judgment. 
It is recommended that the auditor in public practice should follow formal 
training programmes to compensate for the lack in experience in evaluating 
going concern problems or that the services of an auditor, who is an expert 
in this area, should be acquired if a client experiences going concern 
problems. 
It 1s recommended that the South African Institute of Chartered 
Accountants should encourage and assist auditors in public practice m 
becoming informed about the above-mentioned recommendations to 
support the professional judgment process regarding the going concern 
assumption. 
6.4.3 Recommendations pertaining to future extensions of this 
research 
Research opportunities that can make a useful contribution to the area of 
the going concern assumption are virtually unlimited. The South African 
auditor's responsibility regarding the going concern assumption in 
particular is a fertile field for empirical research. 
The following are a few of the points ansmg from this study that can be 
highlighted: 
* 
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Statement AU 294, Going concern (SAICA 1986), still needs to be 
revised to be compatible with the International Standards on auditing. 
Future research could be directed at the revised auditing statement on 
going concern to determine if the shortcomings identified in this study 
were addressed and if it provides sufficient guidance to auditors. 
* Research could be conducted to determine whether auditors in South 
Africa follow an active approach in evaluating the going concern 
assumption, and whether they use specific audit procedures or rely on 
their normal audit procedures to assess the going concern status of 
their clients. 
* 
* 
* 
Research could be conducted on the audit opinion issued to bankrupt 
companies in the period after the issuance of the guideline on 
corporate governance, Guidance for directors: going concern and 
financial reporting (SAICA 1997b ). Research could determine 
whether the directors' increased responsibility to assess the going 
concern status of the company has any effect on the auditor's 
qualifying behaviour. 
The empirical research in section 4.4.4 was confined to bankrupt 
companies delisted on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). Future 
research could examine financially stressed nonbankrupt companies in 
South Africa to determine the type of audit opinion issued by the 
auditor. 
The empirical research in section 4.4.4 dealt with the gomg concern 
status of industrial companies listed on the JSE. Future extensions of 
this research could include other sectors of the market or small 
companies not listed on the JSE. 
* 
* 
* 
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The empirical research in section 4.4.4 examined the occurrence of a 
Type I error, the classification of a nongoing concern as a going 
concern. There is a need for research in South Africa to examine the 
occurrence of Type II errors, the classification of a going concern as a 
nongoing concern. 
Further research needs to be done on whether a gomg concern 
qualification is associated with the loss of the client, resulting in 
auditor switching. 
A major area for future research concerns expert systems to examme 
the auditor's going concern judgment. As indicated in section 5.4, 
limited information is available on expert systems because research in 
this area is in an embryonic stage. 
6.5 General conclusion 
The author hopes, firstly, that the recommendations arising from this study 
will make a useful contribution, no matter how small, to improving 
auditors' evaluation and reporting of the going concern assumption 
underlying financial statements; and secondly, that others will be inspired 
to conduct further research in this pertinent field of study. 
APPENDIX A 
SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANIES WHOSE LISTINGS 
WERE TERMINATED ON THE JOHANNESBURG STOCK 
EXCHANGE OWING TO FINANCIAL FAILURE 
As discussed in section 4.4.4 of chapter 4, the last annual reports issued 
before financial failure, of 20 South African companies were reviewed to 
determine if the audit reports were qualified for going concern 
uncertainties. The survey was confined to industrial companies that were 
delisted on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) between January 1981 
and May 1991, comprising a five year period before and a five year period 
after the issuance of AU 294 (SAICA 1986) in September 1986. 
A list of 25 industrial companies whose listings were terminated on the 
JSE between 1981 and 1991 was supplied by the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange. They are listed in tabular form in this appendix to determine if 
the audit report was qualified for uncertainty about the going concern 
assumption (see table A-1). The sample included in the survey was 
narrowed down to 20 companies as four companies were delisted for 
reasons other than financial failure and one company's financial statements 
could not be located. 
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Explanation of terms used in table A-1: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
The date terminated column refers to the date the company's listing 
was terminated on the JSE. 
The date of last available audited AFS column refers to the last 
audited annual financial statements that could be located for the 
specific company before liquidation. 
An indication of NQ in the audit opinion column means the auditor 
did not qualify his opinion for going concern problems. 
An indication of Q in the audit opinion column means the auditor 
qualified his opinion because of going concern problems. 
The period before failure column indicates whether the auditor's 
opinion issued was rendered within a period of 12 months before 
failure or within a period of 24 months before failure. Failure in this 
survey is regarded as the date of the provisional liquidation, which is 
normally between two and three months before the date of the final 
liquidation. If the dates of the provisional or final liquidations were 
not available, the date of the termination of the company on the JSE 
was taken as the date of failure. 
The South African auditing standard, AU 294 Going concern (SAICA 
1986:04), places a responsibility on the auditor to evaluate information 
relating to a minimum of six months following the date of the audit report 
or one year after the balance sheet date, whichever is the later. This period 
represents the foreseeable future. However, AU 294 states that the auditor 
should also take account of events, which will or are likely to occur later 
than the foreseeable future period. Table A-2 lists the companies included 
in the sample, whose audit reports were issued in the post-AU 294 period, 
to determine if they have failed within the foreseeable future period that 
the auditor needs to consider. 
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Explanation of terms used in table A-2: 
* The balance sheet date column refers to the date of the last audited 
financial statements that could be located for the specific company 
before liquidation. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
The audit report date column refers to the date on which the auditor 
signed the audit report included in the last audited financial 
statements. 
The foreseeable future column refers to the defined period as stated in 
AU 294 (SAICA 1986), which is the later of one year after the balance 
sheet date or six months following the date of the audit report. The 
later of the two dates is marked with an (*). 
The failed within FF column compares the later date of the 
foreseeable future column and the date of the provisional liquidation 
of the company (see table A-1, included/not included column). The 
provisional liquidation date is taken as the failure date. If only the 
final liquidation date was available, the provisional liquidation date 
was taken as two months before the final liquidation date. An 
indication of No in this column means that the company did not fail 
within the defined foreseeable future period. An indication of Yes in 
this column means that the company did fail within the defined 
foreseeable future period. 
The period beyond FF column refers to the number of months and 
days beyond the foreseeable future period until the failure date, which 
is the provisional liquidation date. 
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TABLEA-1 
TERMINATION OF LISTINGS OF INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES ON THE JSE OWING 
TO FINANCIAL FAILURE FROM JANUARY 1981 TO MAY 1991 
Company Date Included/ Date oflast Audit Period 
terminated not included available .. before opmwn 
auditedAFS failure 
Amalgamated 06/08/85 Not included. - - -
Medical Delisted due to a 
Services scheme of 
arrangement. 
Arontex Hldgs 29/01/91 Included. 28/02/89 NQ 24months 
Ltd Provisional liquidation 
20/03/90. 
Final liquidation 
9/05/90. 
Brohold Ltd 07/10/85 Included. 29/02/84 NQ 24months 
In liquidation. 
Bromain Hldgs 07/10/85 Included. 29/02/84 NQ 24 months 
Ltd In liquidation. 
Central Data 28/11/89 Included. 31/07/88 NQ 24months 
Systems Provisional liquidation 
26/10/89. 
Final liquidation 
23/01/90. 
Channel Mining 16/04/91 Included. 30/06/89 NQ 24months 
Inv In liquidation. 
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Frasers 29/06/90 Not included. - - -
Consolidated Delisted owing to 
Ltd restructuring. 
GBS Hldgs Ltd 19/09/89 Included. 30/06/88 NQ 12 months 
Final liquidation 
15/08/89. 
Greenfield Prop 19/02/91 Included. 30/06/89 NQ 24 months 
Hldgs Provisional liquidation 
4/12/90. 
Final liquidation 
12/02/91. 
Hanhill lnd Ltd 13/02/85 Included. 31/12/83 Q 24 months 
Provisional liquidation 
13/08/85. 
Final liquidation 
1/10/85. 
Hepworths Ltd 28/10/85 Included. 28/02/85 Q 12 months 
In liquidation. 
Hugh Parker 09/12/83 Not included. - - -
Delisted owing to 
restructuring. 
National 31/07/85 Included. 31/12/84 Q 12 months 
Acceptances Provisional liquidation 
Ltd 16/08/85. 
Quality Tyres 27/02/90 Included. 29/02/88 NQ 24months 
Ltd Provisional liquidation 
8/12/89. 
Final liquidation 
9/01/90. 
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SA Selected 09/12/83 Included. 28/02/82 Q 24months 
Hldgs Provisional liquidation 
29/11/83. 
Scopeind 12/03/86 Included. 30/06/85 NQ 12 months 
Hldgs Ltd Provisional liquidation 
13/02/86. 
Final liquidation 
15/04/86. 
Spectrum Ind 15/01/91 Included. 31112/88 NQ 24 months 
Ltd Provisional liquidation 
27/06/90. 
Supertrans 19/02/91 Included. 30/06/88 NQ 24months 
Hldgs Ltd Provisional liquidation 
4112/90. 
Final liquidation 
22/01/91. 
TDHHldgs 11112/85 Included. 31/12/84 NQ 12 months 
In liquidation. 
Thruput Ltd 06/02/90 Included. 28/02/89 NQI 12 months 
Final liquidation 
12112/89. 
Triten 19/01/84 Not included. No annual - -
Provisional liquidation financial 
14/06/82. statements 
Final liquidation could be 
7/09/82. located. 
1 The auditor's report was qualified for the effect of any adjustments in the event of the 
company having carried out a physical stock take. No mention of going concern problems. 
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Turf Hldgs Ltd 14/06/88 Included. 30/06/86 Q 24 months 
Provisional liquidation 
26/02/88. 
Final liquidation 
17/05/88. 
Wills grove 29/03/85 Not included. - - -
Brick & Obtained listing on 
Potteries Ltd Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange. 
World of 29/05/90 Included. 29/02/88 NQ 24months 
Leisure Hldgs Provisional liquidation 
21/11/89. 
Final liquidation 
20/03/90. 
World ofMusic 16/04/91 Included. 28/02/89 NQ 24 months 
Hldgs Final liquidation 
7/02/91. 
Q - Qualification because of going concern problems 
NQ -No mention of going concern problems 
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TABLEA-2 
DETERMINATION OF THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE PERIOD FOR 
THE COMPANIES FAILING IN THE POST -AU 294 PERIOD 
Company Balance Audit Foreseeable future Failed Period 
sheet date report date within beyond 
One year Six FIF FIF 
after B/S months 
date following 
AIR date 
Arontex Hldgs 28/02/89 30/06/89 28/02/90 31/12/89 No 20 days 
Ltd * 
Central Data 31/07/88 20/10/88 31/07/89 20/04/89 No 2mos 
Systems * 26 days 
Channel Mining 30/06/89 24/11/89 30/06/90 24/05/90 No2 9mos 
Inv * 16 days 
GBS Hldgs 30/06/88 23/09/88 30/06/89 23/03/89 Yes -
Ltd * 
Greenfield Prop 30/06/89 27/09/89 30/06/90 27/03/90 No 5mos 
Hldgs * 4 days 
Quality Tyres 29/02/88 26/04/88 28/02/89 26/10/88 No 9mos 
Ltd * 8 days 
The final or provisional liquidation dates were not available. The date of the termination of the 
company's listing was taken as the date of failure. 
219 
Spectrum Ind 31/12/88 12/06/89 31/12/89 12/12/89 No 5mos 
Ltd * 27 days 
Supertrans 30/06/88 06/09/88 30/06/89 06/03/89 No 17mos 
Hldgs Ltd * 4 days 
Thruput Ltd 28/02/89 09/06/89 28/02/90 09/12/89 Yes -
* 
World of 29/02/88 30/05/88 28/02/89 30/11/88 No 8mos 
Leisure Hldgs * 21 days 
World ofMusic 28/02/89 06/10/89 28/02/90 06/04/90 No 8mos 
Hldgs * 7 days 
APPENDIX B 
A SUMMARY OF THE MAIN FINDINGS BETWEEN THE 
DIFFERENCES IN KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURING AND 
DECISION MAKING OF EXPERT VERSUS NOVICE 
AUDITORS 
As discussed in section 5.3.1 of chapter 5, Choo (1989:115-117) reviewed 
research studies that examined the differences in knowledge structures 
used by expert and novice auditors in making professional judgments and 
the differences in judgment competence between these auditors. 
The findings of this review are subdivided into: 
* 
* 
* 
information-acquisition behaviour (see table B-1) 
information-integration behaviour (see table B-2) 
decision performance (see table B-3) 
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TABLEB-1 
INFORMATION-ACQUISITION BEHAVIOUR 
Expert auditor Novice auditor 
* Relies on hypotheses, rules of * Relies on a simple, passive, 
thumb, structured checklists, or undirected, sequential information 
standard lists of questions to guide search. 
information search. 
* Builds an overall picture, or * Lacking among novices. 
develops a "feeling" for the task 
based on prior knowledge. 
* Searches for contradictory evidence * Ignores contradictory evidence. 
and consistently focuses on potential 
contradictions. 
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TABLEB-2 
INFORMATION-INTEGRATION BEHAVIOUR 
Expert auditor Novice auditor 
* Integrates both supporting and * Integrates supporting evidence only 
contradicting evidence to zero in on and ignores contradictory evidence. 
underlying problems. 
* Organises the wide-ranging * Unable to handle the wide-ranging 
incoming information into large incoming information, thus forced 
chunks of information. to organise into smaller chunks. 
* Responds to the deeper features of * Responds to the surface features of 
information as a result of well- information as a result of less well-
developed schemas. developed schemas. 
* Recalls more information (cues). * Recalls less information (cues). 
* Clusters the wide-ranging incoming * Lacking among novices. 
information into proper categories. 
* Verbalises more (number ofwords) * V erbalises less in processing 
in processing information. information. 
* Engages in less information- * Engages in more information-
processing time. processing time. 
* Exhibits mixed evidence of * Exhibits mixed evidence of 
interactive cue processing. interactive cue processing. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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TABLEB-3 
DECISION PERFORMANCE 
Expert auditor Novice auditor 
Shows different frequency * Shows different frequency 
distributions (shapes) of decisions distributions (shapes) of decisions 
from novices. from experts. 
Shows higher level of confidence in * Shows lower level of confidence in 
predictions/ decisions. predictions/ decisions. 
Decisions are not affected by * Decline in decision performance in 
verbalisation (protocol analysis). verbalisation. 
Judgments are more likely to suffer * Judgments are less likely to suffer 
from "conjunctive fallacy" .1 from "conjunctive fallacy". 
Judgments differ significantly from * Judgments are the same as those of 
novices in unstructured and the experts in structured tasks. 
semistructured tasks. 
Mean predictions are not * Mean predictions are not 
significantly different from novices. significantly different from those of 
the experts. 
Shows mixed evidence on judgment * Shows mixed evidence on 
consensus. judgment consensus. 
Adding a common feature to a pair of stimuli produces an increase in the judged similarity between the 
pair, whereas adding a distinctive feature to either member of the pair decreases judged similarity. The 
resultant judgment is said to have suffered from a "conjunctive fallacy". (Choo 1989:113.) 
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